


JPRS 75000

24 January 1980

West Europe Report

No. 1532



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BRIEFS

SANGUINETTI HITS DEFENSE INADEQUACIES--[Editorial Report LD] Paris FRANCE-SOIR in French 3 January 1980 carries on page 2 a 1,700-word article by former national assembly defense committee aid Alexandre Sanguinetti in which he criticizes Europe's attitude toward defense, maintaining that the real danger stems from Europe's own internal weakness. Sanguinetti criticizes Europe for relying on U.S. protection, pointing out that "if American weapons were one day to be removed 'Europe' will be unarmed in face of the Soviets." He describes Europe as "NATOized, incapable of independently reaching agreement, uniting, setting up the armies it needs, drawing up a joint strategy which is entirely different from security guaranteed by a third country--a passive notion which cannot safeguard us and makes us a tool, not a decision-making center." He maintains that Europe must find its own answers to the threats facing it, concluding that it could provide itself with the means it needs within 10 years.

CSO: 3100

IDEOLOGICAL OBJECTIVES, POLICY, OF NONALINED MOVEMENT

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Oct 79 pp 79-94

[Article by Eugene Berg: "The Nonalined Nations At The Crossroads"]

[Excerpts] At the moment the sixth conference of non-aligned nations is being held in Havana, Eugene Berg, currently associate director of research at the International Institute of Public Administration and conference master at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris* here sums up the history of the movement, its initial goals, and its development, a development which has caused it to lose cohesion while it gains in numbers. Alteration in the initial goals of the movement is evident; the conference takes place under the presidency of Moscow's most faithful ally outside Europe, thus illustrating the way in which it has been bent. It is piquant to note that the conference is being held in a territory harboring an American base on the one hand and a Soviet brigade on the other, while the charter of the nonaligned nations states clearly that no country permitting foreign bases on its territory may be a member.

This text was essentially ready when the conference opened. Before sending it to press, we added a post script about the course of the conference and the conclusions about the future of the movement that can be drawn from it.

The sixth conference of the heads of state of the nonaligned nations which will establish movement policy for the coming period of time, was held in Havana on September 3 to 8. At this meeting, Fidel Castro was made president for 1979 to 1982. Such a consecration of Cuba's international role

* The author is preparing a work on the movement of nonaligned nations soon to appear through the auspices of the Presses Universitaires de France.

is an event in itself worthy of study. The nonaligned movement which before had preached a policy independent of the power blocs, revealed deep schisms on this occasion. Will it resist present attempts to reclassify the powers? To reply to this question it seems first of all useful to try to understand the nature of this international trend through its windings in history and its principal orientations and to study its true nature.

I. Nonalignment: the circumstances of its appearance, its history, and its general aspirations.

The policy of nonalignment stems essentially from empirical sources. Attempts at rationalization appeared only afterwards, principally under the aegis of Yugoslavia. This pragmatic attitude gave birth little by little to a veritable international trend which regrouped a large majority of Third World nations, without necessarily restricting itself to this category only.

II. The nonaligned movement in the current international situation.

How is the nonaligned movement defined and situated in present international circumstances which present a prolonged transitory character? In a world of increasingly multi-polar factions, has it the vocation to be a determining pole on the international scene, or should it give way to other more cohesive regional groups (Islamic bloc, Latin America)?

The original criteria of nonalignment have suffered from the passage of time.

At the first Cairo conference (June 1961) a list of five criteria identifying nonaligned countries was drawn up. Though the first two had a positive content and determined the movement's political program (to follow an independent policy founded on peaceful coexistence and nonalignment or to adopt a posture favorable to this policy; to bring constant support to national liberation movements), then what of the three others, formulated essentially to help the young states avoid political and military alignments with the great powers.*

At the moment of their formulation, these criteria basically were turned against the West to the extent that the only alliances existing were SEATO or CENTO; nonalignment, then the search for complete emancipation, meant standing apart. Thus it is legitimate to query the validity of these principles when two of the founding states concluded friendship and cooperation treaties with the Soviet Union in 1971. These texts contained clauses

* To belong to no collective military alliance formed in the context of great power conflicts; to not make any bilateral military alliance with a major power and not be member of any regional defensive pact formed in the context of great power conflicts; to not accept willingly the establishment of foreign military bases on their own territory.

providing for mutual consultation in case of aggression or threat of aggression against either of the signatory parties, in all points analagous to Western mutual alliance treaties. At the time of signing, their promoters justified them by claiming the wish to turn to one of the great powers in order to resist pressures and threats from other powers or their allies. As an element of traditional balance of power politics, this argument is just barely acceptable. The fate of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty of 25 May 1971 was to be denounced by President Sadat in March 1976; as for the Soviet-Indian treaty of 9 August 1971, it has not altered in any fundamental way the independence of India. In this regard, the declaration of Mr Dessai when he came to power in March 1977, according to which India was to return to "true nonalignment", should not be taken to the letter to the extent that the Janata party is maintaining a special relationship with the USSR.

These ups and downs have only secondary importance to the extent that the determining factor of nonalignment has been shifted from the political-military domain to the economic.

The search for a new international economic order and the program for horizontal economic cooperation seems to imply that from now on the solidarity and unity of the nonaligned countries will be based on new criteria. However, the political-strategic orientation remains preponderant and will soon manifest itself in favor of the new circumstances of the eighties. The desire of some countries to attempt to bend the line of independence of nonalignment is inscribed in this context. The Cuban offensive aimed at approaching the socialist movement as a natural ally does not date from today. At the ministerial conference in Georgetown of August 1972, didn't the Cuban minister of foreign affairs, Raoul Roa, declare "the only way to achieve the goals constantly emblazoned by the nonaligned countries: complete independence and real development, is to abandon the principle of nonalignment itself and to put in its place bonds of solidarity and economic cooperation with the USSR."*

At the moment that pro-West alliances are being dissolved and the United States is exercising a relative withdrawal as a consequence of the Vietnam War and the Watergate affair, the new Soviet activism can be disturbing to those adhering to an independent line outside the power blocs.

However, in just numerical terms, the number of Soviet "allies" or "friends" among the movement of nonaligned nations, is hardly disturbing, only a fifth of these countries. The number of pro-Western countries is much greater than that. But it is their strategic position and activism that counts. Is there to be a concerted takeover of nonalignment activity by the socialist camp? Such an interpretation cannot be accepted lightly. To see the Kremlin

* See on this point, Donald S. Zagoria: "Into the Breach, New Soviet Alliances in the Third World," Foreign Affairs, Spring 1979, p 733-754.

behind every initiative of the USSR's new friends is to reduce many historic, social, economic, and regional causes to one factor. It is certain that the Soviet Union has very early seen the advantage it can take from the movement which it has approached since its beginning, while the United States and the West held it in more or less legitimate suspicion. The West has not been sensitive to the nonaligned countries' deepest motives nor seen them as serious. In truth, a real reclassification of forces on the international level is taking place. To the extent that all that is left of the cold war era are the political-military alliances, a new response must be given to the challenge of those regions which can no longer be called peripheral. Thus, nonalignment philosophy must, in spite of the many solicitations addressed to it, adapt itself to the changing circumstances confronting it.

To reduce this philosophy to a simple appendix or a reservoir into which anyone can dip, would be to ignore the profound desire for national independence which stirs the present leaders. It is this which is the interest of consolidation and deepening which should be the work of the nonaligned nations themselves, free of exterior pressures and intervention.

What has happened to that preponderant factor of unity and cohesion represented by the search for a new international economic order since the early seventies? The history of dialectic relations between the nonalignment movement and the Group of 77 is yet to be written on this point. What will it reveal? Without a doubt the nonalignment movement was for a while the motive force mobilizing the syndicate for common action. The mandate of the Algerian presidency (1973-76) corresponded to a time of strength, marked by a close symbiosis of the nonaligned countries, members of OPEC, and developing countries. This allowed the latter to present a unified front to the industrialized countries. Since then the situation has been modified. Persistent economic stagnation, growing differentiation among the developing countries, perceived in the most concrete way possible, new threats in the energy domain appearing on an already threatening horizon, will these factors affect the will to action and the solidarity of the nonaligned countries and the developing countries? It is significant to underline that the initiative of bringing up the energy question at the fifth UNCTAD in Manila came from a group of Latin American countries who are latecomers to non-alignment and who adhere less to the initial credo than do other developing countries. This leads to a question about the universality of the aspirations of nonalignment.

Nonalignment: Expression of a universal goal, or an alliance of Third World countries seeking a role and a place in the international system?

The ideology of nonalignment incontestably contains a universal element. It envisions the inauguration of an international system where the reign of force, injustice, inequality, will be banished, when each state, whatever its rank, its size, or its political, economic or social regime, will participate equally in planetary decisions. A generous vision, no doubt considered utopian by some, whose ultimate realization lies far in the future.

It is this which moved the first promoters to avoid creating an undistinguished third bloc and to act as the "conscience of humanity" (Tito). It is this which moved Yugoslavia's tireless efforts to prevent the geographical platform of nonalignment from being limited to the Third World alone, an ambiguous expression. This desire to transcend the current world divisions of East/West, North/South, is shared by some nations and tendencies on the international scene. Certain convergences of neutral and nonaligned countries, who often acted in concert during the CSCE. However, the example of Romania, who since 1976 participates in nonalignment activity as much as with the Group of 77, remains isolated. With the exception of Cyprus, Malta, and Yugoslavia, of course, nonalignment has barely nibbled at the edges of the northern hemisphere, other than a limited participation by some neutral European nations.

The continental grouping of its members remains fundamentally marked by origin. At the time of the Ministers' Conference in Belgrade, July 1978, the continents were represented as follows: Asia: 28 members (33 percent); Africa: 46 members (55 percent); Latin America: 7 members (8 percent); Europe: 3 members (3 percent).

Certainly the nonalignment movement does not constitute either a unified bloc, nor a region. Rather, it presents the characteristics of an international subsystem still largely subordinate to the global system dominated by the great powers. An assembly of small or middle-sized nations with only weak powers of pressure, excluding oil which is a particular case, imposed on many ideological and political affiliations, it remains the vessel of coordinated action for most of the Third World nations. Nevertheless, there is still a question: Other than harmonizing national positions, solidarity on global political and economic questions, can the movement of nonaligned nations as such achieve concrete and well organized common action?

Most of the controversial questions taken up by the heads of state and their ministers present in the Cuban capital (problem of representation by Cambodia, participation by Egypt, project to create regional vice presidencies, rule of consensus....) tested the relationship of existing forces. With any rupture excluded, in retrospect it is seen that it was not probable that any spectacular steps forward would be taken. Faced with crisis in identity, leadership and solidarity, the nonaligned movement, if it wants to continue on the path traced out for the past two decades, must innovate profoundly.

Post Script (11 September 1979)

Is it possible to draw any conclusions hot from Havana, where the conference has just closed? Not an easy task, for it involved untangling the inevitable compromises, sometimes at the price of close discussion, from the deeper tendencies of an assembly of nations heterogeneous in nature but tied by the same desire to be and act together. To be sure, only experience will bring out the movements and fissures sketched out here, but susceptible of being enlarged upon.

Facts first. The sixth conference of the movement of nonaligned nations made a good showing with a fairly large participation of heads of states and governments. First rebuttal to detractors and boycott partisans. There were seven new members, four observers, and an important guest (Spain), enough to confirm the attractive character of the movement. There are some who still want it, more than ever perhaps. Almost all the developing countries (108 out of 120) rallied to the banner of nonalignment. So far have they come since Belgrade. But does the number yet imply that nonalignment has come to be a second, parallel, United Nations, from which it has borrowed so many procedures, and the style and tone of the debates. This is where the innovations at Havana come in. A congress where rival factions faced off to take control of the leadership of the movement, such was the sixth summit. This ideological confrontation symbolized by a sort of duel on the part of the two principal protagonists, if it doesn't date from today...it was latent in Algeria in 1973 when Castro and Qadhdhafi squared off...illustrates well the extent of the cleavage. Certainly, the violence of tone and vocabulary, the "lider maximo" discourse, comes more from African-Asian militancy, indeed, from tri-continental revolutionism than from the middle of the road, decentralized, universalistic inspiration embodied with so much opinionatedness by the old and prestigious Yugoslav leader. With age, the epochal essentials, as do the combats, blend together. Though important for the future of the movement, the question of knowing whether this or that seems to be a natural ally of the socialist camp is not the only one he would have to settle. Can he also, in the particularly delicate circumstances of the moment, play an active, independent, and deeply innovative role on the international scene? The debates in Havana have hardly brought a definitive answer to this point. Can they elsewhere?

Then glosses. If duel there were, which camp made the most out of it? The "hardliners" seem to have brought off a few victories, the "vigorous condemnation" of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty and the creation of an ad hoc commission to study the "damages suffered by the Palestinians" could appear as first steps towards the exclusion of Egypt. However, it should be followed up before too long a delay. More significant on this point is the solution to the problem of representation of Cambodia. Leaving its seat vacant, rather than putting on the same footing a legal regime, however shameful it might have been, and a regime established by foreign intervention, indicated a perceptible retreat from the Maputo formula (January 1979) which had given the Pol Pot regime the right to be seated, though not the right of speaking. In the opposite direction, the reaffirmation of the principles and policies of nonalignment and in particular its fight against the politics of "major powers and blocs" appeared to be a victory for continuity of the original trend. To be sure, it required a prodigious effort by the Committee of Four (Algeria, Cuba, India, Yugoslavia) to come to this result which should have come about naturally on its own. But the attempt at deviation had, in reality, failed.

On other points, the movement remained faithful to its traditional aspirations, even though the western powers are being more severe in their criticisms. Moreover, though some divergences in economic questions have come

to light, unanimity remains solid and there was little in the way of new proposals. The times seem to be for realism and reflection.

Finally, lessons learned. To be sure, only the future will show if Fidel Castro will keep the promises he made in his closing speech to not use the movement for his profit alone. The next general assembly will quickly show if the nonaligned group will stay united behind all the positions adopted. The bureau of coordination, a moving force in the movement, has been enlarged to 36 members with a slight increase in African participation. It has been seen that at Havana things were happening with a different style than before. But nothing irreparable was done. The time lapse of the Cuban presidency may be too brief for him to impress a decisive mark on the future of the movement. The essential is that the states remain profoundly themselves and express it, even at a price of some excess. It was a strategic move for the United States to attempt to exploit the revelation of a Soviet brigade (?) in Cuba, just as it was expected that Moscow would salute the "success" of Havana. It is not in the nature of the great powers to let go something as easily taken. It is the task of nonalignment to try to patiently recast the group of international relations. Can the movement meet the challenge alone in these difficult times?

8860

CSO: 3100

CYPRUS ARCHBISHOP CRITICIZES GREEK SUPPORT TO CYPRUS

AT161530 Athens ELEVETHEROTYPIA in Greek 16 Jan 80 pp 10, 13 AT

[Exclusive interview granted by Cyprus Archbishop Khrysostomos to ELEVETHEROTYPIA correspondent Giannis Liapis at Thessaloniki on 15 January]

[Text] Greece and Hellenism do not do what ought to be done for the Greeks of Cyprus said Archbishop of Cyprus Khrysostomos yesterday with obvious bitterness. He indirectly but clearly confirmed he visited Athens on a delicate diplomatic mission aimed at stirring up "the Greeks of Greece out of their bliss." When challenged by ELEVETHEROTYPIA to explain "what exactly" in his opinion Greece ought to do toward a successful outcome of the Cypriot struggle he defined the following four "moves":

1. The Cyprus issue must become the number one issue in Greek foreign and domestic policy.
2. Greece should continuously prepare to wash off the humiliation and the shame of July 1973.
3. Greece must make it clear to its so-called allies who basically support the Turkish invaders that in no way will it be prepared to accept a prolongation of the injustice committed against the Hellenism of Cyprus.
4. As a guarantor of the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, Greece must use this position within the international community and it must call upon Britain to act jointly for the restoration of the island's independence and territorial integrity.

At the start of the exclusive interview he granted to ELEVETHEROTYPIA the archbishop was asked whether he considers himself a religious or a political personality or both.

I am exclusively a religious personality, assured the archbishop who in Athens was received by the president of the republic and conferred with Prime Minister Karamanlis, the leader of the majority opposition, Papandreou, the chairman of Kodiso, Pezmazoglou and with messrs Kanellopoulos and Mavros.

Question: Were these meetings strictly formal in character?

Answer: They also had a formal character but we also exchanged views, thoughts, I would say, on the Cyprus issue. This should not appear strange to you. I am the head of the Cypriot Orthodox Church and as you know the church is not just so many walls, churches and icons. The church is primarily the people, the sum total of the faithful. The problems of these faithful are also the problems of the church.

Question: Are you satisfied from the "exchange of thoughts" you had in Athens?

Answer: I remain satisfied only when I see certain things being implemented in action. Helladic support must not only be limited to words but it must also extend into actions. We in Cyprus are [word indistinct] with words. We now expect a more specific appearance of support from Athens toward Cypriot Hellenism.

Question: When you say "Athens," what do you specifically mean?

Answer: I mean both the government and the opposition but also the entire Greek nation. I was not in time to see the reaction in Cyprus from the latest debate in the Greek Chamber of Deputies. I can, however, assure you of one thing: Cypriot Hellenism expects more from the Greek side. It considers itself as part of the nation. It has endured occupations, calamities and massacres for nearly 3,000 years. It was never uprooted from the land of its forefathers. Now the Turkish hordes are uprooting it. This is where the great danger lies. This is a danger which not only threatens Cyprus but also threatens the entire nation. While Cypriot Hellenism today is mounting its own calvary it wants to feel the militant heartbeat of its brother Greeks by its side. It wants its issue, an issue of the survival of a portion of the nation, to be the number one issue of interest to official Greece both in its planning of domestic policy as well as in its contacts overseas.

Question: Could it be that what you have just said is a hint that perhaps in your opinion the Cyprus issue was not as seriously handled as it could have been during the latest visits of the prime minister overseas?

Answer: I am in no position to know whether and to what degree the Greek Prime Minister dealt with the Cyprus issue in the various capitals he visited. I do know, however, that Cypriot Hellenism discerns that its issue does not have the number one position in Greek affairs. If the Cyprus issue was of an economic or any other nature, perhaps it would not have been of such a great interest. It is, however, a national issue. It has to do with our very survival both as a race and as a religion. Furthermore, the fact that the Turks are today in Cyprus is due to certain Greeks of Athens.

Question: Is it not at all due to certain "Greeks" of Nicosia?

Answer: No it is not because Nicosia is an organ of Athens. Nicosia was moved, swept away and was deceived by Athens in the summer of 1973. At that time Athens had promised "union" of Cyprus with Greece.

[AT161646] Question: Would you like to have the "dossier on the treason of Cyprus" opened?

Answer: I am in no position to know what this notorious dossier contains.

If it is to reveal to us what we already know, that is that everything had been agreed upon, that a plot was woven by foreign interests for the purpose of bringing the Turk to Cyprus, then it is of no interest to us whether the dossier is opened or left sealed. If, however, it contains information about personalities or groups whose treason has not yet been revealed to date then we demand that the dossier should be immediately opened.

In this way these personalities and groups will be neutralized before they can cause any additional damage to Cypriot Hellenism as well as to the entire nation. Today the entire nation must be turned toward Cyprus. It is in Cyprus that the latest history of Hellenism is being written. It is up to our generation whether this history is written in a way which honors Hellenism or whether it will shame it. The entire nation is in danger. Everyone must understand this.

Question: How do you view repercussions upon the Cyprus issue resulting from the Islamic uprising?

Answer: Look at the map. Cyprus is nearly surrounded by Islam. It is possible that this uprising would have adverse repercussions on the Cypriot cause. I must, however, stress that our difference with the other side is not a religious issue nor is it an intercommunal issue. It is the question of a foreign invasion, of a foreign intervention.

Question: How would you comment upon the Pope's recent visit to the Phanar [Orthodox Patriarchate at Istanbul]?

Answer: We greet the Pope's visit to the Orthodox Patriarchate of Konstantinople for two reasons: It contributes toward promotion of the efforts of the past 30 years toward attainment of unity among churches and such a visit by the leader of 700 million faithful naturally offers considerable moral support to the patriarchate which is in a very difficult position.

Question: With the view of which Greek official from among those you met in Athens, do the views you have just expressed coincide?

Answer: You will permit me not to answer your question.

[Signed] Giannis Liapis.

Statements

In statements to newsmen Archbishop Khrysostomos stressed that:

--There are two aspects of the difficulties we are passing through as members of Hellenism and as members of humanity: the trend of materialism and corruption which is prevalent in our times and the injustice of the strong of the earth as expressed very actively and openly in the case of Cyprus.

--The man devoted to a hedonistic life and enjoyment cannot fight in the proper way. Nations which remained devoted to moral principles and values managed to overcome difficulties and to survive in the end.

--Hellenism today must remain devoted to its roots which are none other than the spiritual and moral principles of Christianity and to its values which are none other than those bequeathed to us by the wisdom of our forefathers and our national heritage.

--Today in Cyprus the people are waging a struggle for national and natural survival. The Turkish hordes have occupied 40 percent of Cypriot territory and they are trying in every possible way to establish themselves there by uprooting Hellenism.

--Cypriot Hellenism is today faced by the greatest danger in its history. This is because it is being uprooted from its hearths and homes. At other times Cypriot Hellenism was also subjected to calamities, occupations, massacres and ruin. It was never uprooted, however, and it is for this reason that it survived.

--It is believed that the people of Greece fully understand their duty toward their brothers in Cyprus and should the need arise they would "be present" wherever needed so that the Greeks of Cyprus can survive, restore their rights and regain their lands.

CSO: 4908

COOLS, VANDEN BOEYNANTS SUPPORT MARTENS

Brussels LE SOIR in French 21-22 Oct 79 p 2

[Article by J.v.S.]

[Text] After the brilliant performances in the debate Thursday afternoon in the Chamber of Representatives, the political class is now awaiting the reply which the prime minister will make to the various participants. True to his reputation, Mr Wilfried Martens has no intention of dodging the question, as he stated on Friday at noon following the Council of Ministers meeting: "We have reached a crucial time of government action, in regard to both institutional problems and social security reform or the reorganization of public finances. The government will take a definite stand and will provide clear and candid answers, for what is happening is of vital importance for the future action of my government."

It was decided that a ministerial committee for general policy would meet on Monday to prepare the answer which the prime minister will make to the various individuals who participated in the debate in the Chamber. As to whether he was surprised by Mr Tindemans' attitude on the eve of parliament's opening, Mr Martens replied: "It is now 6 months since the prime minister has been ready for anything."

Until Tuesday--and the matter of the vote of confidence, which Mr Martens will very likely bring up--political leaders are spending their weekend thinking and making discrete contacts.

Two factors must also be considered in this regard. First of all, there is the clarification made on Friday evening by Mr Paul Vanden Boeynants in the setting of the "political discussion" reserved for the PSC [Christian Social Party] by the RTBF [French-Belgian Radio and Television]. The man who is considered the "spiritual father," if not the "stepmother," of the current government explained why he forfeited his turn to speak on Thursday, preferring to participate in the debate on Tuesday.

The first reason: the order of the speakers, which had been approved by joint agreement, was changed and switched around without those involved

being notified or consulted, i.e., without their approval. It is known that it was Mr Leo Tindemans who requested this change in the order of speakers, thus provoking in particular the anger of Mr Louis Tobback, leader of the BSP [Belgian Socialist Party].

The second reason: "After Mr Tindemans was given the floor and made an important speech, I felt that with matters the way they are, it was better to take a few days to think before replying and before defining our position, which was nevertheless singularly altered after that speech. I was always taught that sometimes you have to count to 10 before speaking; that's what I did. But I can tell you that on Tuesday, the party's position will be revealed in the Chamber debate very clearly and with all the candor desired."

Mr Vanden Boeynants also said that the content of Mrs Spaak's brief speech had been discussed among the leaders of the three French-speaking majority parties, but that the PDF [Democratic Front of Brussels French Speakers] chairwoman was not authorized to speak in the name of these three groups.

"Last Chance"

The other factor to be considered in this regard is the editorial published on Saturday morning in LE PEUPLE by Socialist Party [PS] chairman Andre Cools, who explained why he described the current administration as a "last-chance government."

"Who," he asked, "would be insane enough to put the country to a new vote when this same country experienced, several months ago, the longest government crisis in its history?" And Mr Cools is afraid that Belgium might become caught up in a "situation like Italy." He also stresses the importance of the "concrete results" obtained in just a few months by the government of Mr Martens and Mr Spitaels. And he concludes with this tribute to Mr Martens:

"The current prime minister is one of this country's few statesmen with a dual asset: he is deeply involved in his cultural community, whose deep-rooted lifestyle he shares with honesty and intensity, but at the same time he has retained a great deal of trust in the French-speaking community. I therefore assure him of the full support of the PS in implementing the agreements made between the majority parties, for if the PS is vigilant, it is also loyal to its alliances."

The Questions

Thus in principle it will be necessary to wait until Tuesday to know the answers to the many questions posed by observers. Unless, of course, the vote on a possible motion of confidence does not manage to raise any doubts. In the sense that, shrinking before the prospect of bearing the responsibility for a new political crisis, majority members of parliament would vote heavily in favor of Mr Martens and his associates while retaining their mental reservations. Thus the process of submitting bills in parliament concerning the second stage of government reform and regionalization could still hold some surprises.

And in this connection, there are many who are wondering about the more or less undisclosed reasons which drove Mr Tindemans to act the way he did on Thursday. MORGEN's editorialist wrote on Saturday morning that it is not only the Social-Christian family, but the entire political world which runs the risk of turning on the ambition of one man.

In the opinion of others, the former prime minister had the intention of provoking the FDF to force it to leave the government. If that were the case, Mr Tindemans probably obtained the opposite effect, since the "front" of French-speaking majority parties appears to be recovering slowly, whereas it seemed quite ill until just a few days ago.

The fact remains that the Antwerp representative expressed views which met with a broad response among the public. But in the meantime, there is still a government agreement by all majority parties, including the CVP [Social Christian Party] and the BSP.

Eurosystem

Following the Council of Ministers meeting, the prime minister again broached two issues: social security reform and the Eurosystem.

With regard to social security reform, Mr Martens said that following the Friday afternoon meeting, government delegates and social representatives will meet again on Monday and Friday, at 4:00 pm on both days. In other matters, before enacting the royal decrees concerning insured patients' contributions to the cost of medical treatment and clinical biology, ministers are waiting for the additional recommendation of the technical medical committee of the INAMI [National Institute for Illness and Disability Insurance], a recommendation which is urgently requested.

Ministers also discussed a memorandum from Mr Henri Simonet on the Eurosystem question.

The Belgian Government will send to Saudi Arabia a mission comprised of a representative from each of the three departments concerned: Foreign Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Public Health. These three officials will be given precise written instructions which will be drawn up very soon at the government level.

11915

CSO: 3100

PARTY CHAIRMEN DISCUSS FUTURE OF MARTENS GOVERNMENT

Brussels LE SOIR in French 24 Oct 79 pp 1, 2

[Article by J.v.S.]

[Text] Spotlights on the Chamber of Representatives! This Tuesday will mark the conclusion of the debate concerning the government communique issued last week by Mr Wilfried Martens. Observers await with interest the speech of the new PSC [Christian Social Party] chairman, Mr Paul Vanden Boeynants. With a certain degree of impatience as well, they also await the replies which the prime minister will make to the various participants in the debate.

No one believes that this vote on government action will have a negative outcome. But everyone is impatiently waiting to know the tenor of the replies which the prime minister will make to the various participants in the debate.

Everything suggests that Mr Martens will keep his intention to be clear, precise, firm and thorough. According to our sources, his speech will be long: about an hour and a half. The final draft of this text was the subject of a meeting of a ministerial committee for general policy--longer than expected--on Monday afternoon before the resumption of talks with social representatives.

As for Monday, it was marked by the luncheon meeting of the five chairmen of the government majority parties. However, due to the lack of time, the luncheon guests did not have the opportunity to discuss current political problems thoroughly and at length. Thus they agreed to meet soon, probably in the presence of Mr Martens.

This luncheon, which was held in a restaurant in Commerce street, had been scheduled for more than 3 weeks. Initially, the banquet made it possible to receive two "new boys" into the "college" of chairmen.

Mr Leo Tindemans of the CVP [Social Christian Party] and Mr Paul Vanden Boeynants of the PSC were thus received by their peers and elders: Mr Andre Cools of the PS [Socialist Party], Mrs Antoinette Spaak of the PDF [Democratic Front of Brussels French Speakers] and Mr Karel Van Miert of the BSP [Belgian Socialist Party].

This meal of very Spartan parcidity was held, we are told, in a particularly relaxed atmosphere. The luncheon guests almost got to the point of telling each other the latest fashionable anecdotes. Actually, as we have said, there was not enough time to permit a detailed exchange of views.

Four of the five chairmen had presided over the weekly meeting of top officials of their parties. The last to take his place--Mr Tindemans--did not arrive until almost 2:00 pm; the first to leave his colleagues left at about 3:15 pm, thus the desire to meet again soon.

With regard to table conversations, it was reported that Mr Tindemans tried to reassure his majority partners by assuring them that his highly controversial speech of Thursday had been misunderstood.

The fact remains that following the meeting of his party's management committee, the CVP chairman showed a certain degree of ill humor in referring to remarks made by the press (including several Flemish dailies) concerning the serious incidents which occurred on Sunday in Fourons.

Mr Tindemans, as well as Mr Van Miert, also showed a certain degree of embarrassment in answering questions about the actions taken by the fascistic shock troops of Flemish nationalism. He did not criticize the attitude of the law-and-order forces, of course, but he nevertheless urged that repression be restrained.

The PS and FDF in turn very vigorously stressed the need to firmly apply the legislative arsenal regarding private militias.

Otherwise, it is quite obvious that there is still keen distrust within the majority. Mrs Spaak suspects Mr Tindemans of wanting to reexamine the terms of the government agreement. And Mr Cools has implied that the CVP chairman is seeking a false quarrel with his majority partners by stating that the texts concerning the second stage of government reform go beyond the terms of the statement of government policy. It was actually in consideration of Flemish demands and the objections of the Council of State that Mr Martens and his associates were induced to revise the texts which they had initially drawn up.

Thus the situation is such that the government will obtain the confidence of the Chamber without any trouble. But doubts will persist. Thus Mr Martens' reply in the name of his administration will receive the greatest attention, as will the speech of Mr Vanden Boeynants, the spiritual father of the government. Finally, it will be interesting to observe the reactions of influential representatives during the interrogation--supplementing the debate--which Audenarde Jan Verroken's CVP will conduct regarding the interpretation of language legislation in Comines, Thuin Paul-Henry Gendebien's PW (Walloon Party) on the application of laws regarding private militias and of socialist Marcel Remacle concerning the situation in southern Luxembourg.

PARTIES DISCUSS POLITICAL SITUATION

Brussels LE SOIR in French 24 Oct 79 p 2

[Text] It was to be expected that the parties which assembled their staffs on Monday would devote a good part of their discussions to the political situation following the day of rioting in Fourons. Some went to work on preparing for the Tuesday afternoon debates in parliament and the remarks which Prime Minister Wilfried Martens will make.

Outside the majority, several political leaders also provided their comments.

PS: Conscious Desire to Inflamm Passions

At the Socialist Party (PS) staff meeting, the communique published following the "hot Sunday" in Fourons was very sharply worded. The PS stressed "its deep indignation over the veritable invasion of the commune of Fourons by more than 1,000 members of fascistic Flemish nationalist militias."

The attitude of the national police force did not satisfy the Socialist leaders: "The measures of public order taken or decreed were particularly insufficient to prevent the devastation of public buildings, attacks against people and property, the expression of racist attitudes and acts of violence against representatives of the French-speaking press."

Finally, the PS demanded that the legal proceedings instituted on the basis of the 1934 law "culminate in the punishment of those charged and their accomplices and the disbanding of the militias."

Commenting on the events in Fourons, Mr Andre Cools believes that the incidents were consciously provoked by those who want to use every means to prevent a communal agreement.

Asked to express his feelings about Mr Tindemans' appeal for a dialog between Flemings and Walloons, the PS chairman retorted: "We agree on trying to find a proper solution to our institutional problems, but it would be highly dangerous to ignore the existence of the Brussels region. Those absent are bound to feel that they are the victims of a solution negotiated without them."

We are still ready to negotiate, but we refuse to participate in talks that would lead to solutions taken against one of the regions."

Responding finally to certain objections made by Mr Tindemans, the PS chairman noted that if the government had somewhat exceeded the political agreement regarding the second stage of government reform, it was in an effort to satisfy the Flemish demand concerning the "asymmetrical" structure of regional and communal administrations and to respond to the many objections of the Council of State.

FDF: Mr Tindemans Wants to Block Reforms

According to the FDF [Democratic Front of Brussels French Speakers], Mr Tindemans' speech to the Chamber of Representatives clarifies the intentions of the CVP [Social Christian Party] chairman. "For him," Mrs Spaak's party states, "it is a question of blocking Mr Martens' bills, just as he blocked the Egmont agreement. It is also a matter of not allowing any institutional reform that would recognize the third region and would permit Brussels residents to govern themselves in accordance with the wishes of its population."

Thus the FDF is on guard "against the torpedoing of institutional bills by the CVP." What would be the purpose of negotiating again after a new setback, it asks. And in this connection, it said that it would make sure that the best relations are maintained among French speakers of all parties which have decided to oppose Mr Tindemans' new offensive.

The FDF then reiterated its positions and pointed out that it is waiting for clear answers from the prime minister to the two questions which it has asked him, i.e.:

1. Will the recognition of the three regions, formally scheduled for the irreversible stage, also apply to the final stage in accordance with Article 107d of the constitution, which cannot be amended?

2. Will the final government of the regions be prepared by representatives of the three regions or will you allow Flemings and Walloons, with the exclusion of Brussels residents, to negotiate the future of residents of the third region?

In this regard, the FDF denounced the positions of Mr Gol (PRL [Liberty and Reform Party]) and Mr Hansenne (PSC [Christian Social Party]) who, it said, "want to establish an assembly and administration common to the Walloon region and the French-speaking community with the inevitable result that the Brussels region will be reduced to the role of an insignificant institution under the supervision of a government with a Flemish majority."

Finally, the FDF commented at length on the recent events in Fourons. It directed the attention of the public and Democrats to the extreme-right

political climate in which Mr Tindemans' program is developing. It added that what happened in Fourons prefigures what would happen to Brussels if Mr Tindemans' ideas should prevail.

CVP Appeals for Calm in Fourons

In its communique, the CVP staff "makes an appeal for calm in the Fourons area and vigorously disapproves of any form of mutual provocation." The CVP "urges the government to take all measures necessary for peace. Any unequal treatment must be avoided so that no harm can come to our institutions."

Asked about the exact significance of this last sentence, Chairman Tindemans said that he was unable to reply because he could not attack institutions which cannot defend themselves.

The CVP staff also protested "the commentary of the RTBF [French-Belgian Radio and Television], according to which there was a connection between the incidents in Fourons and the CVP's attitude in the Chamber at the time of the discussion concerning the government communique."

With regard to the Chamber debate, Mr Tindemans again stressed the fact that he made an effort to express the wishes of his group as faithfully as possible. "I did not change a word in my manuscript after hearing Mr Cools," he said.

The CVP staff was also pleased with the statement of the prime minister, who announced that the freeze on the Educational Building Fund would be lifted on 1 January 1980, making it possible to implement the plan for rationalization of secondary education.

BSP: "Walks" Not Serving Flemish Cause

The BSP [Belgian Socialist Party] held a routine meeting, following which there was a brief communique from the chairman, Mr Karel Van Miert. The staff meeting was concerned with the Califice plan. A decision: no contributions from insured patients without proportional contributions from doctors, to be specified in an agreement. As for pensioners' contributions, there cannot be any question of this except in the case of large pensions.

Referring to the incidents in Fourons, Mr Van Miert noted that marches and walks served neither the interest of Flanders nor that of the Flemings in Fourons. As for paramilitary organizations, it is obvious that they are unacceptable, but this must not prevent a thorough investigation of the searches made of the homes of Flemings in Fourons.

As for the measures taken in opposition to the VMO [Flemish Militant Order], the chairman noted that repression should not be carried out according to a double standard, but without any discrimination.

With regard to general policy, Mr Van Miert said that he would have to wait for Mr Wilfried Martens' reply tomorrow before commenting further.

PRL: Disgrace of Nationalist Extremists

According to Mr Jean Gol, PRL chairman, "several VU [People's Union] members of parliament and its chairman took part in shameful demonstrations studded with revolting acts of violence. Thus the erroneous choice made in 1977 and repeated in April 1978 by the PS and PSC, of having nationalist extremists govern the country, has been demonstrated in the eyes of the French-speaking public."

"The debate underway in the Chamber also demonstrates the disorder of the coalition based on this choice. Not only are communal quarrels becoming more acute, but the country's financial, economic and social situation is also deteriorating."

PVV: Prime Minister Hated by Own Party

Mr Willy De Clercq, chairman of the PVV [Liberty and Progress Party], did not talk about Fourons in the name of his party.

But he took the opportunity to say "that the CVP is the government's Achilles heel and that it is high time for this party to realize that it has no dealings with the FDF and that government reform as currently proposed is unacceptable to Flemings." And he added that he wonders whether it is possible to expect achievements from a government "working in an atmosphere of suspicion and from a prime minister who feels hated by his own party."

RW: Government Incapable of Assuring Peace

The executive staff of the Walloon Rally [RW], chaired by Representative Henri Mordant, regrets that despite the unusual measures interfering with the normal life of the people, the government has proved incapable of maintaining peace and assuring the protection of people and property. And he is amazed at the inability of the forces of law and order to prevent the invasion of a commune by the fascist hordes of the VMO and the TAK [Language Action Committee], supported by the People's Union in this case.

11915

CSO: 3100

'I SIMERINI' CRITICIZES CYPRUS' ABSTENTION FROM UNGA VOTING

NC161000 Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 16 Jan 80 p 1 NC

[Editorial: "The Abstention"]

[Text] So, Cyprus has abstained. The UN General Assembly Resolution was calling for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. But Cyprus failed to speak up. It abstained. That is, it actually opposed the withdrawal of foreign troops.

We cannot expect serious things from a government which is in a state of resignation or stumbling. However, the Cyprus problem is a problem of foreign invasion, and our demand is that the invasion troops must leave. This is the demand that we raise every year at the United Nations. And we keep on repeating that because Cyprus is a small country and its struggle is based on principles. What has become of these principles now? The Akel pressure has been to the sacrificing of these principles at the altar of Soviet interests.

What about Rolandis? How does he justify Cyprus' abstention from the voting? With what pretexts will he seek assistance tomorrow from the 104 countries that voted for the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan? How can Cyprus talk about principles, invasions, foreign troops and so forth? How can we see in the eyes all those who were being told that Cyprus is the victim of invasion and occupation? This is tragicomedy. This abstention is actually extremely dangerous!!

But there is something else that is still more serious. We ask that Turkey be pressured, and we seek this officially not from Moscow but from the West. We ask Washington for this. Moreover, there have been recent reports that the foreign minister was planning to go there for the sake of some kind of revival of the U.S. initiative. Now? Who, how and when will be asked to pressure Turkey?

In connection with the abstention, it is naively argued by the government that if we voted in favor of the withdrawal, then the following year the Soviet Union would be turning its back on us. It is obvious that this is

a ridiculous argument because 104 states--almost all of them nonaligned--have asked for Moscow's withdrawal from Afghanistan. Thus, Cyprus has fallen in the trap and has committed a fatal mistake for which it will have to pay either today or tomorrow.

The great powers have embarked on a fierce conflict of interests. They do not condone the whims or stupidities of the small countries. The Americans and the Russians are at the beginning of a terrible showdown. Abstention from voting on a matter of principle that has been supported by the entire international society is a fatal mistake. Unfortunately, we shall pay a very high price for this. The Akel pressure has triumphed here; the government is definitely a political captive. As for the rest, the problems of construction workers, the measures for rapprochement will be advanced. The government's political wisdom is more disgusting than its political morony!

CSO: 4908

PAPER VIEWS NATO, EC DECISION ON SOLIDARITY WITH UNITED STATES

DW170908 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 17 Jan 80 p 3 DW

[Commentary by Brussels correspondent signed Ha.: "Europe's Resignation"]

[Text] Eventually the U.S. Government can demonstrate to the American public that also the West European allies respond to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan not merely with paper protests. In a parallel action of the foreign ministers of the European Community and of the permanent NATO Council decisions have been achieved expressing the minimum of Western solidarity that can be achieved in view of the existing different interests.

The allies' balancing act was most urgent because the hostages held in Teheran are becoming a problem for President Carter that could touch off World War III if the least error occurred. Moscow's action in Afghanistan has initiated in Iran a change of the anti-American psychosis that now has become an anti-Soviet psychosis. But the U.S. public presses Carter to take action to achieve the liberation of the hostages.

The Western solidarity that has now been demonstrated against Moscow will suffice, one hopes, in order to take the domestic political pressure off Carter. The spotlight will be focused on Moscow. The West European allies and the European Community as their core will "not torpedo" U.S. economic sanctions against the Soviet Union. Since that seems obviously to be rather little, the Federal Government also presses for the taking of positive steps by the European Community to strengthen economically Yugoslavia, Turkey and the still independent oil states on the Persian Gulf through new agreements on the quick satisfaction of old wishes.

The real reason for the late steps by the West European states is the influence that was brought to bear on public opinion in the United States. Eastern and Western Europeans live-- quite correctly--in the fear of an impending World War III on whose potential origins they cannot bring any influence to bear, origins in Iran and Moscow with regard to Afghanistan. What happened on Tuesday in Brussels in the session of the European Community and the NATO Council is the best evidence that the European Community has missed its historic chance to jointly enter world politics again and shape them together with the big powers.

PRESS COMMENTS ON UN AFGHANISTAN RESOLUTION

DW160946 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German to East and West Germany
0605 GMT 16 Jan 80 DW

[Press review on the UN Resolution on Afghanistan]

[Text] Freiburg's BADISCHE ZEITUNG writes: Never again since the UN debate on the quelling of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 has Moscow had to take a defeat of that extent in the world forum in New York. It is nonsensical to smell U.S. or Chinese manipulation behind it, as the Soviet propaganda media are doing. The smallest and weakest members of the family of nations are those tolerating the least tutelage. They are honestly outraged over Moscow's action against a country which they had counted as belonging to their circle, the nonaligned states. It does not seem as though the leap of the Soviets beyond their sphere of influence could be undone.

FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU declares: The governments in Moscow and in other East bloc capitals must not comprehend that the Soviet Union and its friends in the UN General Assembly not only had to take a moral reprimand but also have suffered a serious political defeat. In the era of rapid information even world powers can no longer do as they please, notwithstanding the fact that at first, nobody can prevent them from an intervention militarily. Despite all propaganda smokescreens the world nowadays always finds out what is really happening. Moscow cannot change anything in this even though it tries, in the case of Afghanistan, to hide behind statements which are just as threadbare as they are cynical.

We read the following comment in SUEDEWESTPRESSE: Not one single Soviet soldier will have to leave Afghanistan as a result of the latest UN resolution--and yet the vote wields an enormous political weight. For the USSR has been pushed into an isolation that had ceased to be conceivable for years. This is one of the reactions which obviously had been erroneously assessed in the Kremlin and which not only aggravates Moscow's policy in the topical situation. For the distrust which the nonaligned states thus express toward Soviet policy will carry its effect into the future relations with the Soviet Union. Yet, and the West at large and the United States in particular should not harbor any illusions about it, this does not make the policy of the West any easier, either.

NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG in its editorial proceeds from the potential effects of the latest development in Yugoslavia: In this phase the express support of the Afghanistan resolution of the United Nations by Belgrade and its desistance from seeking refuge in an abstention from voting, looks like a warning signal to Moscow. It is obvious to see in this vote also an indication of Yugoslavia's concern about its own fate. The news on Tito's state of health have intensified the anxieties about the further development in this Balkan state. For the Soviets Tito had become an unassailable symbolic figure for Yugoslavia's independence. No successor is in sight anywhere who would be capable of fully living up to this role. A weak leadership in Belgrade, possible conflicts between the ethnic groups, another call for help may well whet the appetite in Moscow for new expansion. This would spell the direct case of crisis for Europe.

WIESBADENER KURIER writes on the same topic: Against the background of the Afghan crisis Tito's fate has gained special significance. For decades the marshal has been the outstanding personage of Yugoslavia. His political vigor and his personal radiation formed the clamps which held the multi-nationality state together despite immense international differences. Under his leadership Yugoslavia has been able to afford to defy Moscow and to embark on a communist road of its own. What will happen if this great man of European postwar history dies? In normal times this question presumably would have less of a worried undertone. In these current weeks, however, the political feelings in the world have changed. It is not just in Yugoslavia that apprehensions prevail that Moscow might exploit succession quarrels in Belgrade for marching into Yugoslavia, following a call for help after the tested pattern.

CSO: 3103

SOVIETS CAUGHT NATO UNAWARES OVER AFGHANISTAN

DW101213 Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 11 Jan 80 p 4 DW

[Article by Lothar Ruehl: "Bitter Lesson for Nato"]

[Text] Brussels--Only an invasion of Norway or Yugoslavia by the Red Army could have more rudely awakened the Atlantic alliance headquarters from its slumber into the holidays than has the coup in Kabul. For years the allies have envisaged so-called peripheral threats or security risks outside the present alliance boundaries as topics for political consultations and crisis planning. But the treaty borders in the Middle East coincide with the state borders of Turkey. Afghanistan is outside, and most NATO partners will not hear of joint actions outside the alliance area.

Furthermore, the strategic significance of the mountain country on the Khyber Pass naturally is incomparably less as an anti-Russian bulwark than it was for the British Empire in India at the time of Rudyard Kipling. After the dissolution of the Middle East pact and after the loss of Iran, neighboring Pakistan can no longer be protected from the West but only from the Indian Ocean by U.S. naval and air forces anyway--provided naval bases and airports are made available in that region. Besides, Washington would have to decide to relocate a new operational fleet permanently in the Indian Ocean (between the 7th Fleet in the Western Pacific and the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean).

Even in that case the security of Pakistan would depend less on the adequate military strength of the West in this area vis-a-vis the Eurasian Continental power of the Soviet Union than it would on the threat of confrontation and the risk of escalation in a worldwide conflict. In the Middle East, from the Caucasus to India, the Soviets have the advantage of having military power close and, in addition, having a geographic buffer in front of their own borders that can be dominated. For Western security an occupation of Iran by the Russians would be much more harmful than that of Afghanistan or even of Pakistan. But should the Soviet troops and Moscow policy succeed in getting Afghanistan under control and in setting an example for the Muslim nationalists for the purpose of consolidating a pro-Russian socialist regime in Kabul, then something would have fundamentally changed in the

entire Islamic orient: Neither Iran nor the other states rich in oil on the Persian Gulf would be safe against a repetition of Soviet interventions. Thus a lot is at stake in Afghanistan in the future period for both sides.

Moscow has taught the West a bitter lesson with regard to detente and security. Just like in Angola and Ethiopia, the Russians have demonstrated in Afghanistan their concept of the divisibility of detente and their strategy of localized conflict with military means. The forcible overthrow of a government in a foreign country along the Russian borders by Soviet intervention forces, which even liquidated the head of state and his family in the process as though he were an ordinary party secretary in Soviet Tadzhikistan, is a spectacle which the world has not seen since the quelling of the Hungarian popular uprising in Budapest in 1956. But at the time, after all, the Russians left it to their Hungarian followers to hang the members of the National Communist Government.

What has shocked the Western powers so much and caught them at a loss in the true sense of the word is this political aspect, especially in a year in which the negotiations on security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE) are to be resumed in Madrid. The CSCE conference in Belgrade 2 years ago was marked by sharp West-East controversies over human rights in Eastern Europe. But they also quarreled over the question of whether the Soviet Union had displayed good behavior in interstate relations as it had undertaken to do in Helsinki in 1975. Hardly anyone in Brussels can seriously visualize now how constructive negotiations are to be conducted in Madrid this year on security in Europe. The program of new "confidence-building measures" (no military demonstrations of power near borders) intended to help reduce the danger of surprise attacks already appears to be funny against the background of the wintry mountain war panorama in Afghanistan, as do the latest Brussels proposals for the Vienna conference on troop reductions in Europe.

Though the fact that Muslim peoples are being beaten with Russian arms beyond remote Turkey does not herald any immediate danger to Europe, this is little consolation. The spearhead which the Soviets have driven in the direction of the Indian Ocean along the Eastern border of Iran with tanks and airborne troops is deep and offers remarkable starting points for an encirclement of Iran from east and north should the situation at some time make a Soviet intervention politically expedient. Anarchy is preparing the ground for that.

By its invasion of a hardly passable, guerrilla-infested country in the middle of winter, the Soviet Army has carried out a first-rate military operation and demonstrated impressive flexibility with its Blitzkrieg tactics. The action obviously had been prepared, militarily at least, a month in advance without the NATO organs at their mid-December meeting--must 14 days prior to the bear's leap over the mountain border--having known anything about it. This tactical surprise is all the more serious

since no strategic surprise factor was involved: As early as in the beginning of September 1979 the former NATO supreme commander in Europe, Gen Alexander Haig, had quite openly talked about such a possibility in the near future because the campaign against the Islamic rebels became constantly more difficult for the Afghan Government troops. The former U.S. ambassador to Moscow, Malcolm Toon, who left Russia in early October, has said now that he had regarded the Soviet intervention as inevitable even then. At least the State Department should have known this view of the U.S. Embassy.

[DW101228] Granted, the NATO partners had reckoned with an intensification of the military involvement of the Soviets in Afghanistan and even with the dispatch of large troop units and the assumption of military leadership by the Soviets. Yet nobody got the idea of an intervention against the pro-Soviet Government of a friendly neighbour country as the practical Soviet solution to the problem. This special surprise has several reasons, all of which are on one line of political thinking.

The Western power of imagination time and again fails in the assessment of Moscow's reactions as soon as pro-Soviet governments in neighboring countries and Soviet power interests are threatened. Meanwhile, NATO had gathered its experiences in Europe in 1956 and 1968, and the Soviet Union had also threatened military intervention for the protection of Egypt and Syria in the Middle East War of 1973.

Once again the general experience since World War II is confirmed that Moscow threatens most the very countries which rely on the protection of the Soviet Union and maintain close relations with it. In the early seventies, President al-Sadat in Cairo had to learn this, too, when a pro-Soviet group in the Egyptian Government tried a coup d'etat against him after the Soviet candidate for Nasir's succession, Ali Sabry, had failed in 1970. In Kabul the Russians overthrew their former ally Amin over Christmas after they had failed in September to induce him to resign.

The Western powers had to learn that the business basis they took for granted, namely, "reliability" and "predictability" of Soviet policy, does not exist. Brezhnev's attempt to deceive Carter was actually a foregone conclusion, for after all, the Soviet leader could not admit that he had intervened to overthrow with force a friendly government that seemed to be unsuited to him and to have its chief liquidated in the process. The contention that the Soviet Union had invaded to fend off foreign interventions is classical--it did not come as a surprise to anybody. It means, however, that Moscow's policy might be tempted to use such pretexts time and again to justify a power policy operation in another country on its borders.

All these lessons for Europe and the United States are casting a dark shadow on relations, especially since the Soviet Union, in the judgment

of U.S. experts, will be forced to import oil 5 years from now. Then Moscow will appear on the Gulf as a competitor. These prospects and the lessons from the intervention in Afghanistan pose several serious security questions for the NATO partners:

1. The Soviet air-lift operation was devised for a distance of 5,000 kilometers with, at first, 200 transport flights for about 5,000 soldiers and large cargoes of heavy arms and equipment simultaneously. Shortly before the chairman of the NATO military committee in Brussels, Gen Zeiner Gundersen, had drawn attention to this strategic air transport capacity with the help of forces over large distances. This assessment of the situation, however, had not met with any discernible attention in the political consultations of the NATO ministers. The transports were started from the same bases in southern Russia near the Black Sea which had been intended to serve for the planned Middle East intervention in 1973 and which, in the event of a conflict, might be used for such actions against Turkey, Greece or even Yugoslavia. Thus, the occupation of Afghanistan is of political-military significance not only for the Middle East and the Indian Ocean but also for NATO at its southeastern flank in the Mediterranean--primarily for Yugoslavia in a succession crisis after Tito's exit.

2. What means can the Western alliance use for defensive actions outside the pact area? Pulling out NATO troops from Europe, for example U.S. units, might be an emergency solution, yet considering the military power ratio on the continent this would be risky. The U.S. Army Reserve in North America at the moment numbers only 170,000 men of active personnel, including 85,000 assigned to the Central European sector as a reinforcement. Of this contingent, 27,000 soldiers simultaneously are slated for extra-Europe, worldwide missions. What emerges as a result is a competition between the European NATO requirements for reinforcements and the extra-European requirements for intervention.

The conclusion is this: The U.S. world power is only conditionally and moderately capable of military actions vis-a-vis the Russian world power in extra-European areas of crisis. To equalize this weakness the United States would have to reinforce shortly with new programs its navy, its military air transport facilities, its amphibious landing forces and its central strategic army reserves--which requires more personnel and also more bases. Finally, the United States would have no choice but to draft conscripts again in the foreseeable future.

It is such considerations which took forms in the crystal ball gazing under the auspices of the big bear on New Year's Eve in Brussels. Afghanistan, after all, is not as remote from Europe as it seems to be on the map.

CSO: 3103

COMMENTATOR VIEWS PLANNED U.S. EMBARGOES AGAINST IRAN, USSR

DW161056 Bonn DIE WELT in German 16 Jan 80 p 6 DW

[Editorial by Friedhelm Kemna: "The Embargo Does Not Suffice"]

[Text] The hour of the United Nations in this conflict has passed. The world organization has fought in a clear and most impressive way as hardly ever in its history that frequently contained dubious representations; twice in one week the Soviet Union could evade a condemning judgment of the Security Council only by using its veto--closely connected was the sanction decision against Iran. But it could not avoid the solidarism of the Third World that has a devastating effect on Moscow, the really smashing vote of more than two-thirds of the UN body against Moscow's intervention in Afghanistan.

The worldwide political echo to the East River debates must not be underrated; and it could show important way to the industrial nations of the West regarding their strategy aimed at mastering the North-South conflict. But disgust, fear and increasing skepticism of the world's opinion on the recent brutal example of Soviet expansionism will not be a substitute for action, for a concrete and convincing answer to the challenge.

The United Nation's helplessness forces President Carter to take action and levy an embargo against Iran; concern for the fate of the hostages that has been overshadowed by the march of the Soviets into cold war, now is appearing in the foreground again; the unrest also of the voters demands a higher stake from Carter. And yet every step aimed at liberating the hostages through pressure and sanctions must necessarily aggravate the chaos of the Ayatollah state at a moment when Soviet divisions are active at the borders of Iran. Who would doubt it that the Soviets again would exploit "in the sense of their defense interests" the dying of Khomeyni's Muslim revolution whenever the risk seems predictable for them?

Now the widely visible profile of that threshold of risks is involved, its immediate setup and its credibility, particularly at a moment when Moscow's amassment of troops in Afghanistan makes the United States' military option against Iran most doubtful. That will decisively increase the burden carried by Carter, it drastically increases the danger of steering into a hopeless dilemma! In order to become capable of acting after all the

futile diplomatic activity with regard to Iran, he must accept responsibility for a collision course that will not work without the use of the own military power. It seems that the President in Washington now has given the green light to the development of a long-term concept of containment policy that will be equally convincing for the European allies as for the Soviet Union. Just as a reminder: the strategy of containment after all has achieved coexistence between the East and the West that was relatively free of violence long before "detente" has been invented and before tension became "divisible"--in Africa, Southeast Asia and in the Middle East.

The new beginning of a containment policy, however, in the comprehensive self-assessment of the Western Alliance and its politicians will have to avail itself of the military thinking to which SPD Chairman Brandt so eloquently objects. The Soviet threat is concrete and applicable any time; and it cannot be talked out of existence by the slogan of the divisibility of detente, of the "division of labor" between conflict and cooperation. Anyone wanting to banish the "risk" of the military thinking from politics in this situation in truth invites the Soviet Union to the next round of the militarily secured development of power. This well-oiled machine is exactly 3 hours away from the reach for the vital nerve of the Western industrial nations: this is the threat which makes the present tension worldwide and indivisible.

Practices of embargo may set exclamation marks, the refusal of wheat deliveries and technology transfer will be painful, but they alone and even a boycott of the Olympic Games will not induce the Soviets to see internationally committing reason, to respect the right of man and people to live. They can only be the trimmings to a hard core of power development by which power is effectively and credibly contained: With policy of bases of the United States in the distressed region, the Indian Ocean, in Turkey, in Pakistan--and with the clear readiness to put up against any Soviet seizure any time an effective intervention force adapted to the conditions of the region.

Indira Gandhi might, in the old neuralgic aversion, play poker against a highly armed neighbor Pakistan with just as high stakes of a pro-Russian position--in view of the new geopolitical facts created by Moscow within reach of the "warm" ports of the Arabian Sea there is no reasonable alternative to massive military assistance to Pakistan for helping itself. Especially the government in New Delhi can be the least interested in a destabilization of the neighboring region, a new power vacuum which the Soviet Union might penetrate without any trouble.

This not only forces the United States and its president to bid farewell to the formulas of political pleadings with Moscow which are so provably impotent. It also demands of the European allies a new strategy on the side of their most powerful partner. If the United States remained alone with a policy of calculated confrontation against the Soviet course, if Bonn and Paris would continue playing their helpless word games over tension and detente, then "detente" ultimately would be truly divided and the Soviets could embark on the road of tensions, for instance around Berlin, nearly without any cost and freely.

EDITORIALIST OUTLINES ACTIONS NEEDED AGAINST USSR

DW161203 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 16 Jan 80 p 1 DW

[Editorial by Guenter Gillessen: "What the West Must Do"]

[Text] The test for a foreign policy lies in the question of whether it can change the will of the opponent. Now a renewal of Western foreign policy outside of Europe has become due which would have to impose on the Soviet Union a restraint which obviously it is not prepared to impose on itself. The Brezhnev doctrine not only applies to Eastern Europe but potentially to all states which are not yet communist but might be victimized by a coup d'etat tomorrow. Potentially means to the extent the Soviet Union has the strength to do it. The West has a say in how far it reaches.

What should and what could the Western countries do now? The United States urges sanctions and has begun with acts of "punishing" Moscow such as the cancellation of the SALT II ratification, the recall of consular personnel, the cut in the wheat deliveries and the curtailment of the fishing rights of the Soviet Union, the threat with a boycott of the Olympic Games in Moscow. In Europe it is just London which supports this U.S. policy. France and the Federal Republic hesitate, would not want to give up "detente policy" and doubt the expediency of sanctions. Are these two governments asking themselves wrong questions? Detente policy cannot be preserved unilaterally. But as far as the effectiveness of sanctions is concerned, it is true that they cannot force the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan. Yet they have still other purposes: they are also signals of the will for resistance, appeals to cohesion, instruments of internal leadership of an alliance.

A "punishment" of the Soviet Union, however, is not enough. It must be prevented from repetitions. After the American will for intervention was worn out in Vietnam, it was hardly deterred anymore in Asia and Africa. What is now in demand is a policy which could insure peace and balance there. Just like in Europe in 1948, such a policy should be composed of three elements: efforts toward mitigating specific enmities among the threatened nations, stabilization of their economic and social conditions, provision of external intervention forces.

A lot will have to be settled in the Third World. The regional conflicts demand solutions or at least a damping, for example on Cyprus, in the Middle East, around Kashmir and in southern Africa. The diplomatic efforts toward an arrangement should be renewed. Especially the large poor countries of the Near and Middle East require a reconstruction of their national economies: Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan. Finally, it will be necessary to move Western conventional intervention forces up against the Soviet expeditionary forces and its proxy armies.

Except for France's minor operations in Black Africa, the Western nations have banished this thought for themselves. A ban for moral and pacifist reasons which obviously harms peace. Self-defense is considered permissible only within the treaty area of NATO. This curtailed reason legitimatizes the definition of Western interests from back in 1948; it neglects to protect the interests in any way other than trade and development assistance. So far no power policy conclusions have been drawn from the demands for the "indivisibility" of detente and from the change of the Soviet Union from the continental European great power of Stalin to the world power of Brezhnev.

What is needed now is not just an American but also a multilateral West European corps for swift overseas missions, comparable to the mixed brigade of the NATO Supreme Commander Europe or the mixed NATO squadron in the Atlantic. These two overseas corps to be additionally set up require a large air transport apparatus, with the aircraft pools of the civilian airlines being requisitioned, if necessary. The triple tasks spell heavy burdens on the individual citizen and the European national economies.

What may become necessary as individual measures is this: The reintroduction of conscription in the United States and in Great Britain and the extension of conscription where it has been cut, for instance, in the Federal Republic; more exercises of the trained reservists; technical specifications in orders for new civilian aircraft, for instance, large cargo hatches in passenger planes; search for, lease and construction of bases and depots in countries wanting Western assistance including military equipment assistance; provision of large credits and expertise for selected receiver states in the Third World. This means renunciation of consumption, of making the "social net" even more close-knit and of searching for constantly new fields of state economic and welfare activity.

The probability of having to use a European intervention army overseas will become all the smaller the more the Western nations are believed that they are capable of acting in a triple way.

CSO: 3103

'SPIEGEL' PUBLISHER VIEWS DIVISIBILITY OF DETENTE

DW151348 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 14 Jan 80 p 20 DW

[Article by Rudolf Augstain: "Detente Is Divisible"]

[Text] Well, it may be that the members of the Politburo did not probably assess the reaction to their invasion of Afghanistan. As usual, we do not know the factions. It seems as though "world opinion" was either unknown or immaterial to a majority.

Why is it that the Western world is reacting differently this time than it did in 1956 to Budapest and in 1968 to Prague, even though the fate of the 17 million Afghans elicits incomparably less emotion in the West than that of the Hungarians and of the CSSR? Because the "compulsion to intervene," inevitable perhaps from the viewpoint of the Russians, this time does not make sense to most people.

After all, it seems as though the Soviets exploited the misfortune of the United States in Iran. Further it seems as though they were the first to start the nonideological war over the raw materials in a bloody way--without giving the detente partner United States even a hint of an advance warning.

Is this so new? The world situation is new, the action of the Soviets not quite. The United States, too, kept a foreign country, South Vietnam, occupied for years, waged war there, and had the leader whom they had imported, Diem, assassinated. It had to pay a very high price, too high a price, however.

Thus it may be that the reckoning of the Soviets will not pan out, either. The country of Afghanistan with its mountain tribes is hard to pacify. The danger of contamination for the 50 million Soviet Muslims may have become greater instead of smaller.

The excitement in the Third World may abate. But we may doubt whether the Soviets have come even one inch closer to the oilfields and an ice-free port on the Indian Ocean.

For there is still the Hacha effect left. When Hitler in March 1939 also grabbed the rest of Czechoslovakia he overturned the cardtable. Granted, the Soviets are not Hitler. What Hitler wanted was the great war. But

if we regard the Soviets as realists, then what remains is just the conclusion that they no longer know their limits. For sheer fear so being threatened, which they have caused themselves, a threat emerges for the entire world and thus for themselves.

When Hitler annexed Prague the appeasement policy collapsed because everybody then knew what it was all about. This time the situation is more complex and more complicated.

Granted, it must be made plain to the Soviets that they cannot afford another Afghanistan. There are means for doing this, even though one cannot but doubt that they will be used with circumspection and persistence by Carter and his people. But there are means, to be sure. Only they must not lead to the erroneous conclusion that detente policy is over now. Perhaps the Kissinger system is over because it lacked the lower part of its body. The alternative to detente in Europe, however, would be war.

Hence, contrary to the opinion of Strauss, is detente policy geographically divisible? Surely so, if one understands by detente what it has so far accomplished.

Detente in Europe means the following: The Soviets have seized too big a part of Europe. They may suffocate from this big bite. The West is making it clear to them and proves that it is not planning any warlike measures. They would have to have this process become deadly, for all. [as published]

This, and nothing else, is detente: the renunciation of pushing the Soviets back behind their borders with military pressure ("roll back"). Since they have not "pericilitated" in other regions of the world, as Bismarck would say, since they did not go beyond the bounds of what is good for them, what is applicable is what applies to the rest of the world, not necessarily to Europe. Here, the alternative is: Either one does not threaten the Soviets with military means, one leaves their conquests to them purely militarily speaking, and awaits developments still unknown to us today, or one marches directly into the great war.

Detente, says Strauss, has produced nothing.

To begin with, this is not true this way, as innumerable people can testify who were helped from a bad situation into a better one. Secondly, the manner of posing the question alone is wrong. Detente in Europe is nothing that we can sell to the others. If we wish to avoid World War III it is worthwhile to us and in itself.

French President Giscard d'Estaing, above all, is aware of that. Surely it is true that Helmut Schmidt, facing the choice between Carter and Giscard d'Estaing, would have to pick Carter in the long run. Yet it is questionable whether Carter will still demand nondetente in Europe at all after his presidential elections. He too, and especially he, is now acting under domestic political pressure.

SPD CHAIRMAN BRANDT INTERVIEWED ON DETENTE AFTER AFGHANISTAN

DW151200 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 14 Jan 80 pp 23-28 DW

[Interview with SPD Chairman Willy Brandt by editors Klaus Wirtgen, Richard Kiessler and Fritjof Meyer in Bonn--date of interview not given]

[Text] SPIEGEL: Mr Brandt, in 1978 you called for "working systematically toward achieving a situation where detente policy may be continued in the transition to the eighties without illusions but with an open mind." Can you still put your stakes on detente after the invasion of Afghanistan by the Russians?

Brandt: Yes, quite expressly and without any illusions, just as we have always done.

SPIEGEL: You will have to justify that.

Brandt: Viewed from the angle of our interests it is a fact that we would be among those most harmed. Hence, we must do everything humanly possible to help prevent a relapse into cold war.

SPIEGEL: This is not so easy to do.

Brandt: We are not a great power even if the world powers--both of them, by the way, one is feeling it in Iran and the other will yet get to feel it somewhere else--also see themselves pushed more strongly to the limits of their power. After all, there is something pathetic about the developments in Iran, seeing as how the greatest power on earth has been facing the Teheran hostage drama for more than 2 months now.

SPIEGEL: What can the Federal Republic do anyway?

Brandt: I think that Chancellor Schmidt did the right thing when he went to Paris to write European solidarity in capital letters. Western solidarity is important, and European solidarity is particularly important in this situation. The threat, where it exists, must not be hushed up.

And since it exists, excitement--I believe Helmut Schmidt said excitement but I might add sterile excitement--will not do us any good. We must rather see this serious crisis through with a clear mind. In that point I am in agreement with Carter.

This may well turn out to be the most serious impairment to world peace since the end of World War II. In any event it is comparable to the Cuban crisis of 1962 when, if we will recall, they surprisingly returned to the negotiating table again. At the same time I am agreed with my friend Bruno Kreisky who has said that this is probably one of the most daring adventures in which the Soviet Union has so far engaged.

SPIEGEL: You just mentioned the Paris visit by the chancellor. Is Paris not an address which is bound to entail irritations in Washington now that France has been the first country to repudiate Carter's reactions to the Soviet invasion?

Brandt: I said on purpose that we must now write European solidarity in capital letters. This in turn must be embedded again, of course, in a good, trustful relationship with the United States, if alone because of our special security interests.

SPIEGEL: Is this the new order of priorities: first European solidarity and then Western solidarity?

Brandt: As far as I am concerned European solidarity and Western solidarity are inseparably linked. But we in Western Europe are not world powers.

We are situated where we are. France is our direct and most important neighbor. The European Community has ceased to be an Economic Community exclusively. As we know, it has difficulties in being such. But if I compare this also with the time 12 years ago when I was involved as foreign minister, we have grown from a rather noncommittal foreign policy consultation into a phase of concerted West European action in foreign policy. From my viewpoint this already wields a weight of its own, without its being allowed to be anti-American.

SPIEGEL: And yet will Bonn not inevitably end up in conflict with the United States?

Brandt: In our books the French foreign minister made some rather harsh utterances a few days ago concerning the U.S. measures. Helmut Schmidt, prior to his flight from Madrid to Paris last Wednesday, expounded this from the viewpoint of the German interests and without any polemics, without any overtones and objectively: We cannot keep the Russians from getting wheat because we are not delivering any wheat anyway. This, by the way, is not quite true for France, and I think that there was some contact between Giscard and Carter.

But I do not want to intrude now. I am speaking of Germany. Unlike the United States, the Federal Republic does not grant any credits....

SPIEGEL: ...But German banks do.

Brandt: The government does not grant any credits, and what is involved here is governments. Unlike many other states we have parity in embassy personnel. We have 100 people in Moscow and they have 104 here. So: cum grano salis, or, a difference of four grains of salt. We have strict

parity in airline connections. Whatever one might think of measures, I do not want to criticize those now which Carter has announced, I just want to quote Kissinger who said that one should be careful not to play mad, by which he surely did not mean his president.

SPIEGEL: Whom else?

Brandt: Those who former Kennedy adviser and historian George F. Kennan in a very interesting essay for the weekly DIE ZEIT directly prior to the intervention in Afghanistan had termed people who are characterized by an increasing militarization of thinking, and this is being somewhat amplified in addition by the American election campaign now.

All I say is this: In the case of these measures it is necessary to watch out that they will not turn into a mere phrase. I am not saying anything against the American considerations. Nor is it up to me to make politics for the United States; I am rather back at the point where I would like to see our policy remain as closely tied into the West European policy, into the policy jointly developed with France and with our other West European partners, which then must be coordinated in the Atlantic Alliance.

[DW151225] SPIEGEL: Have you not now turned the priorities of former times upside down?

Brandt: Oh well, you know, earlier times: these really are very earlier times when people in Germany spoke of Atlantic advocates on the one hand and Gaullists on the other. Even then I refused to be pressed properly into the pattern. I once bought a lot of criticism also in my own party, I was not quite yet chairman at that time, when I said in New York--on purpose in New York--after a prudent speech by De Gaulle, as I found: Why only he?

I did not apply this to all points of De Gaulle but to one which now has a relation to our subject: the utilization of the leeway between the superpowers by a European medium power sought by De Gaulle.

SPIEGEL: This was also addressed to the Soviets.

Brandt: For a mayor of Berlin, after all, it was obvious to ponder the question as to what should become of our relationship with the Soviet Union.

SPIEGEL: Can we still face the Russians today as we did 10 years ago when you signed the German-Soviet treaty?

Brandt: Yes, how did we face them 10 years ago? At the time we did so in a genuine effort not to obliterate anything for a change with regard to the difference which in fact exist: convictions, ideology, as some people call it--which basically is a nonsensical word--interests which are identical only where they deal with peace and, as I believe, of as much objective cooperation as possible. This, after all, has not changed.

SPIEGEL: One of the main pillars of your detente policy has been the confidence in the Soviets' will for peace--and for that you have been attacked often enough by the opposition. Does the Soviet invasion still fit into the picture of a peaceable partner?

Brandt: The policy we have been able to pursue as a non-world power in the years we are now discussing was by nature a policy primarily aimed at Europe. I observe with interest how many people in our country say that if at all, then worldwide detente would be necessary. This would be very nice; this would also be to my liking. Kissinger would have wanted that too. And perhaps chances were missed to reach beyond Europe. Maybe the constellations were particularly unfavorable especially close to the end of Nixon's presidency.

Even if my outrage, disappointment, embitterment over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were even stronger than they are, nobody can dissuade me from asking the question concerning our interests and from drawing attention to the dangers emanating from those who have written adventurism on their banners even if they have a different name for it.

SPIEGEL: Who do you mean by that?

Brandt: To me it is interesting to note with what relative self-discipline Mr Strauss at first stated his view. It is no particular feat that he, in so doing, temporarily was advantageously different from his paper BAYERNKURIER. I am not surprised that he thereby differed from Helmut Kohl for the time being who insinuates that the chancellor and I do the Soviet Union's business. This is so unqualified that it actually need not be registered.

But the fact that a man like Alfred Dregger says in all earnestness that it is now time to extend the area of operation of NATO to the Persian Gulf means concretely: German soldiers, German airplanes, German ships if we had some that could be used there, should be used for military actions beyond the area of the alliance. I think this is wrong.

SPIEGEL: Do you still consider the Soviet Union a trustworthy partner now that Carter has said that he feels personally deceived by Brezhnev?

Brandt: You know, I naturally ask myself, as do many others who contemplate developments in the world, what is happening at the power controls in the one world power and in the other. The excellent expert on the Soviets, Kennan, says that the circle around Brezhnev enthusiastic for detente is presumably on the retreat from the political stage. I cannot give a conclusive answer to that, but I say time and again that I must proceed from the German interests and I must, without harboring any illusions and without deceiving myself, try to find out whether the basis for continuing or for beginning anew does not exist after all.

SPIEGEL: Your friend Kreisky already doubts that the CSCE followup conference planned in Madrid for late 1980 will take place.

Brandt: Without claiming a copyright I doubted that long before Afghanistan. I told myself that there will be elections in a few important countries--above all in a very important Western country--and therefore emotions will make it impossible to talk reasonably in Madrid in November 1980 and to engage in less polemics than in Belgrade in 1978,

After all, we can already see now that this terrible event will not be easy on the Russians, the first balance sheet showing that Cuba has not been elected a member of the Security Council even though it is chairing the movement of the nonaligned. And Mrs Gandhi, whose name is very strongly linked with the friendship treaty between India and the Soviet Union, has made pointedly critical utterances about the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Quite generally the Soviet Union is encountering very harsh criticism in the Third World.

But I fully and wholly agree with the German Chancellor that we must continue exploiting all available options for an exchange of opinions with the Soviet Union. This also holds true for the CSCE.

SPIEGEL: Did you personally have any contacts in the past few days with Brezhnev as whose friend you are taken in the Federal Republic?

Brandt: No, none.

[DW] (VDB) SPIEGEL: Would it not be useful if the SPD chairman, who is also the chief of the Socialist International, were to go to Moscow as soon as possible?

Brandt: I have reached an age and a state of mind in which you just do not, or should not, obtrude anywhere any longer.

SPIEGEL: This means that if a signal were forthcoming from Moscow, you would go?

Brandt: This need not necessarily come from there alone.

SPIEGEL: There would be ample topics to discuss. If voices are raised in the Federal Republic demanding that NATO be extended to the Persian Gulf, one might visualize a counterposition, namely extending detente up to the Persian Gulf.

Brandt: Yes, this is exactly what would matter. Viewed from the Western angle it looks like this: The Russians have insured their possessions in Europe, which is but half of the truth. After all, we also gained something. I do not want us to feel in Berlin again, as we did before and after the Cuban crisis, how sensitive we are. But the people are saying that the Russians have abided by something like detente only where it was in keeping with their interests, subsequently having made a thrust into other, soft regions.

SPIEGEL: That is true, is it not?

Brandt: You know, this is part of the character of world powers. When Egyptian President Al-Sadat, whom I not only respect but also esteem, fell out with the Russians the Americans did not say: We now declare this an area which must cope by itself. Instead they endeavored to intensify their relations. After the Soviet Union established itself, or at least engaged itself, at several points partially directly and partially through the Cubans, and partially--completely unreasonably--through the GDR....

SPIEGEL: ...You mean Africa, above all....

Brandt:...The Americans have been trying for bases in Kenya, in Oman and in Somalia.

SPIEGEL: Do you deem this reasonable?

Brandt: Let me put it this way, to begin with. What matters is not whether I deem something appropriate between the two world powers in this connection; I only state this: This is in line with an intensification now further aggravating. What is inherent in it is the possibility that we may well skid into war.

SPIEGEL: Do you mean to say that the West has aggravated the situation?

Brandt: I did not say that. This is a mutually upward swinging of a crisis to a point where ultimately nobody can tell where it all started. We must not, however, forget in this connection that the intelligence services and arms lobbyists are making life hard for the acting politicians of both world powers.

SPIEGEL: On the occasion of his Bonn visit in 1978 Brezhnev, in a joint statement with Chancellor Schmidt, promised with his signature "to respect the indivisibility of peace and security in all parts of the world." The Federal Government in its reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan has committed itself to the principle of the indivisibility of detente. Is it not necessary now to declare this principle obsolete if the Federal Republic wants to look after its own interests?

Brandt: No, it is necessary--though I think not for me--to approach matters much more soberly. In the West, too, people must get rid of all temptations of hypocrisy.

It is with a certain interest that I observe that some people who are more excited about the military adventure in Afghanistan than others would have had no objection if the Americans had landed in Iran. Before this terrible hostage affair started it was not just particular representatives of the United States who talked about possibly securing the oil sources also with means of military power. Well, that preponderance of military thinking is a phenomenon that is probably not limited to just a part of the Soviet leadership.

SPIEGEL: Mr Brandt, for what do you plead concretely by demanding more instead of less detente as an answer to Afghanistan?

Brandt: I do not say "more detente" but--please, we must not misunderstand each other here--I say that if possible, the things that have been achieved in Europe must not be destroyed now, because it would be difficult enough to bring it back to the present state.

SPIEGEL: You mean Berlin?

Brandt: No, I speak of Germany as such and of relations between both parts of Germany and the parts of Europe. I would add that as desirable as it might be to extend detente, this enterprise has proven to be most difficult. But one must try it.

You know, years ago I learned something from the late Jean Monnet who was the actual father of what was called the Schumann Plan. He derived the firm conviction on the basis of experience gathered in two world wars that Germany, France and Western Europe as a whole ought to merge more closely. When West European cooperation had once again become most difficult he told me: "When it becomes most difficult, one must give some thought to rearranging the scenery. Often one can create another picture with the same means and one can start something anew by rearranging the scenario, something that seemed to be stuck completely."

[DW151300] SPIEGEL: Would you agree to the thesis that on principle detente is indivisible, but we Europeans must act out of our own interest as if it were divisible?

Brandt: No. I want to use another comparison. My basic conviction as well as that of many people in our country is--whether you say that it is due to the anchoring in Christianity or humanism--that human dignity is indivisible.

That does not create the conclusion, however, that I am only in favor of human rights in my part of the world, although they are valid everywhere; it creates exactly the opposite conclusion: I must be for them wherever it is possible and I must try to expand the sphere of human rights.

SPIEGEL: Does the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan prove all those NATO "hawks" right who emphasized the recent decision of the alliance to produce and station new medium-range missiles in Europe, and who consider the offer to negotiate on bilateral disarmament just a necessary addition?

Brandt: Yes, that hazard exists. In a certain way it is the fault of the Russians themselves. We West Europeans as well as the Americans--but most of us are Germans and Europeans--must ask ourselves whether we would not have been well advised to have started negotiations earlier.

SPIEGEL: That would have meant sitting down at a table prior to the NATO decision made on 12 December.

Brandt: No, that is a date picked at random. One could have decided earlier or differently. I said that two things were in the air: first, there was the thing NATO has been discussing for many years--it is not so that in 1979 somebody suddenly had that idea. And then there was the speech by Brezhnev given in early October in East Berlin.

SPIEGEL: Would no invasion of Afghanistan have taken place if negotiations had started at an earlier date?

Brandt: There are people who believe that the Afghanistan invasion would not have taken place had there been intense negotiations between both alliances at that time.

SPIEGEL: Mr Brandt, how do you assess the reaction of the U.S. President to the invasion of Afghanistan?

Brandt: I am not his censor.

SPIEGEL: But you are one of the most renowned foreign politicians....

Brandt:...Really!

SPIEGEL:...of the Western world.

Brandt: Come on. I follow all that with great interest and the proper respect.

SPIEGEL: Is it right to stop the wheat supplies? Or will that possibly end up hitting the wrong people?

Brandt: My experience indicates--but one can always learn something new--that economic boycotts have actually never caused anything politically significant. But it is not so that the United States wants to or will starve the Soviet Union....

SPIEGEL: ...It probably could not do that at all....

Brandt: ...It wanted much rather to demonstrate through a number to getting together as soon as possible then something would have been gained. I consider it one of the great neglects of past years that Carter and Brezhnev needed so much time before they talked to each other.

SPIEGEL: Should the Federal Republic also give such signals? Do you consider it opportune for Chancellor Schmidt to postpone his planned visits to Honecker and Brezhnev?

Brandt: Canceling such visits, who is supposed to gain something through that? I think it is correct that we voice our opinion, stressing how shocked we feel and how dangerous it is, that we meet those in the United Nations who say this and that we talk sensibly to the people of the Third World.

SPIEGEL: There is speculation, not in BAYERNKURIER but in the SPD paper VORWAERTS, as to whether it "would not be advisable if the chancellor and Honecker were not to meet in late January or early February as if nothing had happened between the East and the West. Postponing a meeting between Schmidt and the SED General Secretary, therefore, could make sense--as long as at least as the present mideast crisis prevails." Is that your opinion?

Brandt: No, that is not a decision of the SPD executive board--it is not necessarily the highest wisdom either--it is an article signed by a Bonn journalist whom I respect very much. Moreover, I believe it would mean overrating the role Honecker plays in the other camp if one believes that he has handled the levers very much that led to the invasion of Afghanistan.

SPIEGEL: Would a postponement of the visit make sense just to keep the dialog between Schmidt and Honecker free of emotions connected with the Afghanistan invasion?

Brandt: I do not believe that Schmidt is emotional. Why should Honecker be emotional? Why should they not be able to negotiate on issues in their limited spheres? I do not want to set a date, I never did that. But I am, as Federal Chancellor Schmidt said himself, in favor of changing nothing about the plans. If the other side wants to change them, it will say so. That pertains not only to contacts between both German states but also to the continuation of the certainly not simple but important dialog with the Soviet Union.

SPIEGEL: Could a friendly handshake between Schmidt and Honecker at the present time cost the SPD votes in the Landtag elections in North-Rhine Westphalia and Baden-Wuerttemberg?

Brandt: I know very well that a changed world political landscape would have domestic political consequences. But some people might be surprised with regard to these consequences. If I understand it correctly there is, next to numerous statements made by beer drinking strategists aiming at aggravation, a deep longing among our people to participate in nothing that could lead to unnecessary aggravation and dangers. I trust that there is a good majority for the pursuance of a policy of commonsense.

SPIEGEL: In 1963 you were invited as the then Berlin mayor to a talk with Khrushchev; the Springer Press and the CDU drummed against it. Since the Senate, with its CDU members, threatened to fall apart, you did not go to Khrushchev in East Berlin. But the people of Berlin who were supposed to vote right at that time, pleaded for detente.

Brandt: I like to recall that because the elections did not turn out so badly for the SPD, it achieved about 62 percent. In my precinct in Wedding I achieved about 75 percent. Today....

[DW151323] SPIEGEL: ...That belongs to the past.

Brandt:...It is not usual any more in the country.

SPIEGEL: The opposition will diabolize the detente policy pursued by Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr as wishful thinking and illusionism.

Brandt: Yes, but I am not the one any more who must negotiate for the Federal Republic of Germany.

SPIEGEL: But you must lead the election campaign as the chairman of the leading government party.

Brandt: Certainly I will have to stand my test in the election campaign, and I will have to lead it together with the Federal Chancellor. That is absolutely certain. You know, one can dispute with these people who are jubilant whenever matters do not work out fine; they run toward an aggravation of the world political situation as some creatures run whenever they see grist for their mill.

SPIEGEL: In 1972 you won the elections with the treaties with the East....

Brandt: ...Did I? That is not so certain.

SPIEGEL: Let us suppose it. Must you not expect that in the forthcoming election campaign this treaty policy will be thrown into your face again by the opposition with a view to Afghanistan?

Brandt: I cannot rule out that there will be new demagogy. But there are many people, not just in Berlin but also here, who recall the times when one could not go more or less unhindered to Berlin and back, and when there was no family reunification with people coming from Poland or the Soviet Union.

I do not believe that our industry, which obtained some new markets in the Soviet Union, Poland and elsewhere, wants to undo the treaties. That sounds a bit cheap, but I am also there to give some thought to employment problems in the years to come.

SPIEGEL: You have belonged so far to the politicians who are becoming more and more rare, politicians who quoted not merely achievement balances in election campaign but who also offered a view to the future. So you think that foreign policy offers an opportunity for the SPD to wage an offensive election campaign?

Brandt: "Offensive" is a great word. But in political life there are times and areas when and where it is important not to break more China than absolutely necessary

SPIEGEL: Could an election campaign with emphasis on security and foreign policy curtail the chances of the greens [environment protection party] because they have nothing to say on that subject?

Brandt: I can imagine that some people who otherwise would stand aside, also young people, would become active if safeguarding peace policy were or is involved--I leave that to you.

SPIEGEL: How about the effects it would have on the coalition? Could you imagine that a close link to Genscher's FDP could be achieved through foreign politics?

Brandt: What Genscher and Schmidt have said recently with regard to detente policy fits together smoothly.

SPIEGEL: Genscher prided himself at the Epiphany weekend meeting of the Baden-Wuerttemberg FDP by saying that he was right in warning against Wehner's thesis that Soviet arms are defensive.

Brandt: That was a party meeting in a land where Mr Genscher wanted to challenge Erhard Eppler, which naturally....

SPIEGEL:...Also Herbert Wehner.

Brandt: I do not know that. Despite all polemics, Mr Genscher naturally will also know that he has formed a coalition not just with one part of the SPD but with an SPD to the leadership of which Erhard Eppler belongs also.

SPIEGEL: You are evasive. Egon Bahr and you have been sharing the thesis of Wehner. So....

Brandt: ...If you have something to discuss with Herbert Wehner you must talk to him about it.

SPIEGEL: The SPD at its Berlin congress barely managed to support a rearmament decision, promising "security for the eighties." If you are honest, the party did that against its inner conviction. Can that not backfire fatally if the CDU says: Only we can guarantee what the SPD has promised lightheartedly?

Brandt: I consider that a question, but my answer amounts to no, and that for two reasons.

When the CDU says "security" I still recall something which literally was called "no experiments." When the SPD says "security for the eighties," it is saying that we know today better than in early December at the Berlin party congress how endangered the world is in which we live. We will do all kinds of things to represent your interests as well as possible, but that cannot be done with a policy of insistence.

SPIEGEL: Are you not happy to have just finished your Berlin party congress before the situation in the world changed so dramatically?

Brandt: Christmas comes but once a year.

SPIEGEL: Mr Brandt, we thank you for this talk.

COMMENTATOR VIEWS 'BREZHNEV DOCTRINE NO 2'

DW151359 Bonn DIE WELT in German 15 Jan 80 p 6 DW

[Editorial by Carl Gustaf Stroehm: "Brezhnev Doctrine No 2"]

[Text] In a talk with PRAVDA, Leonid Brezhnev--of whom some Western publicists believe that he was against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and that he was therefore "overruled" in the Politburo--justified Moscow's military action against Kabul.

The Soviet party chief starts out from two theses that must be viewed with the greatest attention because it could be the sample for further Soviet interventions of a similar kind. First, he states that the "people" of Afghanistan asked the Soviets for help--and Moscow followed its commitment so as not to abandon the "people." Had it not done so, a similar situation could have come about in Afghanistan as in Chile. Second, the security of the Soviet Union was endangered because the imperialists intended to turn Afghanistan into a base.

If one analyzes Brezhnev's thesis, the following picture can be seen: The Soviet Union reserves the right for itself to become active everywhere in the world where it will be called in by "the people." Obviously it did not interfere in Chile because that country is still too far away from Moscow. On principle, however, the Soviet Union could have acted in every country, Brezhnev used the formula "people" in the Marxist-Leninist sense: the "people" consists of the progressive forces, the people are not the mountain tribes who defend themselves against the Soviet invasion. The people are only the friends of Moscow, such communists as Amin, who do not stand on the side of the "people"--meaning that they do not follow the Soviet line for whatever reason--are not the people but criminals who must be eliminated in the name of the people.

Closely linked with that missionary awareness that reaches in the meantime as far as Africa and the entire Third World is the Soviet definition of security. Moscow reserves it to itself to decide when insecurity is taking place, that is, when it will be necessary to take military action in a neighbor country. One recalls: In 1956 in Hungary and in 1968 in Czechoslovakia the action of the Soviet army was justified by saying that in these countries the imperialists, the Americans (in the case of Prague it was even the Federal Republic!) wanted to get a foothold and that the security of the Soviet Union would be threatened that way.

The combination of "the people" who call one in and the "security" that must be preserved gives the Soviet Union a practically unrestricted right to intervene. After the quenching of the Prague spring in 1968 the Kremlin formulated the first Brezhnev doctrine, namely the doctrine about the "limited sovereignty of socialist states."

Now we have a second Brezhnev doctrine doing considerably beyond the first. Now the right of the Soviets to intervene has been extended also to non-communist states, when both factors exist--the people call one in and security that is threatened. But only Moscow will tell when that has occurred. So Brezhnev adapted the doctrine to the changed international conditions that are considerably more advantageous for Moscow.

The Prague intervention of 1968 that was discarded by Western states with the remark that this was a sphere of influence belonging to Moscow since the end of the war, created great concern in "in-between zones" such as Yugoslavia. But now it is clear: Wherever destabilization of internal conditions takes place, Moscow reserves for itself the right to take action. Such unstable neighbors of the Soviet Union as Turkey, but also "still" stable countries such as Finland, Yugoslavia and maybe even Norway could be candidates for the implementation of Soviet security interests.

At the moment, however, one country feels involved that is closer to the place of action. Ayatollah Khomeyni reacted to a statement of the USSR's *Ministre d'affaires* in Mexico. The Soviet diplomat was said to have stated that Moscow is prepared to offer its help to Iran--also military help--in case of an American blockade. Khomeyni protested against that "unfounded statement" which amounts to an "insult," warning Moscow by saying that "we will resist with all our strength every violation of our country's integrity." The Ayatollah wants to make it clear in time that his people are not calling the Soviets in. But whether Moscow will accept him as "the voice of the people," will depend only on the power situation.

Names do not matter. A Soviet diplomat told DIE WELT (issue of 14 January) that one can later on eliminate the same Amin who allegedly asked for help, eliminate him because he did not pursue the right policy vis-a-vis the Mullahs. Simultaneously one can, as did Lenin and Stalin, exploit the "contradictions" existing between the imperialists. If the West Europeans were to separate from the Americans, everything could be good again--indicates Brezhnev.

The question is only: Did Brezhnev want the West Europeans to play the same role as was played at a time by the "bourgeois" Afghan Prime Minister Daud, who was a noncommunist friend of the Soviets until he was eliminated by the "people" (namely through a communist putsch)? As regards fraternal socialist help, the difference between the Afghans and the West Europeans consists only of the fact that the latter enjoy the protection of a strong alliance. The first step in the direction desired by Moscow, therefore, would be Western Europe's separation from the United States.

STOLTENBERG ATTACKS SCHMIDT ON OIL DEPENDENCY SITUATION

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 27 Dec 79 p 4

[Article: "Dependence on Oil Just as Great as in 1972"]

[Text] Bonn, 26 December. The recent oil price increase announced by the oil-producing countries has also dominated the economic and political discussions over the Christmas holidays. The deputy chairman of the CDU, Stoltenberg, drew a great deal of attention with his criticism of Chancellor Schmidt by maintaining that Schmidt did not make use of his spiritual and political leadership in assuring energy supplies, either with regard to his own party or to the public. For this reason Stoltenberg foresees the danger of a crisis in energy supplies in the 1980's. The CDU politician said that the years since the first oil crisis in 1973 were lost because of the "disastrous conflict" on the use of nuclear energy in the large government party for the development of a long-range energy policy. Stoltenberg noted that at about 51 percent this year, the portion of imported crude oil on the energy balance sheet is just as high as in 1972. Progress in becoming more independent of oil has hardly been achieved, he said.

Government spokesman Boelling contested Stoltenberg's charge. Hardly any other government leader has fought so energetically and with so much foresight for a rational energy policy as has Schmidt, he said. The chancellor will also do all he can next year for a common oil and energy policy of the Western industrial nations in view of the possible oil shortages and price increases. He went on to say that "national egoistic interests" have to be extinguished in favor of the functioning efficiency of the European Community and of the West as a whole. Instead of pointing the finger at the Federal Government, he said, Stoltenberg should have a word with Strauss and Albrecht so that they might create the preconditions for a limited expansion of nuclear energy by constructing interim storage depots for spent fuel rods.

For the time being, the Federal Government does not see any pressing need for it to change its energy policy. This conclusion can be derived from the comments of SPD Chairman Wischniewski. It is known that Federal

Economics Minister Graf Lambsdorff, as always, does not think too much of a speed limit on the autobahns or of other coercive measures. The most recent price increases by the oil-producing countries have not changed his opinion on this. As observers in Bonn note, for now the Federal Government wants to wait and see what the future developments in the crude oil markets will be and observe very closely whether the oil prices are more differentiated than they have been up to now.

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CSO: 3103

FEDERAL BUDGET PASSED, DETAILS GIVEN

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 15 Dec 79 p 4

[Staff report by "Kg": "1980 Federal Budget Passed--Parties Are in Agreement on Further Consolidation--Debt Increase of DM 24 Billion--Matthoefer: The CDU Has No Policy Concept"]

[Text] Bonn, 14 December. On Friday the Bundestag passed the 1980 budget with 249 votes of the SPD and FDP against 229 votes of the CDU/CSU. The budget envisages expenditures of DM 214.5 billion, which yields an increase of 5.6 percent over the level of the preceding year. The expenditures can be financed only with the incurrance of new debt of roughly DM 24 billion. This reduces the growth of indebtedness by a few billion marks in comparison to the preceding years. In the closing debate on Friday, in which the budget specialists of the parties and Finance Minister Matthoefer participated, the Bundestag was in agreement on the necessity of maintaining the policy of consolidation also in the next few years.

Matthoefer accused the opposition of not having juxtaposed a policy concept of its own to the government draft and of having attempted instead to undermine the confidence in the solidity and credibility of the Federal Government's policies. This attempt has failed, he noted, and with the 1980 budget the coalition has created a basis which will bring the FRG security, liberty, peace, full employment and economic stability also in the coming decade insofar as this is possible in this unsettled world. Matthoefer said the opposition wanted to burden fiscal policy with an entire set of demands that were mutually irreconcilable, such as the demand for a reduction of indebtedness and at the same time the numerous requests for expenditure increases. The Federal Government did not intend to enter into a contest of "illusionary promises" with the opposition.

CDU deputy Windelen, the chairman of the budgetary committee, said that the shortfalls of the Federal Government's policies were not reflected in the budget. The strengthening of families, the safeguarding of the future energy base, the securing of freedom against threats from the inside and the outside, the restoration of health to the pension system and the reduction of the oppressive debt burden--none of these questions had found a satisfactory answer in the 1980 budget. The consultations in the budgetary committee had not changed anything of significance in this respect. Even though the budgetary committee had cut DM 1.8 billion, owing to additional expenditures the savings in comparison to government's draft budget were only DM 800 million.

Windelen pointed out that the committee had reduced by almost 40 percent the government's demands for new plan positions and reclassifications of posts to higher levels. Thus the budget politicians had proven themselves stronger than Matthoefer and Schmidt. The result could nonetheless not be considered satisfactory. In spite of a continued decline of the population the public service did not cease expanding. Personnel costs had by now swallowed up more than one-third of all state expenditures. This increasingly constrained the margin of latitude available for political decisions.

The fiscal expert of the FDP, Hoppe, presented the view that the restoration of health to the state financial system had gained outlines. But the future development was not without risks. The tax reduction in 1981 would in the first instance have to produce an easing of the progressivity of taxation. But the consolidation of state finances would have to retain priority also in 1981. In 1980 the threats for state finances are more likely to stem from oil price increases. Both the economy and the consumer would again be burdened. Hoppe asked the Bundestag to contribute to a reduction in aggressiveness and an enhancement of tolerance. In the Bundestag, too, he saw an increasing tendency to approach matters in terms of a "friend vs enemy" conceptualization.

The SPD politician Loeffler said that the Federal Government had the aim of achieving a soberly moderate reduction in the annual debt increase. Budgetary expenditure policies, he noted, have greater flexibility than tax policies and therefore are more suitable for countersteering in case of economic setbacks. But the spending budget also has a fixed structure which cannot be rapidly and simply adjusted to the economic requirements of the economy. It is not feasible to reduce expenditures suddenly in case of a change in the economic situation. This has to be done carefully, in form of a gliding approach and not in that of a dive, but at any rate consistently. The real danger in a net increase of the government debt of more than DM 20 billion is not the actual volume of borrowing, but the process of habituation which creates a mental approach structured in terms of demands. Many were of the opinion that the state could do everything, even if it had to incur debts.

<u>Individual Expenditure Positions</u>	<u>1980 in DM 1,000</u>	<u>1979 in DM 1,000</u>	<u>Change from 1979 increase (+) or decrease (-)</u>
Federal President and President's Office	14,693	14,330	+ 363
Bundestag [lower house of parliament]	342,270	310,073	+32,197
Bundesrat [upper house of parliament]	9,106	8,861	+ 245

The 1980 Federal Budget (in DM 1,000)

Bundespräsident und Bundespräsidialamt (1)	14 693	14 330	+	363
Bundestag (2)	342 270	310 073	+	32 197
Bundesrat (3)	9 106	8 861	+	245
Bundeskanzler und Bundeskanzleramt (4)	397 822	383 353	+	14 469
Auswärtiges Amt (5)	1 833 648	1 664 023	+	169 625
Bundesminister des Innern (6)	3 649 632	3 414 428	+	235 204
Bundesminister der Justiz (7)	331 888	324 494	+	7 394
Bundesminister der Finanzen (8)	3 005 835	3 439 583	—	433 748
Bundesminister für Wirtschaft (9)	5 678 499	5 112 633	+	565 866
Bundesminister für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten (10)	6 594 978	6 393 214	+	201 764
Bundesminister für Arbeit und Sozialordnung (11)	48 242 263	44 781 951	+	3 460 312
Bundesminister für Verkehr (12)	25 834 172	26 347 591	—	453 419
Bundesminister für das Post- und Fernmeldewesen (13)	16 468	4 963	+	11 505
Bundesminister der Verteidigung (14)	38 461 588	36 663 605	+	1 797 983
Bundesminister für Jugend, Familie und Gesundheit (15)	18 931 945	18 290 592	+	641 353
Bundesverfassungsgericht (16)	11 938	10 780	+	1 158
Bundesrechnungshof (17)	34 369	33 182	+	1 187
Bundesminister für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (18)	5 231 672	4 937 916	+	293 756
Bundesminister für Raumordnung, Bauwesen und Städtebau (19)	4 382 440	4 273 556	+	108 884
Bundesminister für innerdeutsche Beziehungen (20)	481 044	467 538	+	13 506
Bundesminister für Forschung und Technologie (21)	6 001 018	5 568 187	+	432 831
Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft (22)	4 124 250	4 151 253	—	27 003
Bundesschuld (23)	16 026 550	13 387 882	+	2 638 668
Versorgung (24)	9 106 202	8 719 374	+	386 828
Verteidigungskosten im Zusammenhang mit dem Aufenthalt ausländischer Streitkräfte (25)	1 249 370	1 131 653	+	117 717
Zivile Verteidigung (26)	739 948	730 661	+	9 287
Allgemeine Finanzverwaltung (27)	13 686 392	12 723 024	+	962 468
Summe Haushalt (28)	214 480 000	203 289 600	+	11 190 400

Key:

1. Federal President and President's Office
2. Bundestag [lower house of parliament]
3. Bundesrat [upper house of parliament]
4. Federal Chancellor and Chancellor's Office
5. Foreign Office
6. Federal Minister of the Interior
7. Federal Minister of Justice
8. Federal Minister of Finance
9. Federal Minister for Economics
10. Federal Minister for Food, Agriculture & Forestry

[key continued on next page]

Key: [continued from previous page]

11. Federal Minister for Labor & Social Affairs
12. Federal Minister for Transport
13. Federal Minister for Post & Telecommunications
14. Federal Minister of Defense
15. Federal Minister for Youth, Family & Health
16. Federal Constitutional Court
17. Federal Accountancy Court
18. Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation
19. Federal Minister Regional Planning, Housing & City Planning
20. Federal Minister for Inner-German Relations
21. Federal Minister for Research & Technology
22. Federal Minister for Education & Science
23. Federal Debt
24. Provisioning
25. Defense Costs Related to the Stationing of Foreign Military Forces
26. Civil Defense
27. General Financial Administration
28. Total Budget Expenditures

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CSO: 3103

MARK REVALUATION PREDICTED FOR SPRING 1980

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 12 Dec 79 p 4

[Staff report by "Ho": "New D-Mark Revaluation in the Spring? Professor Willgerodt Notes Lack of Stabilization efforts"]

[Text] Bonn, 11 December. The German mark will probably have to be revalued again within the framework of the European Monetary System [EMS] next spring. This is what Prof Hans Willgerodt (University of Cologne) predicted Tuesday in Bonn during a "market-economic consultation" on the year about to close by the "Action Group for a Social Market Economy." Willgerodt justified this prognosis with the lack of stabilization efforts above all in France and Italy. The compulsion towards a common stabilization policy, which for many people had been the hoped-for consequence of the introduction of the EMS, has not been forthcoming. Willgerodt mainly reproached President Giscard d'Estaing of France with the failure of conducting a policy of stabilization; he observed that French economic policy can be watched only "with bated breath."

Willgerodt accused the industrial countries of throwing overboard market economic concepts in the field of international trade without scruples for the sake of a short-sighted defense of narrow interests. In the fields of steel, textile products and other goods an increasing use of voluntary restraint agreements and other forms of trade constraints can be noted. The developing countries, by contrast, are increasingly discovering the advantages of a market economy. Willgerodt pointed to Taiwan, Malaysia, and other countries of Eastern Asia which by now have obtained good economic results with market economic methods.

The chairman of the Action Group for a Social Market Economy, Wolfgang Frickhoefer, asked for a maximal degree of flexibility and innovation for the mastering of structural changes. Protective subsidies, codetermination and excessive protection against dismissals are contrary to this aim, he noted. Frickhoefer rejected all forms of protection of the status quo, whether concerned enterprises or workers and employees.

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CSO: 3103

BRIEFS

WARNING ON NATO ACTION--Bonn--Wolfgang Mischnick, chairman of the FDP Bundestag Parliamentary Group, has warned against military actions by NATO outside the theater in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. At the start of a parliamentary group meeting in Bonn today, he said that anyone who supported such a step was committing himself to "military actionism" [militaerischer aktionismus] which would eventually cause conflicts in other regions to be extended to Central Europe. Mischnick thus opposed statements by CDU/CSU politicians, whom he called upon to rely more on reason. [Excerpt] [LD151458 Hamburg DPA in German 1259 CMT 15 Jan 80 LD]

LAMBSDORFF ON SAUDI ARABIA VISIT--[Question] We depend more on Saudi Arabia than ever. Will that country continue to be relatively stable? Will it remain a reliable and cheap oil supplier? [Answer] We assume, and I have been assured of that here again by the Crown Prince as well as by oil Minister Yamani, that Saudi Arabia will continue its moderate oil policy which shows a great deal of responsibility toward the conditions of world economy. That was in part contained in the message of the Federal chancellor addressed to the Saudi Crown Prince in which he thanked him for that attitude. We have good reason for doing this because the situation has not become easier for the Saudi Government. The number of hawks has increased who want to have higher oil prices and who threaten to cause an oil shortage. The number of those with insight and common sense has rather decreased. But Saudi Arabia also in the future wants to pursue that policy, although, and one must plainly admit it, the situation has not become simpler for it, as I said. [Interview with Dr Otto Graf Lambsdorff, federal minister of economics, by Reporter Ederer, in Riyadh--recorded] [Text] [DW101343 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 2000 GMT 9 Jan 80 DW]

KOHL ON SOVIET INVASION--Berlin--Leading CDU-CSU politicians have again stressed that the policy of detente is indivisible. At a parliamentary group meeting in the Berlin Reichstag building, opposition leader Helmut Kohl said that a genuine detente policy presupposed a real balance of military and political power between East and West, not only in Europe but throughout the world. Kohl again condemned the invasion of Afghanistan

by Soviet troops and said that the wind of the Stalin era was blowing again. He sharply criticized the Social Democrats for protesting against the opposition giving things their proper name. He said that what had happened to Afghanistan today could happen to Pakistan or Saudi Arabia, Yugoslavia or Romania tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow. Free Europe and West Berlin could also be affected. [Excerpt] [LD151530 Hamburg DPA in German 1201 GMT 15 Jan 80 LD]

REVERTING TO DULLES DOCTRINE--The world power United States is recalling the strategy of Dulles. Granted, Carter does not copy the energetic Secretary of State of the fifties in all respects. One does not want to be victimized by his "pactomania." Yet the system of bases of the Eisenhower era is modern again. This is not surprising, because a naval power which maintains a gigantic air fleet to boot, must think and act flexibly with regard to strategic matters and not statically. Mobility requires bases and not vast territories--one clings to the strategically opposite coast, the conquest of the continents not being required. The new orientation of U.S. military policy compelled by Afghanistan has placed these old and tested principles into the center of planning again. Key areas of the policy of bases are the Indian Ocean, the Near and Middle East. The Guam doctrine has been replaced--by the Dulles concept. [Text] [DW170833 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 17 Jan 80 p 8 DW]

SAFEGUARDING DETENTE--Berlin--Speaking at his new year press conference, Berlin's governing mayor, Dietrich Stobbe, SPD, today demanded that despite the conflicts in the world every effort must be made to safeguard detente in Europe. Stobbe stressed that the USSR's intervention in Afghanistan violated international law and must be condemned with particular emphasis, especially in Berlin. It was however by no means inevitable that crises in other parts of the world must have negative consequences for East-West detente in Europe. In the past, detente between East and West had been possible where a political equilibrium had been able to develop on the basis of a military equilibrium. Speaking about the proposed meeting between Chancellor Schmidt and GDR State Council Chairman Erich Honecker, he said that it might contribute to the stabilization of detente between the two German states. [Excerpts] [LD171614 Hamburg DPA in German 1141 GMT 17 Jan 80 LD]

GERMAN-AMERICAN WEDGE--We Europeans ask first what good Carter's needling policy could be for the West. Even that will be interpreted by many Americans as a lack of loyalty to the alliance. Special mistrust will be directed against us Germans, a mistrust fed by many sources. Will the

Soviets be able to succeed in driving a wedge between the Germans and the Americans as some sort of byproduct of their Afghanistan aggression, so to speak? We could not avoid a wedge even if we supported the American reaction unconditionally and in an unrestricted way, because it is doomed to fail in any case; and because the Americans then would prefer to hold us responsible rather than themselves. In addition, we do not just have reason to doubt the success of the American measures, we must also fear that they could be dangerous for us Germans, for the West as a whole and for world peace. The Soviets hold West Berlin as a hostage. And Germans and Americans are equally involved in Berlin. [Text] [DW161246 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German to East and West Germany 1200 GMT 13 Jan 80 DW]

CSO: 3103

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN PUBLIC OPINION POLL

Paris LE POINT in French 3 Dec 79 pp 81-85

[Article by Jean Charlot, professor at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris]

[Text] The IFOP [French Public Opinion Institute] poll that LE POINT is publishing today in connection with the 1981 presidential election covers two different surveys.

The first concerns the image of the politicians (tables 1 to 8). It was taken from 6 to 13 November 1979 using a representative sample--based on statistics from INSEE [National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies]--of 918 Frenchmen aged 18 and over.

The second concerns French voting intentions--gathered using ballot boxes--in the first and second rounds of the presidential election. It was taken from 30 October to 20 November and involved 5,686 Frenchmen aged 18 and over. This sample was developed using INSEE data and on the basis of 38 criteria: sex (2), age (4), occupation of the head of household (6), housing (5), and region (21). Although this was the first time that IFOP and LE POINT chose such a sizable sample, the purpose was not so much to increase the reliability of the survey as it was to be able to analyze more closely the breakdowns between the various categories of voter and the transfer of votes during upcoming surveys. Those surveys will again cover about 6,000 persons.

In the current phase of the presidential election campaign, it is clear that no poll can reveal the name of the man who will enter the Elysee Palace in 1981. There is no need to recall, for the umpteenth time, that a poll is no more than the snapshot of a situation and that the farther away the election is, the more likely it is that voting intentions will change. But if that is so, one might ask what purpose this preelection poll serves. Its

usefulness is twofold. First, there is its long-term usefulness: to understand how a situation develops, one must establish points of reference by taking periodic measurements, and in that regard, nothing is better than a good series of repeated polls. Each survey is clarified by those preceding it in that it confirms or contradicts those that went before. But the IFOP-LE POINT poll taken in November--18 months before the election--also has immediate usefulness: the finals will not take place tomorrow, and neither will the semifinals represented by the first round of balloting, but the qualifying rounds for the selection of candidates are going on now, and already the selections, withdrawals, and rejections are becoming clearer, as are the tactics and countertactics.

If we are to believe the French, few men have what it takes to be president. Giscard, Rocard, Chirac, and Mitterrand are definitely seen as being presidential material. Chaban maybe. And to them we must add Marchais, who, being a Communist, has all the qualities of a president in the eyes of the Communists but no one else. The other possible candidates may obviously find support, run, and glean some votes, but barring a spectacular recovery, their lack of credibility condemns them to a poor showing. Among those apt to be eliminated in the presidential qualifying rounds, several cases need to be singled out.

The case of Georges Seguy, a candidate despite himself in the IFOP-LE POINT poll, illustrates how persistently the French separate union functions from political functions. Even Communist voters would not look favorably on his candidacy. Michel Jobert and Robert Fabre, despite their political fame, do not measure up in the race for the Elysee Palace. Scarcely 1 percent of the Socialist and Left Radical voters mentioned their names spontaneously, and the vast majority of the French feels that they lack the personal qualities of a president. The cases of Simone Veil, Pierre Mauroy, Michel Debre, and Jacques Chaban-Delmas, on the other hand, are of a different nature.

Table 1: The Campaign Has Begun

"Do you personally feel that the presidential election campaign...":

	<u>%</u>
Is already underway?	41
Has more or less begun?	37
Has not at all begun?	11
No opinion	11

In all groups of voters, over three-fourths of those questioned feel that the presidential campaign has at least "more or less begun": Socialist voters (50 percent) and Giscard's supporters (46 percent) are more inclined than Gaullist voters (43 percent) and Communists (37 percent) to think that it is already in full swing.

Their credibility suffers because of their competition: from Giscard in the case of Simone Veil, from Mitterrand and Rocard in Mauroy's case, and from Chirac in the case of Debre and Chaban.

One is nevertheless struck by the weak presidential image some of them have. Pierre Mauroy, first of all, who was practically never mentioned spontaneously as the president "hoped for" by Socialist voters, 47 percent of whom said, for that matter, that they would not vote for him "under any circumstances"; his peacemaking activity in the Mitterrand-Rocard encounter does not seem to have been understood. Simone Veil was the only woman tested in the IFOP-LE POINT poll. She is not in fact committed in any way to the presidential race (and that may explain in part why she does not seem very credible). It is surprising, however, that someone as popular as she was during her time as minister of health should be roundly rejected by 56 percent of the French (57 percent of the RPR [Rally for the Republic] voters and even 36 percent of the UDF [French Democratic Union] voters), who said that they would not vote for her "under any circumstances." It really seems that her European campaign strongly undermined the good feeling that existed toward her.

Table 2: Majority: Giscard d'Estaing in Strongest Position

"In your opinion, which candidate can best lead the majority to victory in the second round of the presidential election?"

	Overall	CP	Socialist Party- Left Radicals	UDF	RPR
Valery Giscard d'Estaing	58%	56%	64%	82%	52%
Jacques Chirac	16	16	21	9	24
Michel Debre	5	6	3	1	8
No opinion	21	22	12	8	16

For over half the RPR voters (52 percent), Valery Giscard d'Estaing is more credible as a winner than a Gaullist candidate.

Table 3: Opposition: Rocard in Strongest Position

	Overall	CP	Socialist Party- Left Radicals	UDF	RPR
Michel Rocard	42%	30%	41%	57%	63%
Francois Mitterrand	31	20	43	28	25
Georges Marchais	11	43	9	3	2
No opinion	16	7	7	12	10

Georges Marchais cannot lead the left to victory even in the opinion of Communist voters. Among all the groups of voters except the Socialists-Left Radicals (where he trails by only 2 percent), Michel Rocard is felt to be in a better position to win than Francois Mitterrand. But the latter retains considerable credibility among the left's voters.

Table 4: Percentage of French Who Would not Vote for...

"Here is a list of political personalities. Tell me which of them you already know you would not vote for if they were running in the presidential election."

Michel Rocard	33%	Georges Marchais	55%
Valery Giscard d'Estaing	38	Jacques Chirac	55
Francois Mitterrand	43	Simone Veil	56
Pierre Mauroy	47	Michel Debre	58
Jacques Chaban-Delmas	50	Georges Seguy	60

An absolute majority of those questioned (over 50 percent) rejected all the suggested candidates except four: the three Socialists and the incumbent president, Valery Giscard d'Estaing. Only Michel Rocard was rejected by less than half of those questioned in each of the four major political groups (a rejection rate of 12 percent in the PS-MRG [Socialist Party-Left Radicals], 42 percent in the CP, 44 percent in the UDF, and 46 percent in the RPR). Valery Giscard d'Estaing's performance was equally good in three out of four groups of voters (a rejection rate of 6 percent in the UDF, 20 percent in the RPR, and 48 percent in the PS-MRG, but 79 percent in the CP). Francois Mitterrand and Pierre Mauroy were rejected by the majority, but more or less accepted by the left. Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Jacques Chirac, and Michel Debre, on the contrary, were rejected by the left but more or less accepted by the majority's voters. Georges Marchais, Georges Seguy, and Simone Veil were rejected by over 50 percent of those questioned in three voting groups out of four and found favor only among the voters in their own parties.

On the Gaullist side, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, although still marked by his defeat in the 1974 presidential election, is nevertheless a more likely dark horse than Michel Debre, who continues to find more favor with Gaullist party members than with Gaullist voters and, with even greater reason, than with French voters as a whole.

There remains the case of Raymond Barre, who was not mentioned spontaneously as a "hoped-for" president. His is a surprising absence. It is true that his name was not among those appearing in the other questions in the survey and that the French cannot imagine his being able to compete with the chief of state.

Obviously, it is not impossible that between now and 1981 one of those individuals or someone else could be pushed front and center by unexpected circumstances. That is improbable, however, considering that each of the major political groups already has at least one candidate of presidential class.

Table 5: Candidates' Chances

"Tell me whether each of the following political personalities has, on the whole, increased or reduced his chances of winning the next presidential election over the past few weeks."

	<u>Increased</u>	<u>Reduced</u>
Michel Rocard	42%	12%
Valery Giscard d'Estaing	26	32
Francois Mitterrand	19	37
Jacques Chirac	18	39
Georges Marchais	17	32
Michel Debre	9	33

Only Michel Rocard currently shows a positive balance in the presidential dynamics: his chances, in the eyes of public opinion, have increased (a great deal) more than they have diminished ($42\% - 12\% = 30\%$). This average positive balance is all the more significant in that it is largely independent of the political options represented (+43 percent in the PS-MRG, but also +32 percent among CP voters, +32 percent among the UDF's voters, and +30 percent among the RPR's voters). The candidate least badly placed after him--Valery Giscard d'Estaing--has increased his supposed chances of victory (with his chances nevertheless remaining greater than those of Rocard) only in the opinion of the majority's supporters (+39 percent in the UDF, +3 percent in the RPR, -26 percent in the PS-MRG, and -37 percent in the CP). In the case of the other possible candidates mentioned, there was a general retreat except for Georges Marchais, whose chances were considered to have increased only by the CP's voters.

The "big five" who dominate these qualifying rounds are divided into three "heats": one loner and two sets of opposing candidates.

The loner is Georges Marchais. While he has no rival among Communist voters, he is largely rejected outside that party. His credibility is weak: 71 percent of the Communists see him as having the qualities of a president, compared to only 22 percent of the Socialists and from 4 to 12 percent of the majority's voters. As for leading the opposition to victory, even the Communists doubt that: 43 percent place their hopes in him, but 50 percent feel that Mitterrand and Rocard are in a better position. Marchais is rejected by the majority of the voters (55 percent), but also by the Socialists and the MRG (56 percent would not vote for him "under any circumstances").

He is mentioned spontaneously as a "hoped-for" president by only 10 percent of the French and by less than half the Communists (47 percent). So while

he has the best chance of getting the Communist vote in the first round of balloting, he has no prospect of final victory. Has he the slightest chance of beating the Socialist candidate in the first round, as the CP hopes? Considering current voting intentions, that possibility is hardly likely: he is 5 points behind Rocard and from 4 to 5 points behind Mitterrand.

The outcome of the duel between Mitterrand and Rocard for the Socialist nomination remains uncertain. The dynamic Rocard is impressive: the voters of all parties feel that his chance of winning has increased over the past few weeks, while that of his rival has diminished. Rocard is in a clearly better position than Mitterrand for leading the left to victory, according to Communists, Giscard supporters, and Gaullists, and slightly less well placed for doing so (41 compared to 43 percent) in the opinion of Socialist voters. Like Mitterrand, he is considered presidential material by the vast majority of the left's voters, but also, unlike Mitterrand, by an absolute majority of Giscard's voters and a relative majority of Gaullist voters. Rocard was chosen spontaneously as president by 13 percent of the French (Mitterrand by 10 percent), by 25 percent of the Socialists (27 percent of whom chose Mitterrand), by 14 percent of the Communists (Mitterrand, 7 percent), and by 6 percent of the UDF and RPR voters (Mitterrand, 2 percent of the UDF voters). Lastly, Rocard provoked less rejection: those saying they would not vote for him "under any circumstances" represented 33 percent of the French (compared to 43 percent in Mitterrand's case), 12 percent of the Socialists (Mitterrand, 23 percent), and 45 percent of the UDF and RPR voters (Mitterrand, from 67 to 77 percent). Only the Communists rejected Rocard (42 percent) by a higher percentage than they did Mitterrand (32 percent).

In short, the matter would be settled if the Socialist nomination were purely a question of electoral potential: with an image that is both less negative and more attractive than that of Francois Mitterrand, Rocard is objectively the best Socialist candidate. But Mitterrand has retained sufficient legitimacy among Socialist voters to be frequently preferred, just barely, over his challenger. Moreover, unlike Rocard, he has proven his ability to head long and difficult election campaigns. Relationships of strength and tactics within the PS will make the difference.

The duel between Giscard and Chirac is altogether different. Giscard's advantages are considerable at the outset: as the incumbent president, he is naturally credited with presidential ability by most of the French (71 percent), including those on the left (73 percent of the PS-MRG and 54 percent of the CP). Chirac is also presidential material according to a majority of the Socialists, Giscard supporters, and Gaullists, but somewhat less so. Giscard's performance in the Elysee Palace may alienate only a small minority of the majority's voters (9 percent of his supporters and 22 percent of the Gaullists, who consider his performance "negative on the whole"). Giscard is perceived by many as the majority's best candidate: 52 percent of the Gaullists themselves feel that he would lead it to victory, while less than one-third feel that way about Chirac or Debre. Lastly, Jacques

Table 6: Four Carry the "Presidential Label"

"For each of the following, tell me whether you think he or she does or does not have the personal qualities necessary for some-day being president of the republic."

	<u>Does have</u>	<u>Does not have</u>	<u>No opinion</u>
Valery Giscard d'Estaing	71%	17%	12%
Michel Rocard	53	26	21
Francois Mitterrand	50	36	14
Jacques Chirac	45	39	16
Jacques Chaban-Delmas	39	41	20
Michel Debre	27	52	21
Simone Veil	26	56	18
Georges Marchais	26	59	15
Pierre Mauroy	24	47	29
Georges Seguy	12	70	18
Robert Fabre	11	63	26
Michel Jobert	9	63	28

In the opinion of a majority of the French, only four men are presidential material: Giscard, Rocard, Mitterrand, and Chirac. Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the incumbent president, has proven himself worthy of the post even in the eyes of the Communists (saying that he has the qualities of a president were 54 percent of those questioned in the CP, 73 percent in the PS-MRG, 83 percent in the RPR, and 91 percent in the UDF). A majority of the Socialists, Communists, Giscard supporters, and Gaullists feel that Michel Rocard has the qualities of a president, and the same is true, excluding the Communists, in the case of Jacques Chirac. A majority of only the Socialists and Communists feels that way about Francois Mitterrand. A chance might be seen for Jacques Chaban-Delmas, who is credible to RPR and UDF voters. Michel Debre is credible only to the Gaullists, Simone Veil only to Giscard's supporters, and Georges Marchais only to the Communists, as is--Pierre Mauroy. As for the others, they are not credible candidates to any of the big groups.

Chirac provokes a rejection rate that still limits his electoral potential: 55 percent of the French would refuse to vote for him under any circumstances (while 38 percent would not vote for Giscard), 21 percent of the RPR's voters would refuse to vote for him (6 percent of the UDF rejects Giscard), and 71 percent of the Socialists refuse to vote for him (while 48 percent refuse to vote for Giscard).

To appreciate Chirac's handicap, it should be realized that in the United States no outgoing president seeking his party's nomination for a new term has been rejected since 1884. The outgoing president's advantage is so

great that not until Carter came along has a challenger with the political clout of Kennedy dared to challenge the nomination of an outgoing president. And Kennedy is far from having won the game. In short, Chirac would be attempting the impossible by confronting Giscard in the first round, seeing that the majority among his own voters can be considered one party and one party only, as has been shown by numberless polls. But at present he is the best possible Gaullist candidate, and it would be difficult for the party he heads to back out of the race in 1981.

Table 7: Whom Do You Want as President?

"On the whole, whom do you personally want to see as president of the republic in 1981?" (Spontaneous answers.)

Valery Giscard d'Estaing	27%
Michel Rocard	13
Francois Mitterrand	10
Georges Marchais	10
Jacques Chirac	7
Jacques Chaban-Delmas	2
Michel Debre	1
Simone Veil	1
Other	4
No opinion	25

Given a free choice, the French did not put forward any new man for president; on the contrary, they concentrated their choices on the most probable and most credible candidates: Giscard, Rocard, Mitterrand, Marchais, and Chirac.

Giscard's reelection would meet the desires not only of the vast majority of the UDF's voters (71 percent), but also of a relative majority (42 percent) of the RPR's voters (only 20 percent of the RPR's voters said they preferred Chirac, 6 percent Chaban-Delmas, and 3 percent Debre). Mitterrand outdistances Rocard by a head (27 percent compared to 25 percent) in the hearts of Socialist and Left Radical voters, but the latter is mentioned more frequently than the former by the CP (14 compared to 7 percent) and by the UDF (6 compared to 2 percent). Georges Marchais has no rival among the CP's voters. The line designated "other" includes individuals garnering less than 0.5 percent each. Among them are Pierre Mauroy, Robert Fabre, and Michel Jobert.

Table 8: Giscard d'Estaing: Overall Performance Negative

"If at this moment you were to rate Valery Giscard d'Estaing's overall performance as president of the republic since 1974, which of the following would you say applies?"

	<u>Overall</u>	<u>CP</u>	<u>PS-MRG</u>	<u>UDF</u>	<u>RPR</u>
Positive overall	39%	19%	31%	76%	60%
Negative overall	42	72	57	9	22
No opinion	19	9	12	15	18

On balance, his performance looks very positive to the UDF (+67 percent), a little less so to the RPR (+38 percent), negative to the PS-MRG (-26 percent), definitely negative to the CP (-53 percent), and slightly negative overall (-3 percent). But one-third of the Socialists and one-fifth of the Communists rate Giscard "positive overall," while 22 percent of the RPR's voters have the opposite opinion.

Table 9: First Round Voting Intentions

"In the next presidential election, let us suppose that you have to choose among the following candidates. For which of them would you be most likely to vote?" (Responses for every 100 French voters stating an opinion.)

<u>Situation 1</u>	
Valery Giscard d'Estaing	39%
J. Chirac	12
F. Mitterrand	20
G. Marchais	16
R. Garaudy	1
An ecologist	7
An extreme rightist	1
An extreme leftist	2
A left radical	2

<u>Situation 2</u>	
Valery Giscard d'Estaing	35%
J. Chirac	12
M. Rocard	22
G. Marchais	17
R. Garaudy	1
An ecologist	7
An extreme rightist	1
An extreme leftist	3
A left radical	2

A comparison of situations 1 and 2 shows that in the present state of voting intentions for the first round, the substitution of Rocard for Mitterrand reduces Giscard's lead (19 points ahead of Mitterrand and 13 ahead of Rocard) and the number of votes for the majority's two candidates (51 percent with Mitterrand listed third and 47 percent with Rocard in the third spot). Rocard does much better than Mitterrand in the Paris Region, among the liberal professions, and among senior executives. Mitterrand does much better than Rocard among workers and low-income wage earners.

<u>Situation 3</u>	
Valery Giscard d'Estaing	40%
M. Debre	7
F. Mitterrand	21
G. Marchais	17
R. Garaudy	1
An ecologist	8
An extreme rightist	1
An extreme leftist	3
A left radical	2

As the situation now stands, the substitution of Debre (in situation 3) for Chirac (in situation 1) has a negative effect on the RPR and causes the majority's total to fall from 51 to 47 percent.

<u>Situation 4</u>		<u>Situation 5</u>	
V. Giscard d'Estaing	45%	V. Giscard d'Estaing	43%
F. Mitterrand	22	M. Rocard	23
G. Marchais	17	G. Marchais	18
R. Garaudy	2	R. Garaudy	2
An ecologist	9	An ecologist	8
An extreme rightist	1	An extreme rightist	1
An extreme leftist	2	An extreme leftist	3
A left radical	2	A left radical	2

A comparison of situations 4 and 5 with situations 1 and 2 allows one to see the effect on the first round of the competition between Giscard and Chirac. In every case, the total for Giscard alone in the first round is lower than that for Giscard and Chirac combined.

Table 10: Second Round Voting Intentions

"Now let us suppose that we have reached the second round of balloting in the presidential election. For which of the following would you be most likely to vote?" (Responses for every 100 French voters stating an opinion.)

<u>Situation 1</u>		<u>Situation 2</u>	
V. Giscard d'Estaing	57%	J. Chirac	44%
F. Mitterrand	43	F. Mitterrand	56
<u>Situation 3</u>		<u>Situation 4</u>	
V. Giscard d'Estaing	53%	J. Chirac	42%
M. Rocard	47	M. Rocard	58
<u>Situation 5</u>		<u>Situation 6</u>	
V. Giscard d'Estaing	64%	J. Chirac	55%
G. Marchais	36	G. Marchais	45
<u>Situation 7</u>			
M. Debre	52%		
G. Marchais	48		

The significance of these simulated situations in the second round is limited, considering that the first round is 18 months away. It will be noted, however, that in the present state of things any of the majority's candidates would beat Georges Marchais, Giscard would beat Mitterrand and--with more difficulty--Rocard, and Chirac would be beaten by either one.

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CSO: 3100

ANALYSIS OF PCF VIEWS TOWARD DIFFERING MODELS OF COMMUNISM

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 16 Oct 79 p 8

[Article by Arnaud Spire]

[Text] A culmination and not just a starting point, the 22nd PCF Congress in 1976 was definitely a congress of strategy. The unity of our intermediate goals and the approach to achieve them emerged there for the first time with obvious force. The democratic socialism which France needs and the democratic way of achieving it finally appeared to be linked together.

Three years later, the experiment with the joint program, the refusal of the PS [Socialist Party] to honor its commitments and the March 1978 defeat should induce the 23rd PCF Congress to assess some implications of the new strategy.

I. Rejection of Any Model of Socialism

In this regard, the process of consideration and action, by which French communists have progressively rejected the models applied for decades, has great theoretical significance.

This clearly began during the 22nd Congress with the rejection of any model of socialist society: "There is not and cannot be any 'model' of socialism which could be transposed from one country to another or copied." This is a statement-corollary of our strategy, also the result of a long development since the abandonment several years before of the "center" and "detachment" concepts which prevailed for a long time in the international communist movement. However, it is normal for habits of thinking to survive for a time after the disappearance of the reality which gave rise to them.

It is simultaneously the requirements inherent in working out a French approach to socialism and, in existing socialist countries, renewed evidence of the democratic requirement which socialism must meet, which have led us to this rejection of any model of socialist society.

Antimodel Ideology

Thus we have not yet completed, as if by magic, the process implied by the model concept itself. This process consists of transposing what has been done elsewhere, from one real sector to another, of considering the development of a concrete object in terms of being from a different reality rather than considering each thing as a unique process whose contradictory logic must constantly be analyzed.

The opposite of the model concept reappeared in the thinking of those who made applied socialism the model of what must not be done in France, according to them. Thus an antimodel ideology emerged; as though by considering the opposite of what was done in the Soviet Union, GDR or Cuba, it would be possible to change the existing situation in France.

This is why the 23rd Congress added to and enriched the criticism of models, started in the 22nd Congress, by radicalizing it. The idea that there could not be any model (in our time and with regard to existing socialism) was coupled with two additional ideas.

- 1) If there is no existing model of socialism, no socialist country could therefore represent an antimodel (without reverting to an approach which would amount to the same thing).
- 2) Finally, we could not be careful enough not to present the socialism that France needs as a model for other countries (here again, not without breaking radically with the approach implied by the model concept).

II. Three Questions in this Wake

This radicalization of the criticism of existing models of socialism leads us to pose three questions, of practical, methodological and theoretical significance.

1. If no existing socialist country represents an antimodel and if we do not present our choice of socialism as a model for other socialist countries, aren't we condemning ourselves to remain silent concerning practices with which we disagree, even if they are implemented, here or there, in the name of socialism itself?

The 23rd Congress answered this question: The establishment of socialism under various national conditions, which we consider positive, should not cause us to stop criticizing the mistakes, corruptions and other obstacles to the construction and advance of socialism. Much to the contrary, as a progressive response to the actual needs of a nation's workers, socialism bears a universal democratic responsibility. Thus it is in the name of this real democratic responsibility, which existing socialism itself has created and nurtured, that we offer our criticism--an internal criticism, as it were (i.e., criticism from a communist standpoint).

1. Does the rejection of any model of socialist society have a methodological significance inasmuch as it leads us to ban the very concept of a model from our set of conceptual tools?

This attitude (subordinating everything to policy) probably derives more from systematic thinking than from actual analysis to understand why at a given time in the maturation of a process the model concept, which has become obsolete, is becoming an obstacle to the completion of the process.

Isn't the model concept one which is symptomatic of a time of immaturity in the process of growing knowledge or activity? Since the model's theoretical effectiveness is linked to the fact that it is generally idealized or amended.

Thus in the process of humanity's transition to socialism, the existence of the first socialist government has nurtured and idealized (or amended) representation which has served as a model in the immaturity of the process, i.e., at a time when socialism was not really a force in only one of the advanced capitalist countries.

Thus it would be a new mistake of a dogmatic type to ban the very concept of a model as a technical force and ideal figure contributing to the rise of an emerging scientific application. The rejection of any model of socialism, which occurred in the 23rd Congress, teaches us nothing else except that a model, a transitory abstraction in a process of consideration and action, is destined only to be dismantled and that the extreme development of the process in which it has served, far from establishing it firmly, destroys it.

It is possible for this destruction of models to be considered one of the indirect signs of the structural crisis of French society and another symptom of the imminence of change?

In any case, the continually fruitless efforts of the powerful middle class and its ideologists to organize France along the lines of the German model, to provide it with a new capitalist model of growth, are filled with lessons in this regard.

2. The result of a long maturation and an expression of the crisis of our society, is it possible for our rejection of any model of socialism to be concerned only with the essential aspect (i.e., the socialist character) of the proposed society which communists want for France?

That seems difficult, at the cost of having a very monolithic concept of the essential aspect (the essence). It is much more a case of imagining the particular form of existence, in this or that aspect of social reality, of an approach conceived in terms of national existence with general features or laws of socialism.

No Model of Struggle or Model Struggle

a. Isn't this already the meaning of the last Central Committee's appeals to develop rank-and-file unity in action? No model of struggle or model struggle.

practical advice where possible, but nothing anywhere else. Since the main purpose is to express concretely, in adequate ways, public discontent and to add to the growth of the movement as it occurs. Any success, even partial, in any sector of social life, because of the very fact that the crisis is worsening, has an impact which allows it to be considered part of the revolutionary process. Thus in the future we see the break with the capitalist system as a set of thresholds and breaks, constituting a continuous process within which a new quality is imparted to all aspects and factors of the whole, but without involving any preestablished order.

No Model or Antimodel in Private Sphere

b. Nor is there a model for what is usually called "private life." Neither for communists nor for others. A political party does not legislate every aspect of life in society. That is the deeper meaning of "everything is not political," which Georges Marchais said in 1977 at the Sheraton. In this regard, the antimodel ideology is experiencing a revival of favor today. Communists and their party are asked to come out in favor of this or that sexual practice, against some other practice, in favor of this way of communal life, against that concept of the family. Here again, there is a continuation of resorting to models, but this time in the opposite direction. But oppression is not eliminated by imposing this or that so-called liberating lifestyle. Do we therefore have nothing to say about the way in which oppressive social relationships reinforce exploitive relationships? In this regard as well, we suggest active criticism: by fighting against backward thinking, beginning right now. Not by virtue of some abstract progressive principle, but in the name of a need for liberation which, with the crisis worsening, derives from the diversity of social relationships themselves.

No Standardizing of Criticism of Models

c. However, the application of models has a much tougher skin than would be supposed by the initial generalization of the implications of our criticism of models, launched in the 23rd Congress. The objective existence of models will no doubt continue for a long time in insufficiently developed sectors of social life. This is the case of cultural life, for example. This is understandable and has more than just negative aspects in the present case. For example, we might consider the way in which certain cultural models become "patterns" of reference or "models" in a society which is the denial of the real development of individual personalities.

In a society whose driving forces have been profit and growth for so long, in which individual personalities have been maimed for so long, people will still need models for a long time to compensate for the inadequate development of their individual personalities. The condition for the self-development of people was the abandonment of adopting models of society. The 23rd Congress made that possible. Now its results remain to be seen.

11915

CSO: 1100

APPARENT TEXT OF PAPANDREOU ADDRESS TO PARLIAMENT

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[Apparent text of speech by PASOK chairman and leader of the majority opposition party Andreas Papandreou before the Greek Chamber of Deputies in answer to Karamanlis' speech on 11 January 1980--recorded]

[Text] Mr Chairman, colleagues, before I present the evaluations and positions of PASOK on these critical times through which humanity and our country are passing I would like to express my surprise over the observations made by the government's prime minister on the accession of Greece to West Europe, the family of the West and over the interpretations he offered on the position of PASOK.

Does the prime minister know or does he not know that the EEC countries adopted an unacceptable position on the vast national issue of Cyprus?
[applause]

Does the prime minister know or does he not know that the EEC identifies with NATO at least on what has to do with the identity of members, with certain exceptions?

What was the position of NATO toward the 7-year old dictatorship in our fatherland? [applause]

Is it or is it not clear that NATO undermined the democratic institutions of this country? [applause]

Karamanlis interruption: When you left Greece Mr Chairman where did you go? [laughter]

Papandreou: I did not hear you.

Karamanlis: Hear me. Which countries helped us during the dictatorship? Only Europe helped us. Neither the nonaligned nor the East did. [applause]

Papandreou: Mr Prime Minister, during the years of my exile I had the personal opportunity for contacts with political leaders from the entire west.

I know very well that although in fact their words were favorable to democracy in Greece, using the same voice, however, they argued that irrespective of the regime in Greece defense of West's interests predominated and consequently support of the dictatorship came first. In the British Parliament, on the day before the decision of the Council of Europe to expel Greece, there was a statement by the deputy secretary for national defense. Replying to a question by a British member of Parliament who asked, since Greece has been expelled from the Council of Europe should it not also be expelled from NATO, he answered that NATO is only interested in its military strength. It is in no way interested in the form of political regime in existence. [applause]

Does the prime minister know or does he not know what role was played by Kissinger and Sisco and the U.S. services in the great treason in Cyprus? [applause]

The United States and West Europe immediately appealed to the Security Council to condemn the invasion, the intervention, of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Did they do the same when Turkey occupied 40 percent of Cyprus? [prolonged applause]

I would, therefore, request the prime minister not to resort to simplistic presentations and not to put words into the mouth of the opposition. We have never said that we want to sever ourselves from West Europe. We have never said this [confused shouting] it is a misunderstanding and a simplification which is unacceptable when it comes from the prime minister's mouth. We stated that our accession to the common market does not serve the economy, the social and economic development of the country. We stated that Greece must develop equal relations with the West, with the East, with the North and the South. [applause]

I ask the chamber of the Greeks: Do Sweden, Switzerland, Austria belong or do they not belong to the Western family? Are they members of NATO? No they are not. Are they members of the common market? No they are not. Are their economies better than the economies of the EEC? The answer is yes, they are. [applause]

At this time humanity is going through one of the most difficult bends of its history. Its political detente has been subjected to serious and decisive rifts. We have a basic question upon which the fate of humanity rests: Is this development, this renewed transition toward a cold war a simple parenthesis or will it be continued escalating until such time as the cold war becomes a hot one?

It is true that all countries of the world are deeply concerned. This transition from militant coexistence, as it was called, to the cold war has certain milestones which I wish to mention.

[AT131342] First of all the "Camp David" agreement between Israel, Egypt and the United States cut off any role for the Soviet Union in that area.

This was a mistake because that area cannot provide a solution which would be against either the first great power, America, or the other great power, the Soviet Union.

At this time we also have the intervention of Vietnam in Cambodia and the invasion of China into Vietnam. We have, and this is far more significant, the rapprochement between China and the United States, of Japan and China. We have the formation of a triangle which isolates the Soviet Union in a corner.

On visiting China the U.S. defense secretary these days and specifically yesterday, told his Chinese interlocutors: "We will not give you weapons but we will give you that high technology which will allow you to produce the weapons you will need in the common struggle against the imperialist Soviet Union." There is also the great and continuing peoples' revolution in Iran. [noise from the chamber]

This large peoples' revolution in Iran radically overthrew the balance of power in the area of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Naturally it directly led to U.S. reaction, first through dispatch of its fleet, a section of its fleet, to the Persian Gulf and to a search for new bases in the area which includes Egypt, Israel, Oman and the island of Diego Garcia. These bases will be developed very soon. Only one country has refused bases so far and this is Saudi Arabia.

There is also the other vastly important issue of our times: Installation on U.S. insistence of "Pershing" and "Cruise" medium-range missiles in West Europe. This is an issue to which I intend to return.

We now have a series of what one could describe as thoughtless measures, extremely dangerous measures, adopted by the U.S. administration against the Soviet Union. We will examine these measures and their effects.

At this moment it is true that formulation of Greek foreign and defense policies are critical issues. The period is truly critical and it is very true that we are all responsible for the formulation of such a foreign and defense policy which will diminish dangers threatening our fatherland.

At this moment 40 percent of Cyprus is still under the occupation of Attila. In the Aegean Greece is faced with the expansionist and chauvinistic offensive of Turkey which is expressed in words, decisions and with actions. In this offensive Turkey enjoys the support of NATO and the United States, which hasten to supply Turkey with the best possible arms irrespective of its role in the Aegean and Cyprus. This is their offer to the cause of Greece. This is their offer to the Cyprus issue, their offer in the Aegean. With the lifting of the embargo Turkey is being armed at such a rate that soon it will overthrow the balance in the Aegean.

The prime minister of the government last September described the foreign policy he follows as multifaceted. Today like at the time he referred to

the overtures he personally promoted, toward the Balkans, toward the Arab countries, toward the Eastern Bloc and Moscow. PASOK unreservedly lauded these moves and these initiatives. At long last and provided they have any fundamental backing, they justify the positions of PASOK. [applause]

These initiatives, however, as proved by developments since that time, were taken within the strict framework of the doctrine, "We belong to the West." There are statements both by the prime minister, by Rallis and by Averof on the subject, exactly at the time when the prime minister was in the Soviet Union, so that we have nothing which can question this position. The government is totally within the framework of the West and from within this framework it undertakes these overtures. The question, however, remains with what fundamental backing?

I fear, deputies, that the goal of these moves, as developments show, appears to be only one: Internal consumption. I am sorry to say this but this is supported by a series of events and positions which cannot be glossed over. We stress that the government follows a one-sided policy apart from the prime minister's visits.

It basically continues the satellite role of our fatherland. First of all it continues its insistent efforts to return to NATO's military structure. Especially now, after Afghanistan, one could assume that the process will be speeded up. Secondly, the bases and facilities are maintained and expanded for the benefit of the United States and NATO. At the great moment when installation of the new missiles, the Euro-strategic missiles, was being discussed within the framework of NATO, the government gave its "consent." Greece also participated in the appeal of many countries to the United Nations asking for convocation of the Security Council in order to condemn the Soviet Union over the case of its intervention in Afghanistan. I wonder and I would like an answer on this, if the Greek Government appealed to the Security Council in order to condemn Turkey over the invasion of Cyprus. It would be of great interest if mention was made of the appeal and the date on which the Greek Government appealed to the Security Council asking for the condemnation of Turkey over the Cyprus issue. [applause]

Yet for Afghanistan we had to hasten. This is what our master from beyond the Atlantic orders us to do. [applause]

Karamanlis interrupts: You asked a question and demanded a reply. Both at the Security Council and to the General Assembly we appealed jointly with Cyprus.

Papandreou: There is no appeal to the Security Council on the Cyprus issue.

Karamanlis: There are not only appeals but there are also three resolutions of the Security Council.

Papandreou: Pay attention, I have said that Greece has not appealed to the Security Council.

Karamanlis: It appealed together with Cyprus.

Papandreou: Mr Prime Minister, I request that you make this clear within the day if possible. If you are right then, naturally I will retract.

Karamanlis: I have already replied. First there are three resolutions of the Security Council.

Papandreou: I am not interested in resolutions. [confused shouting] I request that we see the documents, I request that you present this chamber with the documents of these appeals and then I will be the first to state to the Greek people that I was mistaken, that I was misinformed.

[AT131524] Mr Prime Minister, we now come to the issue of the missiles--to this great issue of the missiles. Gentlemen colleagues I again request [indistinct interjections from chamber floor] we are discussing a very critical issue and all of us should manifest a corresponding solemnity and responsibility. You should listen to the PASOK positions as we listened to the prime minister's. The SALT I and SALT II agreements concern the limitation, basically in the pace of development, of intercontinental missiles which are called strategic. The meaning of strategic in this instance is capable of striking at the major cities; for the United States to strike at Moscow and for the Soviet Union to strike at Washington. These are called strategic weapons. The United States and NATO have in Western Europe 7,000 nuclear warheads, but all of these warheads are intended for the battlefield, that is, they can be used in a clash only within the framework of Central Europe, they cannot reach the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union has--essentially since 1977--180 SS-20 missiles and 80 backfire bombers. This was the situation until NATO convened and the United States undertook to exert unbearable pressure on Holland, Denmark, and Belgium to accept the installation of these new Euro-strategic missiles. These medium-range missiles can hit the Soviet Union from countries in Western Europe. It should be stressed that, for the Soviet Union, whether these missiles are launched from Western Europe or from the United States is immaterial, since they can strike at the Soviet Union itself. Consequently, it is clear that for the Soviet Union this means a violation of the SALT II agreement. In order to precisely understand the significance of this: It would be as if the Soviet Union had installed in Cuba--as almost happened 20 years ago--medium-range missiles and the United States had said, never mind because these missiles do not fall under the agreement on strategic weapons. Only if we put this issue on this basis shall we understand the great reaction which indeed the Soviet Union and other countries of the Eastern Bloc have demonstrated since these countries indeed can see in these developments a method for circumventing the SALT II agreement. Until these new missiles are installed in Europe--which will require about 3 years and to which the Greek Government has given its consent--Western Europe will be covered by the nuclear umbrella of the United States. Europe's security is contingent on the intercontinental missiles the United

States has. However, it is of great interest to see the interpretation the Americans give to this protective umbrella over Western Europe.

In an interview on 1 September in Brussels, Kissinger precisely defined the content of this nuclear umbrella. He said: It is absurd to base the strategy of the West on the credibility of a mutual suicide. Brzezinski said on 10 October: If NATO were to give the impression that either it does not wish or cannot react to the threat of a nuclear war within the borders of the European zone--I stress, within the borders of the European zone--the Soviets would have a splendid opportunity to begin exerting great political pressures. Most cynically, Brzezinski adds: We shall develop strong systems based on Europe as the theater of operations. These systems will be able to strike at targets in the Soviet Union.

In his memoirs Kissinger writes: The Europeans secretly hoped to base their defense on the dynamics of the U.S. strategic weapons, on having a war take place over their heads. Well, this hope has now been dashed. With the new missiles, the area where the two superpowers will clash will be almost exclusively Western Europe, or all of Europe.

The Americans have the courage to state this. The prime minister asked for frankness, and Kissinger is being frank. However, I should also stress the following: With the installation of these missiles, any hope Western Europe ever had to someday attain its independence and become an entity, a federation, between the Soviet Union and the United States, has ended, because the decision for the use of these missiles can be made only by the man who lives in the White House and no one else. Consequently, let us not talk about a united Western Europe, independent in its foreign policy and independent in its defense policy. From now on, Europe will openly, clearly, cynically be an extension of the United States on our old continent.

Another most important point connected with the missiles and their significance is something Kissinger--who is an unending, inexhaustible source of information about U.S. intentions--tells us. The Soviet leadership he says--pay attention--more than anyone else is afraid of the consequences of another drain on its economy, and for this reason gives priority to arms control. Kissinger admits that this push by the Soviet Union to escalate its arms will lead to immense internal, social and economic problems. Already we know that in the agricultural sector, the Soviet Union has a grain shortage of 25 million tons. Thus it is clear that for the Eastern Bloc and for the Soviet Union recourse to an arms race constitutes something that is opposed to their economic and social interests. I think this was fully expounded to me by Kadar, secretary general of the Hungarian Communist Party when I visited Budapest, as undoubtedly--because I do not know--he must have also expounded it to Greece's prime minister when he met with him.

The last thing I should note in connection with the installation of these missiles is the fact that it constitutes a coup de grace, a strong blow to the leadership in Moscow which so far had planned the course of its

country within the framework of arms control. Undoubtedly Brezhnev has been shaken in the political structure--the political scene of the Soviet Union--and unfortunately we should expect the ascent of the hardliners. If this was the goal of the United States, certainly it has achieved it. It is not easy for me to understand why Greece, which currently is not participating in the NATO military wing, decided to cast a positive vote for the missiles. Did it not have at least the forethought to remain outside this great clash between the giants? Should it have taken a position? [applause]

Dear colleagues, I now come to the Afghanistan issue. It is necessary that all political parties in our country take a position. Thus PASOK has a specific position on the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan. It is natural for a party like ours--which believes in the independence of states and of peoples, in the policy of nonintervention, in an independent, non-aligned policy--it is natural to condemn the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan. This is the first time the Soviet Union has done something of this sort. The cases of Czechoslovakia and Hungary are indeed different because at least they concerned Warsaw Pact countries. Afghanistan does not belong to the Warsaw Pact, therefore the intervention in Afghanistan has greater political significance and weight than the other cases. Have you at last understood me? Had you let me continue [apparent reference to unheard interjection], you would have heard this. [applause]

However, it is indeed a pity for humanity and for the security of this world that the United States so quickly took such decisive and drastic measures against the Soviet Union.

[AT131650] Of course, the ground for such a reaction had already been laid, had already been developed after the development of events in Iran, this ongoing great popular and Islamic revolution which indeed has struck a serious blow at the balance of power in the area. Consequently the Americans were ready to do something, especially Carter who plans on becoming president again next November. Carter had to transform all this anxiety of the American people, concerning the 50 hostages held by the students, into acts against the Soviet Union. Measures taken so far are the freezing of SALT II--we do not know for how long; the drastic reduction in grain quantities the United States will sell to the Soviet Union--we are talking about the 17 million tons which will not be sold, because the Soviet Union was to have taken 25 million tons; the limitation of diplomatic missions and cultural exchanges; and from now on there will be an unending arms race despite the nice words we shall hear from one side or the other. The arms race will no longer be controlled. The amounts the United States will spend on new arms are indeed huge in comparison with the national budget, and of necessity the Soviet Union will have to do the same. The consequences will be a radical reduction not only of the Soviet Union's standard of living, but that of all peoples, in general. Of course, there will always be the Armageddon that may await us any hour, any day.

However, since we have taken a position on the Afghanistan issue, we should stress the hypocrisy of the West and of the United States. I shall recall

for you direct U.S. military interventions: Guatemala, 1954; Lebanon, 1958; Cuba--attempt--1961; Santo Domingo, 1965; Nicaragua; Vietnam; Cambodia; Laos; Thailand; and, indirectly but clearly, intervention in Iran to topple Mossadeq; in Argentina, 1955; in Indonesia, 1957; in Turkey, 1960; in South Korea, 1961; in the Congo, 1961 by assassinating Lumumba; in Burma, 1961; in Guyana, 1963; in Brazil, 1964; in Ghana, 1966; in Greece, 1967--I hope you remember it [applause]--and in Chile, 1973.

It is wrong not to admit the hateful reality. The United States has spread its military networks and bases throughout the world and has surrounded the Soviet Union from all sides.

I now come to the NATO issue, the return to NATO. It is a huge issue. The prime minister referred to this issue and I desire--or rather, it is my duty--to take a position. The government which took over after the change in the regime decided to withdraw Greece from the NATO military wing. In 1974, the prime minister sent a letter to the leadership of the NATO member countries. I read an excerpt from the prime minister's letter to the NATO members: The Greek Government would not be able to cooperate, within the framework of the allied military organization, with a country which by completely despising international agreements struck a painful blow at a significant part of the Greek nation. The result of this development is Greece's decision to immediately regain, without limitations, the exercise of its national sovereignty over its entire surface, airspace and territorial waters. It has decided to regain a national sovereignty which so far had been limited because of its participation in NATO and because of the presence of foreign military installations and facilities on Greek territory, and of the regular use of Greek airspace and Greek territorial waters by foreign military planes and warships. Today, PASOK endorses this statement. [applause]

Someday I would like to know--I believe you too would like to know--what precisely has happened since then that allows the prime minister to advance the cause of return when most clearly the reasons for which he withdrew from NATO still exist, perhaps more strongly than ever. Despite the final and irrevocable decision to withdraw, we have begun negotiations for a return to NATO. A way out was found--let the prime minister bear with me and I will expound upon my statement soon--to save the Greek Government's prestige, the special relationship. However, even this way out has met with difficulty because Turkey--the prime minister has said so--demands a new division of sovereign rights in the Aegean before it allows Greece to return to the NATO military wing under a special relationship.

In the original Verona plan by Haig and Davos the Greek Government had agreed that the issue of operational control over the Aegean--the airspace--be discussed after the return to NATO. However, even this proposal in the Verona plan was rejected by Turkey. Haig submitted a report to the NATO military committee in June 1978 on the Verona agreement and stated: The agreement offers a framework that can be implemented for Greece's return to

NATO under temporary military arrangements until the remaining political issues can be finally resolved. Read instead, "airspace."

Since that time, there have been other Haig plans and we have read in the press that Mr Rogers is preparing another one with great optimism, but we are sure that like all Haig plans so the Rogers plan aims at the mutilation of the Greek airspace to Turkey's benefit. I hope this prediction will not come true. I reiterate something I said in the beginning: Greece has very special accounts with NATO. It has the account of the 7-year dictatorship, the account of Cyprus' treason, the account of NATO's support for Turkey in its claims over the Aegean.

For us, there is no sense in only withdrawing from the military wing when the NATO political wing also supports Turkey's aggressive, chauvinistic policy. And as the national defense minister has assured us--some time ago--we are in no danger from the North, thus we are exclusively in danger from Turkey, in accordance with the official opinion of the Karamanlis government.

The ratification of the Greek-U.S. bases agreement remains in suspense. The prime minister has told us that this is linked with the U.S.-Turkish agreement, but he also told us in the past that it is also linked with Greece's return to NATO and with the maintenance of balance in the Aegean. Meanwhile U.S. bases have been operating on the basis of the old legal status. This is absolutely to the benefit of the United States because the new status--in some way, symbolically at least--will be connected to the Greek military.

In Greece we have four most important bases for the Mediterranean area: We have the Ellinikon air base; the nuclear naval base--I stress this--of Soudhagv we have the Iraklion base, Gournai; and we have the telecommunications base in Nea Makri. The Nea Makri base is especially important because not only does it have espionage capability but it also has "diversion capability," that is, it can send signals to planes that will lead the plane, the pilot, to another destination from the one he thinks he is following. Dear colleagues, this happened in July 1974 when two Olympic Airways planes left for Megalonisos, Cyprus, and landed in Israel. What do we expect from this base in the event of a Greek-Turkish clash? You alone can answer this simple and direct question. [applause]

In addition to these 4 bases, there are 15 other most important bases, and there are other facilities of every form and nature. The issue has been expounded in the Chamber of Deputies and it is not necessary for me to dwell on it.

[AT131815] These bases expose Greece to nuclear disaster. Have we realized this? They expose us to nuclear disaster and I recall Brezhnev's phrase, which was stated recently, that if countries do not have nuclear warheads,

he--the Soviet Union--will not use nuclear missiles against them. I ask: How have we made this decision that is so critical for the country's future? Why do we persist?

Furthermore, the bases constitute a permanent danger in peacetime, too. For instance, the Soudha Bay incident [reference to a ship explosion in Soudha Bay which caused damage to the town].

The U.S. bases and the VOA constitute means for the imperialist expansion of the United States in the area of the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. We become the agents, we reward, we allow U.S. units to act in the future against Third World countries in the area using our facilities. Of necessity we become involved in conflicts in which, if we truly serve only this country's national interests, we have no reason to become involved.

Other colleagues--I expect Mr Zigidhis--will emphasize the following question, but PASOK does not emphasize it because we oppose both NATO and the bases, but those people who believe in the usefulness of the bases and of NATO ask the New Democracy government: Why did it not utilize--within its own framework--the withdrawal from NATO, and why did it not utilize U.S. bases here in Greece to achieve some aims in the Cyprus problem and the Aegean? This is a basic question which we are not asking but which has been asked and I am sure will be asked again of the New Democracy government by other parties.

Regarding Cyprus, the government has not adhered consistently to the policy of internationalization of the Cyprus problem. In many cases, it allowed itself to make it an issue of Greek-Turkish relations. It is interesting that today, referring to the Cyprus issues, the prime minister spoke about a Greek-Turkish dispute concerning Cyprus. The Cyprus problem is a UN issue. It is the violation of the borders and the area of an independent country, a member of the United Nations. The battle for liberation, independence and Cyprus' integrity can be waged correctly only within this framework. Cyprus is a great national issue for us and let us not forget that Greece is a guarantor power and has special legal obligations emanating from the of course unfortunate Zurich treaty.

The government should have undertaken a campaign of enlightenment on the Cyprus issue on an international scale so that when we visit other countries, when we speak with other leaderships both in the East and the West there should be understanding of the Cyprus tragedy. On the contrary, what we always find is a misinterpretation: That there is a clash between two communities and that Turkey is in Cyprus to protect its kinsmen. The Greek Government is very much like a passive spectator of developments in the Cyprus issue, with statements which, of course, always are positive, but its acts are very few. Or in any case, those we know of are very few.

It is unacceptable that so many years after 1974 the government has not opened the Cyprus dossier, the dossier of the greatest national treason

in our era. We wonder, does the government ever intend to disclose to the Greek people the traitors and the treason over Cyprus, or shall we have to await for PASOK to come to power to reveal the treason? [applause]

A few days ago Denktas, as the prime minister also said, announced that he intends to have people settle in Famagusta--Varosha. He will begin in April. It is strange that on this decision--which is a key in the development of the Cyprus problem and on which Ecevit committed himself in 1978--it is strange that today is the first time the government has reacted, through the prime minister's speech, although this event occurred some time ago. We ask: Why did the government not reply officially to Erkmen when he said recently that the creation of an independent, federated Turkish Cypriot state was a possibility? Why did the government keep quiet on this critical issue?

For us--I am nearing the end--the policy followed by the government leads to the completion of dependence and satellization of our country. At the same time, it leads our national issues into deadlocks. The government of New Democracy has succeeded in a few years--5 years--to consolidate internationally the impression that there is in fact an immense issue: A dispute between Greece and Turkey. For us this is a nonexistent issue but now it exists not only for the Turks but also for the international community. The PASOK position is that our country must follow an independent, nonaligned foreign policy and an independent national defense policy. A NATO member cannot plan its defense [word indistinct] it plans its defense with alliance yardsticks. We do not know whether we are in danger of a world war or not, but we cannot do anything about it because if indeed a world war should take place perhaps we shall not be here to deal with this apocalypse.

For us, the important issue is the defense of our borders within the framework of local wars. We must have a national defense and this means suitable arms. Of course, the dependence of our defense forces on specific sources of arms must be reduced because, truly, spare parts for planes, tanks or other units clearly are critical for a country's military preparedness. Not only must we promote, as quickly as possible, the development of national military industry, but we must also find other sources of arms which will enable our country to take positions that will serve only the Greek people's interests.

It is also necessary--this is a position we have repeatedly declared--to have the people and the armed forces on fraternal terms. [applause] The National Defense Ministry and the prime minister must someday stop discriminating against Greeks: Some of them are considered bad influences or dangerous and some are considered national-minded, correct-thinking Greeks. One cannot build, cannot lay the foundations for the Greek people's unanimity--on which the country's future depends--on such a basis. [applause]

The democratization of the state is also critical for our country's readiness. Do not forget how the treason of Cyprus took place. It took place

in the absence of the people. Only if democracy--not only parliamentary democracy but democracy in local administration and in trade union battles of the people which constitute the three expressions of democracy--has been consolidated, only then shall we have a basis to confront any external danger.

[AT131915] Finally, the government cannot follow for so many years a course in the economic field which leads both to inflationary deadlocks and to balance of payment deadlocks and at the same time to a one-sided austerity: An austerity for the many, for those who are underprivileged, and to luxury for the few, the oligarchy and the monopolies. At this hour, when we have returned to the heart of the cold war, there is indeed danger of a confrontation, we are on the verge of the hot war.

For us in Greece, the only course which can lead to a minimization of danger--it is impossible to speak of complete security--is the readiness by all of us to defend our national independence and our territorial integrity regardless of cost and consequences.

Second, we must lead our country away from the cold war NATO Bloc, which not only does not help our struggle for independence and integrity but, on the contrary, undermines it.

Finally, we must participate together with other peoples in a great crusade, a dynamic crusade, for disarmament and detente. It is our duty, it is the duty of every Greek, the duty of every party, the duty of every organization in our country, in coordination with other countries, with other peoples, other institutions, to wage the battle for humanity's survival.

I truly regret that in these hours, which are difficult for the nation and our people, there is a government in power which cannot rise to the occasion. [applause]

CSO: 4908

APPARENT TEXT OF KARAMANLIS ADDRESS TO PARLIAMENT

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[Apparent text of speech by Prime Minister Konstandinos Karamanlis before the Greek Chamber of Deputies on 11 January 1980--recorded]

[Text] Deputies, the present debate is being held at a moment when the current international situation is not simply confused, but also dangerous. For this very reason it must be conducted calmly, and I would even say responsibly. I believe that all of us here in this hall want the best for this country, even when we express it in different ways. However, very often we do so by trying to hurt the government--any government. I hope that during this debate excesses that could make the conduct of our foreign affairs more difficult will be avoided.

Deputies, I will attempt to give you a general picture of our country's situation. Recently, in the international arena, there have been developments which must not only be of interest to us, but which must make us think. From this very position I have repeatedly underlined the confusion which prevails in the world today. It is a confusion which has recently taken on such a form and such dimensions that it creates the impression that all of humanity has entered a period of mass insanity.

Things are happening today in international life that cannot be explained logically. This is confirmed by the fact that today we have clashes between peoples that not only have common interests but are situated in the very same ideological area. Communists clash with communists; nonaligned kill nonaligned; whites strike at whites and blacks strike at blacks, and so on.

At this time, colleagues, we have had a collapse not only of international institutions, but also a collapse of ideologies which are today subjugated by outdated nationalisms and interests. Greece is obliged to define its international relations amid this dangerous chaos which prevails in the world today. It is obliged to do so in a way which will allow it to avoid the maelstrom which can at any moment threaten it.

The country's foreign policy, after the restoration of the democracy, has taken on dimensions which were unknown to Greece in the past. We developed

and we maintain friendly relations with all nations of the world. We have strengthened our ties with the countries of the West and particularly with the countries of the European community. On our own initiative and for the very first time, a climate unknown in the past has been created in the Balkan region. A complex of relations was created which in itself created a climate of detente in our area.

On the other hand, our relations with the Arab countries present a spectacular development. Over and above the continual tightening of our friendly ties we also developed trade relations which are truly spectacular. It is sufficient to state that our exports to the Arab countries increased from \$220 million in 1974 to \$750 million this year.

Over and above this, however, for the first time a Greek prime minister paid a visit to the Eastern countries. There is special importance in the visits I made to the Soviet Union and to China, where I had useful and sincere summit talks. When I say sincere I mean that these talks were conducted amid the recognized constructive international position of each side.

Deputies, a refusal to speak or to support what is right as a result of a fear of making ourselves unpleasant, is the worst of policies. Small nations, if they are to have international prestige, must, without creating provocations, be sincere and honorable. Fear, both in private and international relations, is the worst form of slavery which deprives us of the freedom of expressing what we believe in.

Our country, dear colleagues, lies in the most sensitive area of the world. We must never forget this when we discuss our foreign policy. Different people define their foreign policy in different ways. Countries which are secure as a result of their geographic positions like Portugal, Spain, and Ireland--define it one way, but countries which find themselves at sensitive points on the globe, like our country, must define their foreign policies with wisdom and resolve.

In the eastern Mediterranean, in the Middle East and now in Central Asia peace is in danger, and the danger of a more general confrontation appears on the horizon with unpredictable consequences. It creates (a problem) in which Greece is vitally interested because of the special ties it has with the Arab world. The crisis has become more acute because it is directly or indirectly connected with the energy crisis.

In Iran, after a revolutionary change, the situation remains confused and it is impossible to forecast what the final outcome will be. I very much fear that the situation is heading toward a civil war--in order not to say that, unfortunately, a civil war has already started. This is a civil war which, fatefully and as history teaches us, will lead to some form of totalitarianism.

[AT121615] But Iranian developments, colleagues, have created problems in the international area. Over and above internal problems. The arrest and

incarceration of U.S. diplomats which still continues as it is well known, created an international furor. It created a justified furor because this action abolished an ages-old institution, such as the institution of diplomatic immunity. It also abolishes international law and order. We must hope for the good of peace and the good of the Iranian peoples themselves that logic will prevail in order to avert dangers which could affect Iran itself.

In Afghanistan, on the other hand, we see events which threaten, at least the peace of this area itself. The Soviet Union invaded this country without even making excuses. I believe that the explanations it has furnished can convince nobody that it has resorted to this act in an effort to avert any dangers. It is a fact that this invasion severely injured international detente. In this instance we must also hope for solutions which will avert dangers with unforeseeable dimensions.

There is no doubt, colleagues, that all this disturbance in this area is directly or indirectly connected to the energy issue. As you know, and we do know it because we are feeling its consequences, the energy crisis is the greatest and most acute economic crisis since 1930. This is because it is not only the economy of the world which today relies upon oil. Modern life in the world itself depends upon oil.

The high handed method of oil production, distribution, costing, makes any planning absolutely impossible. It creates grave concern in the world. The repercussions upon all sectors of international life are such that there is a fear that as a result of the energy problem there may be economic and political upheavals which will disturb the world.

As you know, a long time ago I underlined the dangers created by the energy crisis. I supported the viewpoint that in order to prevent these dangers it must be essential that this huge and critical issue must be settled in such a way that it serves on a long term basis the interests of both producers and consumers. It must give the advantages to the producers derived from the fact that this valuable commodity is found in their country, and to the consumers it must provide at least a sense of security. At this moment we are not only threatened by the continuous and excessive increase of the price for oil. We are also threatened by the unwillingness of any producer to deliver oil to us.

I must tell you that during my recent visits I discussed this issue with both Arab and European leaders and I tried to convince them that it was necessary to strengthen the effort for dialog from any source. I must tell you that I established that all of them are deeply concerned and all accept the need for such a dialog, even the Arab producers. And yet the issue is not being handled in a collective way, with a common will, neither by the one nor the other side. In this way we have reached the stage when the energy sector is in anarchy.

We will not be able to control this situation unless there is a long term handling of this issue. It will become even more dangerous because day by day this serious critical issue draws further away from collective control. As you can see not even the producers can agree between themselves. And yet they need to take the initiative because each one of them tries to settle his own needs ignoring the dangers which threaten the whole of humanity.

Deputies, as you know I recently visited various regions of the world and I have had talks with the leaders of all those countries which regulate international life. These contacts of mine were most certainly useful. I was first of all briefed in a responsible way on the trends prevailing in the world today and this is very useful because it permits us to regulate our policy in a more secure way. I also had the opportunity to express Greek views on the critical problems of our times and particularly on the problems which affect Greece. We also created new prospects of co-operation in all sectors.

I regret, however, to say that during these contacts I discovered that the evaluations of the strong on the great and critical problems of our times are so different and contrary to each other that no optimism on the future of the world can be justified. Gentlemen, today humanity progresses without control and nobody can make any forecasts about the future.

It is obvious that these differences between the strong and the great are due apart from interest, to mutual mistrust which today prevails in international life generally and particularly between the East and the West.

The position of Greece toward these problems is well known and firm. We believe that if international mistrust and fear are to be dissolved there must be a balance of power at the lowest possible level which will be internationally controlled.

I believe, deputies, that since total disarmament has been proved impossible the sole guarantee for international peace lies in a balance of power. This is because supremacy in arms naturally creates temptations for the one who has it, tempting him to expand his influence.

[AT121457] I could very well refer to the position of the Italian Communist Party which argued--when asked why it supports the stay of Italy within NATO--that NATO is essential under the meaning that there must be a balance of power in the world. If it does not exist then he who has supremacy will make bad use of this supremacy.

We have proclaimed this policy in every direction with firmness and courage. This is the very reason why Greece has taken its position on the medium-range missiles. It is well known that in Central Europe the Eastern coalition has a considerable supremacy as compared to the West. Consequently the position we adopted has been totally in conformity to the theory we believe, the theory of the balance of power.

Deputies, I will now deal with specific issues of interest to Greece at this moment particularly in the foreign sector. These issues have been repeatedly debated in this chamber. I believe that we debated them in depth during the last political debate. I can yet refer to the latest developments so that the briefing of the chamber will be more complete.

I will start with the tragedy of Cyprus which puts our era to shame. Responsibility for this tragedy, as you know, is borne by Turkey in the same way that Turkey bears responsibility for the prolongation of uncertainty. The dialog which has been conducted successively and repeatedly produced absolutely no result. This is because Turkey did not want to or was unable to clearly define its goals. Over and above this recently Turkey has also threatened to take over Varosha--which if it happens, will make any effort for a solution to the problem impossible. This could also be a provocation not only for us but I also believe for all those who are interested in a solution to the problem and generally in the peace of the area.

Approximately two months ago the United Nations in their resolution recommended a continuation of dialog. This was with the proviso that if dialog did not produce results once again, then a special UN committee must be formed to assist in the finding of a solution. An initiative from UN Secretary General Waldheim is already expected, but I do not know whether Turkey will take advantage of the opportunity to put an end to this tragedy which has also become its own tragedy as well.

Irrespective of what Turkey does, the Greek side, the Greek Cypriot side must come to such a dialog with unity and free of any party predilections and it must seek a national solution, not a left or right wing solution. It must submit clear and specific proposals so that it can have the support of all those who want to support justice. Over and above this and if opportunities for promoting the issue exist, they must not be lost as was the case in the past.

Greece, deputies, follows the development of this tragedy with great interest and with heartache. I believe it is unnecessary to once again proclaim the solidarity of Greece toward the people of Cyprus [applause] the cooperation between Athens and Nicosia is firm and it will be firmly continued until the struggle of Cypriot Hellenism is fulfilled [applause].

The same thing is happening, deputies, with the other differences which we have with Turkey. They also demonstrate a certain stagnation because it was impossible--despite our continued efforts--to reach a logical understanding with Turkey. It is futile for me to repeat that responsibility for this rests with Turkey in the same way that Turkey is responsible for the uncertainty in these problems.

The positions of Greece on these problems are clear and well known. They are so logical that if Turkey had demonstrated elemental understanding then the solution of our differences would have been easy. Because, however,

Turkey, in its effort to justify the noise it creates from time to time, argues that Greece has altered or has the intention of altering the Aegean into a Greek lake, I am forced to reiterate the statement which I repeatedly made in the past in an effort to disperse impressions Turkey is attempting to create.

Greece does not consider the Aegean as a Greek lake. Greece accepts that there are international and territorial waters in the Aegean. Nor does Greece refute the fact that Turkey as a littoral country has certain, naturally limited, rights in the Aegean. What we want from Turkey is that it should at long last recognize that this Aegean is strewn with islands and that these islands are Greek islands [applause] and that, according to international laws, these islands have their rights. From the moment when Turkey recognizes this truth then a settlement of our differences will most certainly become easy.

Naturally, I do not want to intervene in Turkish internal affairs. One could, however, consider the fact that there is political instability in Turkey as a mitigating element for its behavior. Over and above this there are also certain political and economic problems which could justify the unwillingness and unbending position of Turkey.

In any case, as I have already stated, the positions of the Greek Government are well known, firm and logical. We cannot enforce them, however, this is because solution of these issues does not exclusively rest with us. It also depends upon those who have created them.

Over and above this we are not the ones who are in haste. Exerting pressure upon Turkey making it agree to solutions. We ask nothing from Turkey. It is Turkey which makes claims. I say this because there is often an impression that the Greek Government must be blamed for not promoting a solution to these problems. The basis on which the Greek Government must be judged, however, is whether it supports logical solutions, nationally correct solutions and if, as it has done, it protects our interests and the country's security without making concessions. [long applause]

[AT121605] It is, in any case, to the interest of both our peoples to settle their differences peacefully on the basis of logic and justice like all people who have such differences do. We are not, I would say unfortunately, the only ones in this world who have such differences. Many peoples have such differences but they deal with them with goodwill, good faith and they seek processes which at some time lead them to results and solutions.

A meeting between secretaries general of the foreign ministries is expected to take place. One could at least expect this meeting to limit the process so that at least there can be an effective dialog. Once again I cannot predetermine the result of this meeting. I would wish, in any case, that it opens the way for some responsible and constructive dialog.

I will now, deputies, refer to the NATO issue both because it is of the moment but also because it has become the object of continual exploitation by the left, and when I say the left I mean PASOK and the KKE. [laughter] I do not criticize these parties I just simply mention which parties oppose our policy despite the explanations of our policy and the reasons which support establishment of these special relations.

As you know this issue was discussed in this chamber many times during the past few years and not only within this chamber but also out of it. The government explained the reasons why we consider the establishment of such special relations as useful to the country's security.

In its effort to deal with the dangers it inherited, particularly on security matters, the Greek Government primarily took care to strengthen the situation of the armed forces by elevating the armed forces at this moment to the highest point of efficiency they have ever been in the past [applause]. You can appreciate this if you compare the situation of the armed forces today and the one they were in in 1974.

Over and above this effort undertaken to create an army able to protect the nation's security, the government considered it its duty to further strengthen the country's security through diplomatic supports. It is for this reason that it proposed to the Atlantic alliance the establishment of special relations which, in its opinion, would provide this maximum security for Greece particularly in the case of a more general clash.

After a long process, as it is well known, NATO's military command accepted the Greek proposal. Turkey, however, presented objections to this proposal exploiting the fact that NATO operates on the principle of unanimity.

Naturally Greece desires--particularly at this very moment when the general situation creates concern--establishment of these special relations. Greece, however, is not prepared to negotiate it with Turkey. Primarily Greece is not prepared to accept it in a way which is not to the interest of Greece. [applause] This, colleagues, is also the reason why negotiations did not reach an agreement. It is not sufficient that you blame us with the responsibility for the uncertainty prevailing on these issues.

You must recognize the fact that the uncertainty exists because the Greek Government is not prepared to give in [prolonged applause]. They remain uncertain because we are not prepared to accept solutions, no matter how long the uncertainty, which might harm our national interests.

I will also refer to the issue of bases because I know that if I do not mention it then the opposition will do so. In an effort to save you from the need to deal with this issue at length, I want to explain the position at which this problem is now and what the positions of the Greek Government are. It is also well known that some two or three years ago the issue was raised on the initiative of the Greek Government. It was not raised due to

enmity toward the United States. If such enmity existed then we would not have discussed it.

The issue was raised because we thought it essential to settle a confused state of affairs and to adjust it to the conditions of our times and at the same time to our country's defense interests.

As you know a draft agreement was initialled in 1977. A final agreement was, however, not promoted because through the passage of time the issue got involved with the U.S.-Turkish defense agreement. We had to await the outcome of this agreement for reasons which affect the balance of power between the two countries. The Greek Government will await development of these negotiations which, as is known, lead to the signing of an agreement, before defining its position conclusively.

I repeat we would have concluded this agreement two years ago if the Greek Government did not have the foresight as well as the desire to rely the issue of a final agreement upon the outcome of negotiations being conducted in Turkey. What is of interest to us is that the balance of power between Greece and Turkey must not be overthrown.

I repeat, therefore, that when we have the full facts on the agreement concluded or to be concluded between Turkey and the United States we will, I repeat, define our position on this issue.

Colleagues, our country's foreign policy is already taking on a more specific and firm character as a result of our accession to the European community. For this reason it is natural and fated that through this accession we will identify our progress both politically, economically and defensively with the European community. This is the very reason why the left wing has fought obstinately against our accession. It does not fight against it because it considers it detrimental to Greek interests but because it wants to sever Greece from the democratic West.

I left this issue of our accession last because I consider it the most important to the country's future. I spoke at length on the great importance of Greek accession both during the signing of the accession agreement and during the ratification of the agreement by the chamber. Yet I will again refer to the benefits offered to us by this accession and also because volleys against our accession continue, even though I could now refer to these volleys as blank volleys.

[AT121714] As you know our accession was not requested by the European community. On the contrary there were reservations, and I could say justified reservations. I state this because it has been claimed often that the EEC accepted Greece in order to exploit it.

It was we who sought accession with insistency. We did so because this was a national goal adopted by all parties 18 years ago.

Naturally it is an unfortunate coincidence that our accession to the EEC takes place at a time when the world and Europe generally are going through a multifaceted and deep crisis.

It is certain, however, we would have been in a far worse position if we remained alone, particularly at a time when the international situation justifies concern and when it allows no nation to feel secure.

The advantages offered to us by our accession are both political and economic. I repeat that discussion was held on these matters many times in the chamber and I do not feel the need to expand on them further at this moment.

The advantages offered to us by our accession are both political and economic. I repeat that discussion was held on these matters many times in the chamber and I do not feel the need to expand on them further at this moment.

The political advantages consist of strengthening our national independence and our democratic institutions. The economic advantages consist of helping and speeding up the country's economic and social development.

Through accession we will become members of a large European family as an equal member with the great powers having an equal vote with them. In this way we will be part of the decision-making center instead of being a small and isolated country on the margin of international developments.

In other words through accession we will leave our age-long isolation which exposed us to various dangers and forced us to seek protectors.

This is the great and basic significance of our country's accession to the EEC. Exactly because the international conditions are dangerous, so dangerous as I said that no nation can feel secure, I would be tempted to ask the opposition to support this policy of ours.

I do not believe there could be any serious discussion of a nonaligned policy which the opposition and the left propose as an alternative solution.

In any case the reasons for which it wants such a solution are well known

As I have earlier stated the insistent goal of the left is to sever Greece from the democratic West. If ever, however, Greece is severed from the West it will be exposed to serious dangers. It would be alone in the world without solidarity from anyone and this at a time, I repeat, when the international situation dictates to every country to seek the maximum of guarantees for its security. At the same time I do not think it necessary to remind you as to who would benefit from any possible Greek severance from the West.

Colleagues, the nonaligned are not a political or military power able to guarantee the security of its members. Their differences it is true are so many and severe that they make their unity problematic. How could it be seriously argued under such conditions and under the given seriousness of the international situation that Greece ought to follow a nonaligned policy?

As I said at the start of my speech the international situation is dark and nobody can make forecasts on the future. Within the limits of this international situation Greece has to solve various domestic and foreign problems. If the handling of these problems is to be secure and without dangers it requires wisdom combined with determination and, most of all it requires national and social unity.

It is essential that at long last we accept that we cannot solve our problems through demonstrations and demagogic competition. We would only make them more severe as they have been made more severe by all the countries which are today tried by political and social upheavals.

In the mass information media we daily follow developments throughout the world and we can draw educational comparisons. As I have often stated, in the midst of a world in anarchy our country today has a firm political situation and a social calm and by comparison to other countries it also has economic progress. The fact that recently and as a result of the international economic crisis we are also faced with difficult economic problems does not cancel out this conclusion.

Deputies, these conquests, both political and economic, of the past few years must be protected because they are considerable. They are so considerable that they allow us to accede to the EEC. There is no doubt that if the situation in Greece, both political and economic, did not inspire confidence the members of the EEC would never have accepted our country's accession.

They accepted it because, I repeat, over the past 5 years there was considerable progress in all sectors. It is possible that we do not appreciate this progress in the same way. This is natural, not only because we are the government and you are the opposition but also because it so happens that we have different political and economic philosophies.

I repeat, colleagues, that these conquests must be protected, we have a duty to protect them particularly today when various dangers, inestimable dangers, threaten them. I am certain, colleagues, that if we all adjust our behavior to the demands of our times we will be able to overcome today's difficulties, both political and economic and that we will soon again find our upward course. [applause]

PANHELLENIC SOCIALIST MOVEMENT PARTY SUPPORTS THE POLISARIO

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 19 Nov 79 p 4

[Interview with Manos Kafetzopoulos, member of the PASOK [expansion unknown] International Relations Committee. Interview conducted by Hacene Ouandjeli. Date and place of interview not given.]

[Text] Manos Kafetzopoulos told EL MOUDJAHID that PASOK was a resistance movement that was formed in the struggle against the dictatorship and also a socialist party whose influence has not stopped growing. Manos Kafetzopoulos, who is a member of PASOK's International Relations Committee, explained its political orientation and its place on the political chessboard of Greece. He also reaffirmed its solidarity with the Polisario in regard to the Saharan cause. He declared that "no voice in Greece has been raised against the Polisario and the Saharan people."

[Question] Tell us about PASOK, its place on the Greek political chessboard and its strength.

[Answer] PASOK is a resistance movement which developed during the seven and one-half years that the military dictatorship lasted. After the overthrow of the dictatorship in August 1974, PASOK became a legal organization. As far as its ideology is concerned, it is a Marxist party but it is not dogmatic. It is an organization which adheres to the positions taken by the nonaligned nations and it is not part of any international organization. Additionally, it adheres to the socialist principle of self-government. As far as the internal impact of PASOK is concerned, its weight is felt on the level of the municipalities, on the level of the labor unions and on the parliamentary level.

On the international plane, PASOK maintains bilateral relations with all the progressive parties and movements of Europe and has excellent relations with the progressive Arab regimes.

PASOK does not share the position of the Greek Government in regard to NATO. It is opposed to any military pact signed by Greece and other foreign powers and is also opposed to Greece's entry into the Common Market.

As far as the place of PASOK on the Greek political chessboard is concerned, I will declare that PASOK occupies a position between that of the extreme right capitalist party and the Communist Party. In November 1977 elections were held and in regard to that it must be observed that PASOK had such remarkable success that one-third of the representatives in Parliament belong to PASOK. That represents a percentage of between 25 and 26 percent. To be more precise, 93 PASOK members are deputies. That shows you that the popularity of PASOK does not cease to grow and it is becoming more and more important in Greece.

[Question] Exactly how are the relationships between Greece and NATO developing? According to the latest reports Greece has decided not to consider itself bound to the military clauses of the Atlantic organization any longer. What does that attitude mean?

[Answer] As far as the relations between Greece and NATO are concerned, we must establish a distinction between the policy followed by the Greek Government and the position taken by PASOK. In the fall of 1974, after the invasion of Cyprus by the NATO forces, Greece decided then to withdraw from the NATO Military Pact. That position is still in force.

Now, as far as the Greek situation is concerned, the member countries of NATO are trying at all cost to involve Greece again, especially since it represents a strategic point for "coverage" of the southeastern zone. There is also the fact that the NATO forces are trying to spend time to confuse the question of the return of Greece to NATO and its entry into the Common Market.

Up to the present, the Greek Government has resisted those two types of pressure. Finally, the disagreement also centers around the fact that NATO is trying to impose a non-Greek general to command the Aegean Zone.

In that way the person who would be in charge of covering that area would not be a representative of Greece and that is the essential disagreement that the Greek Government is opposing to NATO.

As far as the position of PASOK is concerned, is a question of principle for it to oppose any concept of a military block, of a military alliance for the following reasons: NATO showed itself to be an "ally" of the fascist dictatorship between 1967 and 1974; it also showed itself to be as good as an "ally" of both Turkey and Greece at the same time, which at the time of the Cyprus invasion "arranged" not to take any position. It did not try to slow down the state of belligerence which was increasing alarmingly between Greece and Turkey. It has not condemned the belligerent attitude of Turkey toward Cyprus either. Therefore, with the arrival of PASOK on the great political scene, we are observing the assumption of a conscientiously held position on the part of the Greek people which will now act in such a way that its government can in the future no longer accept any agreement for concessions which would put the territorial

soverignty of Greece in danger. In that sense, PASOK will always give its support to the Greek Government as long as it resists NATO pressures.

For us, NATO is an organization which threatens the integrity of our country, an organization which needs the United States, and the United States has a great influence. We are opposed to the absurd demands presented by NATO with the United States as a bridgehead, chiefly as far as the presence of foreign fleets in our territorial waters is concerned.

[Question] Since the overthrow of the dictatorship, Greece has lived under a republican regime. In your opinion, what are the lessons to be drawn from this institution and the political conduct of your country?

[Answer] In fact, after the fall of the military dictatorship, no radical political changes necessarily took place. A short recapitulation: the military dictatorship went down following its participation in a coup d'etat against President Macarios of Cyprus. When the dictatorship went down the party of the right took power, at the same time that it tried to maintain a type of political confusion. That confusion has been the cause of trials of notorious fascists, at the present time of course, but other elements of the preceding regime are all still with us and have an influence which we must not minimize. Of course, now, Greece is considered to be a republic, a democracy, but there still are many changes to be brought about. For example, on the level of the labor unions, the government as of now does not always lend them a sympathetic ear. It has established laws which interdict certain labor freedoms. The right to strike continues to be a very critical question. To go out on strike is always considered as a crime. Moreover, the internal political situation in Greece is still dominated by the question of its entry into the Common Market.

[Question] Then isn't the specter of the "Greece of the Colonels" laid?

[Answer] From the fact that after the overthrow of the military dictatorship there was no real purge, it is not possible to claim that the demon of the political dictatorship has been exorcised. Some wounds are still open....

[Question] For PASOK, what is the solution to be applied to the problem of Cyprus?

[Answer] It is useless to make a historical analysis of this Cyprus question as it is well known here in Algeria. What PASOK would like to emphasize in this regard is that it is an international problem which concerns a country belonging to the nonaligned movement and a member of the United Nations. The position of PASOK is very simple: the settlement of the Cypriot question should be done in conformity with the resolutions of the United Nations and the movement of nonaligned nations. PASOK would like Cyprus to be once again a demilitarized, unified country where an end would

be put to its division into two communities and that that should be done under the banner of nonalignment.

[Question] What is the understanding of the Saharan cause in Greece?

[Answer] At first, as far as the question of the Western Sahara is concerned, PASOK has given its full and entire support to the Polisario and considers it to be the only legitimate representative of the Saharan people. In that regard, we would like to emphasize the PASOK was among the first to visit the Saharans and that it has visited the zones controlled by the Polisario. PASOK has sponsored different meetings in Greece for the purpose of properly familiarizing the Greek people with the question of the Western Sahara. We even published a very thick volume in Greek on that question. Therefore, the Saharan problem is well known and to my knowledge no voice in Greece has been raised against the Polisario or the Saharan people. Furthermore, we would like to take this opportunity to launch an appeal to the Mauritanian Government asking it to denounce the presence of Moroccan forces on the part of the Sahara that has been liberated by Mauritania.

[Question] Your closing words.

[Answer] We would like to express our pleasure at the excellent relations that exist between the FLN [National Liberation Front] and PASOK and we would also like to celebrate the fact that during international meetings there has always been a community of interest expressed by those two parties. We would also like to take this opportunity to express our militant greetings to the Algerian people, above all on the occasion of their celebration of the 25th anniversary of their heroic struggle. We would like to give our entire support, to express at length our encouragement to the Algerian Government for the efforts made in the construction of a socialist society. We are at the present moment in the process of holding discussions with the FLN for the purpose of arranging a visit to Algeria by the President of PASOK.

Pasok Condemns American Aid

PASOK has published a communique in which it energetically condemns the American decision to sell arms to Morocco.

"At the moment when the Polisario Front, the authentic representative of the Saharan people, is carrying on a difficult struggle for the liberation of its country from foreign domination", the communication declares, "and while it has succeeded in launching a strong force for peace in that region, crowned by the peace agreement between the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and the Polisario Front and considering that all international organizations (OAU, UN) and the nonaligned countries, at their last summit meeting, have reaffirmed the right of the Saharan people to self-determination and to independence, the King of Morocco is continuing his aggressive and expansionist policy, this time stimulated by the serious decision of President Carter which consists of delivering an ultramodern supply of aggressive

modern arms which will require, among other things, the presence of American advisors.

"This new interference is a supplementary escalation which aims at the internationalization of the conflict. This is a challenge to the aspirations of the Saharan people for self-determination and to independence, and also to the latest decisions of the international bodies.

"PASOK, faithful to its policy of national independence and to its aspirations for a peaceful Mediterranean where every people will enjoy its freedom and its independence, "condemns this interference by American imperialism and reaffirms its support to the Saharan people and to its legitimate representative, the Polisario Front."

"PASOK demands among other things a cease to the delivery of American arms to Morocco, which will only delay a just and durable solution to the problem of decolonizing the western Sahara."

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CID: 4900

FINANCE MINISTER REVEALS PLAN TO COMBAT ECONOMIC CRISIS

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 7 Nov 79 p 17

[Unattributed Article: "Financial and Borrowing Measures of Tomas Arnason Revised: A Tax Cut, Reduction of Foreign Debt Contracting and Curtailed Treasury Expenditures. Says Sighvatur Bjorgvinsson, Minister of Finance"]

[Text] The task which we have worked at in the past, here at the Ministry of Finance, is two-fold: an attempt to gain a better grip on treasury finances this year, and the undertaking of revisions of the financial and borrowing measures which Tomas Arnason, former minister of finance, developed and to which we, the members of the people's party, have shown opposition to, said Sighvatur Bjorgvinsson, minister of finance, in a conversation yesterday with MORGUNBLADID.

Sighvatur said that various things had been done to increase restraint in state finance and still more was in the works. He said that, during the last half of October, the debt of the treasury with the Central Bank was decreased by 13 billion krona. There is now a 1 billion positive balance for the treasury in its account with the Central Bank and the deficit in this account was 10 billion krona on October 15. This has been achieved in two ways, by having treasury bill collectors hand in what has been collected early, and by stopping certain disbursements, primarily extra appropriations, while study is being carried out to determine how much may be cut from these appropriations. But I will make it perfectly clear that this is only a temporary success that could turn around in the worst way the last months of the year, but I am hopeful that this will be successful in reducing the very costly deficit of payments of the treasury which the previous government gave rise to, said Sighvatur Bjorgvinsson.

He also said revisions of the measures of Tomas Arnason on financial and borrowing planning, which moved in the direction of increased withholding taxes and substantial loan contracting abroad, were being undertaken. We are prepared to begin with proposals on a tax cut of billions of krona, above that proposed, and a reduction of foreign loans, and also reduced treasury expenditures as well. These proposals have not yet been discussed by the government and I cannot discuss them any more at this time, said Sighvatur Bjorgvinsson, minister of finance.

PAPER COMMENTS ON DECLINE IN BUYING POWER

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 8 Nov 79 p 16

[Unsigned Editorial: "The Decreasing Purchasing Power of Pensioners"]

[Text] The purchasing power of wages of wage-earners decreased 12 percent during the 13 months of the administration of the leftwing government. The purchasing power of old age and disability pensions and other insurance payments likewise decreased during the time of the leftwing government. In all the purchasing power of old age and disability pensions and welfare decreased by 11.3 points in 9 months. The purchasing power of other insurance payments also decreased considerably.

This development is diametrically opposed to what took place during the welfare ministry of Matthias Bjarnason. In mid-1977, old age and disability pensions increased by 17.3 points and together with welfare these pensions increased by nearly 30 percent.

These are noteworthy figures, not the least because the leftwing government has often maintained that it is a better guardian of the interests of pensioners than others. The People's Party and the People's Alliance have always made much to do that these parties are intimately concerned with the condition of pensioners, but now, on the other hand, it appears that during the ministry of the Independence Party man, Matthias Bjarnason, the condition of the pensioners improved but during the administration of the People's Party and People's Alliance the condition of this group worsened. This development is especially serious because the majority of pensioners are unquestionably the worst paid group in Iceland. In discussions on the condition of low wage-earners, it is too often forgotten that the majority of them are found among the body of pensioners, who for reasons of old age, or for other reasons, have less income possibilities than others. Inflation has treated this group badly. There is probably no single group in the nation which lives in such difficulty as the pensioners. On this account it is certainly astonishing when it comes to light that the leftwing government has not attended to the interests of this group and has not thought to preserve the purchasing power of pensions as it ought.

We can argue about many things, but we can be in agreement on one thing: whatever happens with regard to inflation and restraint measures to restrict inflation, we must see to it that that group, which has nothing else to live on but a pension from the social insurance system can get by reasonably. But there is that very danger that this group will fall behind in the mad inflation scramble which now reigns.

It is all very fine to beat the breast, like partisans of the People's Party and People's Alliance do, and go on about how they worry more about the condition of pensioners than others. But deeds talk louder than words and facts tell their tale. There is no doubt whatever that that cut in purchasing power which pensioners have had to bear has come down hard on most of them. We cannot afford to reduce the living conditions of this group. We cannot allow us to be shamed by reducing their living standards. But this has apparently come to pass in the time of the leftwing government most recently without that special measures have been taken or proposed afterward to bring about an improvement.

In the next 6 months, wide-ranging measures must be taken to reduce state expenditures and keep them in check. These measures must, on the other hand, not come down hard on that group which has nothing else to live on than a pension from the insurance system.

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PURCHASING POWER DROPPED 12 PERCENT IN 13 MONTHS

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 6 Nov 79 p 14, 9 Nov 79 p 3

[Unattributed Article: "Purchasing Power Decreased by 12 Percent in 13 Months," and Table: "Purchasing Power of Set Wages (September 1978=100)"]

[Text] The purchasing power of hourly wages of all wage-earners is now, in November, estimated at 88.5 points in comparison to 100 in September, 1978, when the government of Olafur Johannesson took office. This is 11.5 points below purchasing power in that month when the leftwing government took power. It should be noted that when the leftwing government took power the set wages of wage-earners were 1.4 points higher than they were in July, 1977, the first month after the concluding of the "Solstice Agreements," as they have been called. In March, 1978, purchasing power was 94.2 points and it is now 5.7 points lower than then.

These figures are based upon a table which the Icelandic Popular Alliance distributed among delegates to a recently held wage conference of the Alliance but for reference MORGUNBLADID has set purchasing power at 100 at the beginning of the administration of the leftwing government. The purchasing power figures apply to workmen, workwomen, industrial workers, tradesmen, and public employees, but later purchasing power figures have been compiled for all wage-earners within the Icelandic Popular Alliance and for all Icelandic wage-earners. For this present month of November, figures on purchasing power are estimates and the purchasing power of industrial workers was lowest at 88 points. Thus industrial workers are 12 points short of the full purchasing power of September, 1978, workmen 11.7 points, workwomen 11.8 points, all wage-earners within the Icelandic Popular Alliance 11.9 points and all wage-earners of Iceland 11.5 points, as previously stated. Purchasing power figures for tradesmen in the Icelandic Popular Alliance table are, on the other hand, incomplete, in as much as the influence of wage decisions taken in the summer have not been taken into consideration in them.

Noteworthy in the aforementioned table is that workwomen and industrial workers never, during the administration of the leftwing government, attained a purchasing power of 100, that is to say, in spite of purchasing

power fluctuations, they never attained that level to which they were assigned at the beginning of the government coalition of the leftwing parties. On the other hand, the purchasing power of workmen attained this level, 100, in December of the previous year, but fell after that quickly, by two points, in January, and purchasing power of public employees reached this level and beyond in March, 1979, when it attained 101.1 points. It was generally two points higher until a three percent base pay increase took place in the wages of Icelandic Popular Alliance Unions. This increase was contract required with public employees and took force just in March. The purchasing power of public employees is, according to the table, one point higher than in public trade unions.




Table 1. Purchasing Power of Set Wages (September 1978=100)

PUBLIC INDUSTRIES DEFICIT

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 8 Nov 79 p 48

[Unattributed Article: "Billion Krona Deficit in Public Industries"]

[Text] Events are heading towards a billion krona deficit in public industries and organizations this year, since their requests for increases have been cut by the former government or increases have been totally denied in accordance with the present thinking of the government now in power. These facts emerged in discussions which MORGUNBLADID had yesterday with the heads of some state industries.

If the 25 percent increase for national development is denied the industry will come up against a billion krona deficit this year, according to the information of Eirik Briem. This money will have to be borrowed abroad with a 15-16 percent interest rate and the debt will grow ceaselessly due to losses in the value of the krona.

The State Cement Factory plans on an 80 million krona deficit this year, according to the words of Gylfi Thordarson. The operating capital deficit of the industry last year was 100 million krona. The Cement Factory requested a 15 percent increase but this has been denied and Gylfi expects that cement will have to increase in price by 30 percent right after the start of the new year.

The deficit of the Reykjavik Bus System will be nearly 900 million this year and 1.5 billion next year, all things being equal. According to Eirik Asgeirsson, the enterprise requested a 60 percent increase last April but received only a 25 percent increase. At this time the enterprise has requested a 28.2 percent increase but will likely get a complete denial.

The Post Office and the Telephone Company have requested a 12-15 percent increase and the Reykjavik Heating Plant a 22 percent increase. The financial condition of both enterprises is difficult, according to their heads, Jon Skulason and Johannes Zoega, and both enterprises have had to reduce service this year.

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PENSIONERS SEE DECLINE IN REAL BUYING POWER

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 7 Nov 79 p 32

[Unattributed Article: "Purchasing Power of Old Age and Disability Pensions and Welfare: 11.3 Point Decrease in 9 Months"]

[Excerpt] The purchasing power of pensions, compared to index figures for wares and services, has never been so little and is now below that of the second quarter of 1977, but at the end of 1977 there was a real increase in the purchasing power of pensions. The purchasing power of old age and disability pensions and welfare has decreased by 11.3 points from that of the fourth quarter of 1978 and in that quarter, as is well-known, the left-wing government took power.

These figures, which are published by the Wage Research Committee, apply to the second quarter of 1979, so that the figures are those of mid-year. If a comparison is made with index figures for the cost of living the decrease is revealed which has taken place in the purchasing power of pensions in the past year. The purchasing power of old age and disability pensions has decreased, in comparison with the cost of living index figures, by 4.9 points but if welfare is included, the decrease is 7.9 points. The purchasing power of child support has decreased, compared to the cost of living index, by 5.4 points, and the purchasing power of maternity wages for three children or more has decreased by 4.9 points.

It may be said, in conclusion, that those old age or disability pensioners, which require full welfare, are those people who have no other sources of income than those payments from the state insurance institution.

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BRIEFS

MORE UNEMPLOYMENT--Unemployment has increased somewhat at the latest month end compared to the end of September, or by 136. In the entire country there were 159 registered unemployed persons on 30 September but the number reached 295 at the end of last month. Unemployment has increased in all municipalities except in Delvik. There is no registered unemployed person there but there were 12 in September. In Reykjavik, the unemployed increased from 89 to 121, from none to 35 in Siglufjodr, from 1 to 10 in Husavik, and from 2 to 18 in Keflavik. The number of unemployed has increased from 126 to 253 in the municipalities and from 33 to 42 in the villages. Days of unemployment have increased in this time from 2,535 to 1,429. [Text] [Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 8 Nov 79 p 26] 11,433

CENTRAL BANK LOAN--The government had a credit in its account with the Central Bank at the end of October for the first time in 4 years. This point was made in a press conference which Sighvatur Bjorgvinsson, Economics Minister, held yesterday. The next day there was debt anew amounting to 5 billion krona while the credit of the previous day amounted to one billion. MORGUNBLADID has been informed that the treasury obtained a loan from the Central Bank whereby the current account of the treasury with the Central Bank was carried over in another loan form. By this means the treasury was successful, for the first time in 4 years, in showing a balance in this account, but a debt will have to be paid next year. At the beginning of the year the treasury owed the Central Bank 2 billion krona, but when the minority People's Party government took power the debt had risen to 46 billion krona. Thus, during the period of the previous government, the debts of the treasury with the Central Bank have increased by 20 billion krona this year. [Text] [Reykjavik MORGUNBALDID in Icelandic 8 Nov 79 p 42] 11,433

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PCI DELEGATION VISIT WITH ALGERIAN PARTY OFFICIALS

LD101253 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 8 Jan 80 p 1 LD

[Unattributed report: "PCI and Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN): Initiatives for Detente"]

[Text] Algiers--The PCI delegation led by Comrade Gerardo Chiaromonte and composed of comrades Antonio Rubbi, Napoleone Colajanni, Cecilia Chiovini and Giorgio Migliardi, which is visiting Algeria at the FLN's invitation met yesterday with FLN coordinator Comrade Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui, with whom it had a lengthy and cordial conversation. The PCI delegation had previously begun talks with an FLN delegation led by FLN foreign relations chief, Comrade Slimane Hoffman, and composed of the following comrades: chairman of the Europe-North America Subcommittee Ogab; Deputy Kasri; Deputy Baichour; and General Union of Algerian Workers foreign relations Chief Chaa.

During the talks an exchange of information took place on the situation in the respective countries, on both parties' activities and on certain aspects of the international situation.

In particular, the two delegations carried out a frank and open exchange of opinions on the latest international events. The shared belief was expressed that these recent events constitute further factors aggravating international relations and increasing the dangers to security and peace even in the Mediterranean area. Hence stems the need to take appropriate and prompt initiatives aimed at guaranteeing peace and security in the Mediterranean basin and throughout the world.

The two delegations also fully discussed the state of political and economic relations between Italy and Algeria and the development of relations of cooperation and friendship between the PCI and the FLN.

Yesterday Italian ambassador in Algiers Pignatelli Della Leonessa, who, together with FLN representatives, received our comrades on their arrival, gave a dinner in the delegation's honor at the embassy.

SOARES INTERVIEWED, AGAINST 'FRENCH-STYLE' UNITY OF LEFT

Madrid BLANCO Y NEGRO in Spanish 2-8 Jan 80 pp 5-7

[Interview with PSP leader Mario Soares by Jose A. Munoz Atienza at Socialist Party headquarters in Lisbon; date not given]

[Excerpt] [Question] Soares, where did those votes go, about a half million of them, that the PSP [Socialist Party of Portugal] lost?

[Answer] The Socialist Party lost exactly 270,000 votes, to the benefit of the AD [Democratic Alliance], and to the Left, to the benefit of the APU [United People's Alliance]. Specifically, it lost votes in the urban areas where the high cost of living is making itself felt the most, the high cost of housing, the tremendously high prices of every sort. The PSP, identified with the government, has been made responsible for the crisis. The opposition--AD and APU--has made capital of this discontent, as well as of a vague desire for change, still not made explicit but nevertheless persistent.

The PSP, Portugal's Major Political Party

[Question] It is clear that those in charge of the government wear themselves out, become exhausted, from governing. But isn't their exhaustion excessive?

[Answer] The PSP continues to be the major Portuguese political party and represents 27.4 percent of the votes cast. Of every four Portuguese voters, somewhat over one votes for the PSP. At the European level, matters are not as serious as people are trying to say they are. Take into account the fact that Francois Mitterrand's French Socialist Party, rightly considered a great party, represents barely 24 percent of France's electorate. The communists sing of victory for winning 19 percent in a coalition with the MDP [Portuguese Democratic Movement] and claim the PSP has suffered "a resounding defeat" for obtaining only 27.4 percent of the votes. Everything is relative depending on the situation from which one begins.

[Question] There is no doubt but that workers and humble people voted for the PSP, but the petty bourgeoisie, the progressive and liberal middle class, which saw in Mario Soares a curb to the Stalinist communism of Alvaro Cunhal, also voted for it in 1976. Did those votes go to the Right?

[Answer] Part of them did, yes. The fluctuating electorate of the petty and middle bourgeoisie of the big cities is the one that abandoned the PSP. The most humble people, those working in the fields and in factories voted for us. These are our loyal electorate. With the result that now, to our advantage, the PSP has an electorate voting socialist because it is socialist. Not the electorate that voted socialist through fear of communism or because of political opportunism.

[Question] Will the Right more ably handle the economic crisis, which is not restricted to Portugal since it is a worldwide crisis?

[Answer] Frankly, I do not think so. But the fact that it is going to be tested is a good thing. We are going to see of what it is capable. But because of the insatiable appetites and pressures of the "extremists," it appears to me that the task of the next Democratic Alliance government is not going to be at all easy.

"Cunhal Is Playing at Polarization"

[Question] Why did Alvaro Cunhal, an unrepentant Stalinist, in the recent electoral campaign follow moderate and Eurocommunist tactics, camouflaging the Communist Party with the APU acronym, an electoral alliance in which a small satellite party figures?

[Answer] Alvaro Cunhal is a skillful tactician although he continues to be absolutely rigid on strategy. His objective, more than that of containing the Right, consists in weakening the Socialist Party. Because, in his way, Cunhal is also playing at bipolarization of Portuguese society to the extent that the extremisms of the opposing emblem strengthen each other reciprocally.

[Question] Soares, will you pay heed to Alvaro Cunhal's siren song for his alleged "French-style" union of the Portuguese Left?

[Answer] The Socialist Party has its own autonomous plan, one opposed to the Communist Party's plan and you know very well that "union of the Left" would lead to PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] hegemony and to the blocking off of any evolution of leftist groups in Portugal. We have before us France's example to prove this. A very strong communist party has served solely to turn the government without any break over to the Right for more than 25 years, paralyzing any progress of the Left in French society.

[Question] Will the PSP recover the ground lost in the next elections at the end of 1980?

[Answer] That is what we are hoping. But this naturally depends on the work of social implantation which we are able to achieve by that time. I think the Socialist Party should fully take on its role as an "opposition party," without any kind of concessions to the Right or to the Communist Party, rejecting any prospect of "short-term gains." Not only must it work for 1980, but with a longer term outlook so as to be able to achieve tasks of social

implantation on all fighting fronts and do so in depth. In the trade unions, in the cells of enterprises, in the countryside, in the cooperatives, among young people, among the cadres, among women and on the cultural front.

"There Is No Gratitude in Politics"

[Question] The euphoric days of the liberating revolution of 25 April 1974 are far removed. Don't you think that the "carnation revolution" has eaten up its sons just as Saturn devoured his?

[Answer] To a certain extent, yes. But that is natural. There is no gratitude in politics and kindly feelings in politics, as in literature, do not necessarily produce fine work. All in all, 25 April is very vivid to popular feelings. The majority of the Portuguese people are not of the Right. Twenty-five April and the constitution today represent one of democracy's lines of defense.

[Question] With the Right in power, what role is reserved for the Revolutionary Council, for the Armed Forces and for the president of the Republic?

[Answer] The role which the constitution gives them and which I do not believe can be brought into question by the new AD parliamentary majority. The Right is legitimately entitled to govern, but it cannot change the regime. Having said this, I tell you that the Revolutionary Council is a temporary body which in principle will disappear--as its own members have declared--with the new Assembly having constituent powers that is to be elected in 1980. Since 1976 the Armed Forces have respected democratic legality stemming from universal suffrage and I am certain that they will continue to do so.

[Question] Should there be reforms to the Portuguese Constitution?

[Answer] This will happen in 1981 as the constitution itself provides and in accordance with the terms it stipulates.

"We Are Going to Exercise Strong Opposition"

[Question] Is it a positive posture, that taken by Sa Carneiro, the new prime minister--a temperamental man who makes explosive statements--who instead of acting like a victor, has opted for a "policy of dialogue"?

[Answer] It is too early to answer that question and as is popularly said, up to now "still waters run deep."

[Question] Is it now impossible for an "entente" between the PSP and the PSD [Social Democratic Party] of Sa Carneiro whose ideological position seems to be on the center right?

[Answer] As I have already told you, given the electoral results, the Socialist Party is wholly assuming its role as a party of the opposition. It is now up to the Democratic Alliance with its component part, the PSD, to govern

and resolve the country's problems in conformity with the promises it made. The Socialist Party will not make alliances or agreements with the Right. As a responsible party of the opposition, it will not systematically obstruct the government's activities, but it will exercise firm opposition, without any concessions or tolerance, in defense of what it considers are the basic interests of the working classes, the spirit of 25 April and democratic legality.

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PCP'S CUNHAL ON GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS

Lisbon AVANTE in Portuguese 13 Dec 79 pp 6-7

[Speech by Alvaro Cunhal at Little Field Meeting]

[Text] Comrades:

The elections to the Assembly of the Republic were held a week ago. The elections for the local levels of government will be held within a week.

Against the will of the reactionary forces, whose spearheads are the PPD [Popular Democratic Party] and the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party], against the coups and conspiracies, against the destabilization maneuvers, against the successive and violent offensives aimed at the destruction of the great gains of April, against provocation and terrorism, against the attempt to force elections which were nothing but an election masquerade worthy of the times of Salazar and Caetano, against the plans for the unconstitutional revision of the Constitution--5 years and 8 months after 25 April, democratic life continues, the democratic system spelled out in the Constitution is working and the democratic and people's movement shows that it is determined to defend it and to assure its future.

There is no doubt that the interim elections for the Assembly of the Republic--resulting in a majority of deputies and certainly also leading to a cabinet put together by the reactionary parties--confront the Portuguese people and the democratic system with new and serious dangers.

The vertical decline of the PS [Socialist Party] (one of the immediate causes for the majority of deputies attained by the reactionary parties) is also a preoccupying factor although it does teach us some useful and salutary lessons.

These negative results however were not the only important results of the interim elections. A new and positive factor appears now with a greater meaning.

Along with the success achieved by the reactionary parties and the decline of the PS, the mass campaign conducted by the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party], the enormous vote for the APU [United People's Alliance], the strengthening of the parliamentary delegation of the PCP, and the simultaneous election of the deputies of the MDP/CDE [Portuguese Democratic Movement--Democratic Electoral Commission] constitute a big success for the PCP, the worker movement, the most consistent democratically-minded citizens, and democracy as a whole and they confirm (as our Central Committee had an opportunity to underscore) the powerful strength and democratic determination of the worker and the people's movement and the real possibilities for successfully fighting against the reactionaries and in defense of the Portugal of April.

That is the principal reason why, although the Reactionary Alliance has achieved a majority of deputies, we find determination, confidence, and optimism in the working class and in the PCP, as this meeting shows only too clearly, without however minimizing the difficulties or the dangers facing us.

Yes, indeed, comrades. We have encountered and faced and overcome many obstacles and difficulties. We will also face and overcome those which now arise on the road of democracy.

The struggle continues, reaction will be defeated, the Portugal of April will win.

Fragile Reactionary Election Victory

We communists, all democratic forces, and the Portuguese people in general must carefully examine the underlying causes and the immediate causes of the election victory achieved by the reactionary parties.

Those parties, overall, increased their votes by 400,000 as compared to the 1976 elections.

Independently of other factors, one must admit that this increase indicates that the reactionary parties, through a gigantic campaign of lies and misinformation, managed to polarize a part of the discontent among broad strata of the petty and middle bourgeoisie (both urban and rural), which had been affected by the right-wing policy of the most recent administrations in which the reactionary parties, as well as the PS, held effective and heavy responsibilities.

Many thousands of Portuguese believed that blame for current difficulties (the high cost of living, the drop in real wages, the deterioration in the situation of the middle classes, the lack of security and stability) can be placed upon the communists and on 25 April. Many believed that the so-called Democratic Alliance would be capable of solving their problems.

The discrediting of the PS and its sad and sometimes absurd election campaign constituted a major cause of the shift of a portion of the electorate to the right.

One must however say that the increase in reactionary votes by more than 150,000 exceeds the losses of the PS (about 265,000).

It would be a monumental error to conclude rather hastily that the majority of the Portuguese people supports the reactionaries.

Above all it is necessary to recall that the reactionary parties achieved a majority of seats in the Assembly of the Republic but they did not get a majority of votes.

The reactionary parties had 300,000 votes less than the democratic parties.

No matter how much it may rejoice in its victory, reaction continues to be in the minority in Portugal.

The reactionary parties wound up with a majority of deputies in the Assembly of the Republic but the democratic forces have the majority of the Portuguese with them.

This is a fact of life which considerably diminished the scope of the right-wing parliamentary majority which indicates its great frailty and which presages its future defeat.

Prior to the election, the "bosses" of the reactionary parties displayed an awareness that, if they did not get an absolute majority of votes, they could not consider themselves to be winners.

Early in October, Freitas do Amaral said that the right will not be able to form a cabinet "in case AD [Democratic Alliance] does not get an absolute majority of the votes in the interim elections" (These are his exact words).

Now (it is evident) that they no longer have such scruples. But this fact shows that the reactionary "bosses" know that the minority rank and file constitutes feet of clay on which they stand.

The majority of deputies was achieved indirectly.

On the Continent, the Reactionary Alliance did not get more deputies than the democratic forces.

The majority is due to the seven deputies of the PPD in the autonomous regions (where they have para-fascist administrations and where the liberties and the rights of the citizens are not guaranteed) and in emigration (with its extremely unstable conditions).

The practical results of the competition of the UEDS and the left-wing groups completely confirmed our party's prediction to the effect that the votes for the candidates of those groupings would be useless and lost.

We said many times: At most, they will be able to elect one or two deputies, most probably in the district of Lisbon; apart from that, these will be lost votes whose only purpose will be eventually to block the election of APU and PS deputies and to make the election of right-wing deputies possible.

The voting completely confirmed this situation estimate.

For the national total of 200,000 votes, the UDP [Popular Democratic Union], the UEDS, and the PSR elected only one deputy.

Both in general and in numerous districts, left-wing votes prevented the election of APU or PS candidates and facilitated the election of reactionary candidates.

In Castelo Branco, the APU people got 19,052 votes, only 94 votes short to elect one deputy. In the meantime, the UEDS got 1,440 votes, the UDP came out with 2,705, and the PSR wound up with 1,220. That means that 5,365 votes were lost although 67 of those votes would have been enough to bring about the election of one APU deputy.

Similar things happened in various other situations. In Braga, in Portalegre, in Porto, the votes that were lost by the UDP and the UEDS-- if they had gone to the APU--would have made it possible to elect one more APU deputy in each of those districts.

In six similar cases already verified (Castelo Branco, Braga, Viseu, Porto, Portalegre, and Faro) the votes lost by the UEDS and the UDP would have gone to the APU so that the majority in the Assembly of the Republic would be held not by the reactionary parties but by the democratic parties.

Objectively speaking, the candidacies of the UEDS and the UDP thus played the role of preventing a democratic majority in the Assembly of the Republic.

As for the provocative groupings, they also partly attained their objective, confusing everybody with the term "communist" and the symbol of the hammer and sickle. In certain areas, where there was less information, many people voted for these groups, believing that they were voting for the PCP.

We thus see the extreme frailty of the voting that produced a majority of deputies for the Reactionary Alliance.

In addition to that, the votes for the reactionary parties to a great extent cannot be considered the expression of a free and conscious attitude on the part of the respective voters.

A large portion of the votes for the reactionary parties sprang from the limitations and distortions still existing in democratic life, which influence and seriously limit the enlightenment of the Portuguese people and its effective freedom in the exercise of the vote.

Can one consider as a genuine expression of the popular will the voting in the Azores and on Madeira, where they have profascist reactionary administrations, where terrorism, threats, and the media are the everyday weapons of the right, where gangs of disorderly separatists coerce the people, where the head of one of the regional administrations, Mr Jardim, has just said that, if he were in charge of the government on the Continent, he would quickly start political persecutions?

Can one consider as the genuine expression of the popular will the voting in numerous districts on the Continent dominated by the reactionaries who have managed to prevent the results of 25 April from reaching those areas?

Can one consider as a genuine expression of the popular will the voting determined by gigantic misinformation, by confusion, and intoxication carried out by powerful mass communications media in the service of lies, provocation, and ideological subversion?

Can one consider as a genuine expression of the popular will the voting brought about by economic, physical, moral, and religious coercion?

Can one consider the votes of those who are threatened by the boss with being fired and persecuted if they do not vote for the reactionaries-- can one consider those votes to be free votes? And what about the votes of people in retirement homes, the sick, the disabled, who are regimented by those in whose charge they are, who are taken to the polling places almost by force? And what about the votes of the faithful who are threatened with the punishment of hell if they vote for the democratic parties?

No, comrades.

These situations and these processes show that much remains yet to be done before Portuguese political life can be truly democratic.

The voting for the reactionary parties reflects all of these limitations and distortions of the democratic system.

This is why we say that the big vote for the Reactionary Alliance has a circumstantial and precarious character and cannot be considered the genuine expression of the popular will.

Not only did the reactionary parties fail to achieve a majority of the votes but those that were cast in their favor do not add up to a solid base of support.

The social and political base of support of the democratic forces continues to be broader, stronger, more militant than the base of support of the reactionary forces.

What the reactionary majority in the Assembly of the Republic and the action of its administration will turn out to be can be expected to contribute to undermining the base of support of the reactionary forces and strengthening the base of support of democracy.

Dangers Inherent in Situations and Provisional Character of Assembly and Administration

The interim elections produced the new Assembly of the Republic and will give rise to a new administration.

There must be no illusions about the Assembly and the administration we now have in store for us.

We are facing a reactionary majority in the Assembly and a reactionary administration. They will try to make laws and govern against the people, against 25 April, against the democratic system and its gain.

In view of the frailty of their majority in the Assembly and the uncertainty of their social support, the reactionary parties will certainly employ demagoguery. One cannot rule out the possibility that they might in the beginning take some "popular measures." We must be forewarned and we must promptly expose them.

But the basic outlines of their policy will involve the defense of the interests of big capital, the big landowners, the rich people and imperialism, as well as the offensive against the workers, against the small farmers, merchants, and manufacturers, against culture and intellectuals, against the entire working people.

The program of the reactionary parties on the one hand includes the brutal aggravation of the exploitation of the workers, the decline in real wages, the rise in the cost of living, firings, a reduction in social welfare benefits, the ouster of tenant farmers by the rich landlords, the surrender of the common land of the people to the reactionary local bosses, the elimination of liberties and rights achieved through the revolution and spelled out in the Constitution.

On the other hand, the program includes the restoration of the big estates, the restoration of the power of the monopolies combined with the effective

liquidation of nationalizations, indemnities in the hundreds of millions of contos for the big capitalists, and an entire economic, financial, and social policy which is completely and unconditionally in the service of the big exploiters and parasites.

To implement this policy, they will need certainly not only a reactionary majority in the Assembly of the Republic but also a reactionary cabinet; they will have no scruples of a legal or moral character; they will resort to arbitrary procedure and unlawfulness; they will try to limit and erode the liberties and rights of the citizens; they will use administration and regressive measures; they will try to take over the communications media and the government machinery; they will, by all means and ways, try to destroy the gains of April, the standards of democratic life, and the election process itself prior to the 1980 Assembly of the Republic elections.

It would be a total lack of conscience on the part of the responsible political forces if they were to act like an ostrich and if they were to stick their heads into the sand in order not to see reality.

It is indispensable to be fully aware of the gravity of the situation deriving from the majority of reactionary deputies so that the lines of action may be charted and so that one may adopt the forms of struggle which will contain and finally defeat the work of destruction which the reactionary forces are now preparing.

It would be a serious mistake to underestimate the forces and new possibilities of the reactionaries installed in government and holding a majority in the Assembly of the Republic.

But (and this observation is of capital importance at this moment) it would be an even bigger mistake to underestimate the frailty of the reactionary positions and the real and potential strength of the people and of democracy.

At the same time we must have a precise idea of the gravity of the situation and the existing dangers but we must also have a precise idea of the effective possibilities of exercising them.

First of all, the interim elections did not provide a stable outcome for the government crisis but only a provisional solution.

Contrary to what the reactionaries claimed, new elections for the Assembly of the Republic will obligatorily have to take place in 1980 (in September or October, according to the current election law).

In other words, both the Assembly which has just been elected and the administration which is to be formed have a provisional character, limited to a foreseeable duration of about 10 months.

During those 10 months (or perhaps less, by virtue of the foreseeable defeats of the reactionary forces and even their internal divisions), it will be necessary together to confront the policy and plans of the reactionaries and, 10 months from now, during the new elections for the Assembly of the Republic, to inflict an overwhelming defeat upon the reactionaries (something which is absolutely possible and probable and even certain).

Secondly, the Assembly of the Republic, which has just been elected, does not have the power to amend the Constitution. That power is held only by the Assembly that will be elected in 1980.

Thus, both the Assembly of the Republic just elected and the next administration will have a tenure limited and influenced both in terms of time and in terms of their powers and functions.

The country's basic law, the law of laws, the law that is the obligatory base of all other laws is the Constitution. First of all, the reactionary program (with its anticonstitutional content) clashes with the Constitution and with democratic laws.

This is a factor in the political situation which diminishes and limits the possibilities of the reactionaries and which strengthens and increases the possibilities of the people and the democrats in defending the Portugal of April.

In the political life of people, there are frequent situations when governments defend legality against opposition groups which challenge. In the Portuguese political situation, in the near future, amid the repetition of events that happened earlier under the Mota Pinto cabinet, we will very probably witness an inverse situation: A reactionary administration trying to violate democratic legality (starting with the country's fundamental law, that is, the Constitution, which the administration has the duty to comply with) and the people in the struggle to make sure that the Constitution and the democratic laws will be implemented.

One of the fundamental aspects of the political battle during the first half of 1980 will be the Constitution and democratic legality. The reactionary parties in the administration and the majority parties in the Assembly of the Republic are at an obvious juridical and moral disadvantage in this battle.

The institutions and the democratic will of the people will prevail to make sure that the Constitution will be complied with.

Third, a policy against the people and against the system will run into the firm opposition of the democratic voices and the popular masses.

Let the reactionary parties not entertain any illusions. Many thousands of voters who voted for "AD" are already sorry right now and within a short time many more thousands will turn against "AD" and will join the popular movement precisely because they will realize the trap they fell into by virtue of the action of "AD" in the Assembly of the Republic and in the administration.

Success of PCP and APU--Basic Element in Strengthening Democracy

In the interim elections to the Assembly of the Republic, the progress and the voting of the reactionary parties did not manage to conceal another result which is of even greater political importance: The spectacular advance and the mass voting for the APU, expressing the extraordinary strengthening of the PCP and the determination of the workers and the vast popular masses to defend and continue the Portugal of April.

The election campaign of the PCP and the APU constituted an extraordinary political action with a meaning of its own in which the vast political enlightenment effort concerning the big and little initiatives was combined with a dynamics in the mass struggle, the link between general policy and specific problems, the indissoluble bonds between the vanguard, the working class, and the broad masses, fraternization, festivities, expressions of cultural and athletic life.

Allow me, comrades, here, during this first big meeting after the interim elections, to transmit to our entire party, to all organizations and members, to the activist sympathizers of our party, to our friends in the MDP/CDE, to the workers and democrats who participated in the campaign side by side with the communists, permit me to extend to them the warmest greetings and congratulations on the occasion of the big success achieved in the interim elections.

The big success of the PCP and APU above all is expressed by the big vote achieved, that is, 1,120,000 votes corresponding to 19 percent of the votes as against 14.6 percent for the PCP in 1976, an absolute increase of 335,000 votes, corresponding to more than 43 percent compared to the PCP votes in 1976.

The increase of 43 percent achieved by the APU/PCP, compared to the 20-percent increase of the reactionary parties as a whole, shows that, in the Portuguese political panorama, the dominant tendency is a shift to the left and not to the right.

The increase in the votes for the APU generally could be observed in all election districts. The PCP confirmed its status as a big national party for which there are no regions which the reactionaries manage to bar it from.

According to available data, the number of votes was more than doubled in eight districts and autonomous regions (Vila Real, Braganca, Braga, Aveiro, Viseu, Castelo Branco, Madeira and Azores); there was an increase of 50-100 percent in six districts (Viana do Castelo, Porto, Coimbra, Guarda, Leiria and Faro); great increases were also registered in all other districts (even those where we already had achieved large numbers of votes and high percentages in 1976); on the Continent we did not record increased percentages of less than 17%.

In the districts in the North and Center, the number of votes increased from 136,363 in 1976 to 271,000 during the last elections.

In Braga we increased our votes from 13,744 to 38,000. In Porto, we advanced from 69,264 to 125,000.

In three districts and five communities, APU held first place and in 21 communities it exceeded 50 percent--half the total number of votes.

Besides, 47 APU deputies were elected (including 44 for the PCP and three for the MDP); that represents an increase of seven as compared to the previous assembly; but in fact (considering that the prior Assembly had 260 deputies while the current one has 250), this represents an increase of ten seats.

We reelected deputies in all districts where we had elected comrades in 1976; we doubled the number of deputies elected by the district of Porto (from three to six); we increased the number of deputies elected for Lisbon, Santarem, and Faro; and, denying the insistent predictions of the right wing and the PS, we elected deputies in Braga and Aveiro for the first time.

The heavy vote in the industrial centers once again points to the high level of political awareness of the working class and its outstanding role in the defense and construction of democracy.

The mass voting for the APU in the heroic zone of the Agrarian Reform, with a considerable increase in the total number of votes and percentages everywhere, reaching more than 50 percent in the district of Beja and in 16 communities, 48.8 percent in the district of Evora, 46.9 percent in the district of Setubal, and percentages close to or higher than 50 percent in the communities of the Agrarian Reform in this district, with increases in all of the communities in the district of Portalegre--these constituted a powerful affirmation of the identification of the working people with the Agrarian Reform and the firm determination to defend it.

The extraordinary election campaign of the masses, the heavy vote for the APU, the rapid and spectacular progress, the growing strength of the parliamentary delegation of the PCP (in addition to the election of MDP deputies) constituted the most important result for democracy in the interim elections.

We all remember the successive campaigns of the reactionary forces and the PS itself aimed at pushing the PCP to the sidelines. We all recall how they announced that the PCP was on the decline, that its influence was dwindling, and that the number of its votes and its deputies would continue to drop.

The PS even went so far as to assert (this is ridiculous of course but that is what it did) that the PCP would decline seriously in Alentejo and that the PS would increase in proportion.

Somebody even went to the United States to ask for we do not know what and over there—perhaps to calm the American bankers down—he said that the PCP would be held down to 6 percent in future elections.

The interim elections for the Assembly of the Republic precisely demonstrated the exact opposite.

They showed that the PCP keeps growing stronger all the time, that its authority and prestige are on the increase, that its influence of the masses keeps growing, and that its electorate keeps getting bigger.

The results of the interim elections confirmed that a safe and secure vote in democracy means a vote for the PCP. They confirmed that the PCP is the strongest political bulwark of Portuguese democracy.

If we visualize all of the democratic forces in position along the trench which separates us from the enemies of democracy, what did the interim elections show?

That some small left-wing forces pushed too far forward of the trench, that they were lost uselessly among this big battle, and that the enemy did not pass.

That the PS, with all of its yielding, compromises, and alliances with the right, allowed deep breaches to be opened in the trench which had been entrusted to them, allowing the enemy's assault waves to pass through.

But that the PCP, with the democrats of the MDP by its side, its feet firmly planted on the ground, loyal to the ideals, always closely tied to the working class and the popular masses, not only made its trench impregnable, so that not a single enemy was able to pass, but also expanded and strengthened its positions, entering enemy territory, winning new positions, and firmly planting the flags of 25 April, democracy, and socialism in the soil of areas considered occupied by fascism and reaction.

For New APU Victories in the Local Elections

Within 8 days, the Portuguese people will once again go to the urns.

In the situation created by the results of the interim elections to the Assembly of the Republic, the local elections constitute a new and important battle.

If the results of the elections of the 2nd are repeated, then we will register in local government likewise the conquest of positions by the reactionary parties, a marked drop for the PS, and definite progress of the APU.

Given the system in force as to the makeup of the city assemblies (proportional representation of parties using the Hondt method) and concerning the appointment of the president (head of party slate or coalition getting the most votes), the PS runs the risk of losing the presidency of many city assemblies because it will have been outpaced in the voting by the Reactionary Alliance.

The loss of a relatively large number of assembly presidents by the PS is a result which is now irreversible, a result we can count on, a result with which the reactionaries will speculate, but which does not in fact mean--in terms of relative total strength--a new advance for the right but only the benefit of the coalition which gives the coalescing PPD and CDS more votes than the PS, even when the PS gets more votes than either of the two reactionary parties and even when there is a democratic majority of votes.

Comrades, everybody knows that, considering the situation created by the results of the interim elections, the PCP proposed a meeting of delegations of both parties to the PS. We believe that this initiative was in keeping with the necessities of the moment, the urgency of blocking the reactionaries, the worry and apprehensions of the communists, socialists, of all democratic public opinion, and of the Portuguese people in general.

What was the response of the PS?

The steering committee of the PS rejected our proposal and based its rejection on slanderous attacks upon the PCP, accusing it of harboring hegemonic intentions in connection with this proposal and having ulterior motives in terms of the elections.

We can see that the PS leaders do not learn their lessons from these events in spite of the fact that anticommunism is one of the factors that led its party into a continuous decline.

The refusal of the PS certainly does not serve democracy. But neither will it serve the PS. The election results on the 16th will demonstrate that once again.

We are profoundly committed to the fight against reaction and the defense of the democratic system and this is why we look with apprehension to the election defeat of the PS. But who can be blamed for the election defeat

The truth therefore is that, if the PS leaders do not learn the harsh lessons of life, then many PS members and voters, worried about the advances of the reactionaries, will learn those lessons.

We would like at this point to hail all of the many members and sympathizers of the PS who tried to move closer to the PCP so that we may arrive at an understanding in the common fight against reaction and in defense of the interests of the workers, the gains of the revolution, and the democratic system.

We particular greet all those with whom--after the results of the interim elections became known--(out of their own initiative or due to our initiative) contacts were established and maintained with a view to examining the situation within the framework of respective activities so as to arrive at understandings for coordinated or joint action.

It is a shame that, during this campaign for local government, instead of concentrating forces against the reactionaries and seeking to regain the socialist votes that are drifting off to the right, the propaganda of the PS should insist on pointing its guns against the PCP and against the APU.

It is a shame also that, in some communities, the local PS leaders call upon the communists to step aside in favor of the PS under the pretext that they are against the reactionaries; in communities where the PCP is just about to win the elections, local PS leaders are engaging in political negotiations with the Reactionary Alliance in order to try to prevent the Communists from getting into the assemblies.

What can we say, comrades, when PS propaganda vehicles appeal to the communists and the APU to vote for the PS? What can we say when the propagandists of the PS, in an ideological subversion effort, write about our propaganda that the APU should vote for the PS?

We say that, to strengthen democratic representation in local government (and that democratic representation will grow stronger) to win the elections in many chambers and assemblies (and the APU will win), a safe and secure vote for democracy is a vote for the APU. The communists vote for the APU. The APU votes for the APU.

In addition to that, the voters are not an army commanded by the parties, an army whom the parties order to make a half-turn to the right or a half-turn to the left, after which the voters supposedly obey like automatic soldiers.

In the local government elections, a useful vote for democracy is a vote for the APU.

It is a useful vote for democracy because in many cases a democratic vote for the PS means losing and a democratic vote for the APU means winning.

It is a useful vote for democracy because it will considerably strengthen the number of democrats in the local government levels in many parishes, city assemblies, and chambers, in order successfully to defend the interests of the population and the democratic life on the local government level.

It is a useful vote for democracy because APU will win the elections in numerous city chambers, city assemblies, and parish assemblies.

It is within the reach of APU to increase the number of chambers in which it is in the majority by about two-thirds and to increase the number of parishes in which it is in the majority by 50 percent.

In the earlier elections for the local government levels, the APU was not represented in 72 city assemblies on the Continent. If, in the local government elections, on the 16th, the voting results of the elections on the 2nd, for the Assembly of the Republic, then we would not be represented only in 18 assemblies out of a total of 275.

We are profoundly convinced that, to counter the reactionaries and to strengthen the positions of democracy, the local elections will confirm the success of the PCP and the APU in the interim elections to the Assembly of the Republic.

Our campaign is now rolling. Today more than ever before, the working people sees in the PCP the party of truth, of hope, and of the future, the solid and unconquerable bulwark of the workers and of Portuguese democracy.

For all of these reasons we are confident that it will once again be confirmed, on 16 December, that the PCP is the decisive and determining democratic force in the defense and continuation of democracy, in the defense and continuation of the Portugal of April.

With the PCP, the Portuguese People Will Defend the Portugal of April

The desire of the reactionaries to violate and destroy the democratic gains spelled out in the Constitution and the Constitution itself is one thing but achieving that goal is another thing.

The election success of the reactionary parties is fragile and precarious; it does not alter one basic fact of life in Portugal today: The forces of democracy are more powerful than the forces of reaction.

A reactionary administration, which may be constituted, will have its days numbered--because of the limitations in terms of authority and tenure and because it will embark upon a policy doomed to defeat.

Doomed to defeat because, like earlier administrations, it not only will not solve any problems, but will make the situation of the working masses and all of the big national problems even worse.

Doomed to defeat because it will run counter to the new reality created by the democratic revolution, it will run counter to the "real country" created by 25 April and it will therefore create new problems, new tensions, new factors of instability which will turn broad social sectors against the government, including some that voted within the Reactionary Alliance.

Doomed to defeat because it will run counter to the vital interests of the people and the country and because it will therefore rapidly reduce its base of support.

Doomed to defeat because it will run counter to the Constitution, counter to the institutions and counter to democratic legality, which will place the administration itself in a subversive attitude against the institutions, so that we are confident that it will be the democratic institutions that will triumph and not those who want to destroy them.

Doomed to defeat because it will clash with the will, the resistance, and the struggle of the Portuguese people, in the exercise of freedoms and rights spelled out in the Constitution.

The new administration has not yet been formed and has not yet been sworn in and we must already say: If the administration of the reactionary parties tries to implement its unconstitutional, antipopular, and antidemocratic program, the same thing will happen to it that happened to earlier administrations, and just like the Mota Pinto administration, it will have to go!

The PCP declared and insists on declaring that all of its activities and all of its struggle will be developed within the framework of the Constitution and the institutions. The PCP will not employ forms of intervention contrary to the Constitution. But, as we have said many times, although we do not want any special liberties or any special rights, we will not abdicate any of the liberties and rights spelled out in the Constitution in order firmly to oppose the reactionary forces and their administration, in order to defend the interests of the workers, the freedoms and the other great gains of the revolution (specifically, the agrarian reform and nationalizations), in order to defend and consolidate the democratic system.

We are absolutely certain that, in the battles that await us, the PCP will be joined by the workers, the popular masses, broad democratic sectors, including the socialists, an ever larger number of Portuguese men and women who want to live in liberty.

We communists are fully aware of the responsibility which our grand and glorious party has in the nation's political life in this situation because it is the strongest, most coherent, most influential political force with the strongest bonds with the masses, with the greatest capacity to face the reactionaries and to assure the defense of the interests of the people and the fatherland and the consolidation of democracy, capable of conducting the struggle that will bring about a democratic turn in Portuguese politics.

Because we are aware of this responsibility, we will increasingly strengthen our party--its membership, its organization, its cadres, its propaganda--we will constantly expand the information and enlightenment effort, we will build even closer links which connect us indissolubly to the working class and the popular masses.

Because we are aware of this responsibility, we will do everything to unite the working class and all workers.

To strengthen the coherent labor union movement around the glorious CGTP [General Federation of Portuguese Workers]-National Intersindical.

To strengthen the worker commissions, the commissions of residents, and all forms of united base organizations.

To achieve a closer alliance between the working class and the peasantry and the middle classes.

To strengthen the fundamental economic structures of Portuguese economic life--the collective production units, the cooperatives, and the self-management enterprises.

To elevate the popular struggle for culture in the service of the people.

To organize and develop the movements and organizations of women who are playing a first-ranking role in the struggle of our people.

To step up the struggles and movements of youth, with our JCP (Portuguese Communist Youth), now unified, as the vanguard that provides dynamic impetus.

In order to move closer to joint action and to the unity of all democrats and patriots leading to understanding.

The united dynamics unleashed by the APU in the election campaigns is a new and promising element for the democratic forces and for Portuguese democracy.

We are only 8 days away from the elections. Let us work hard, with enthusiasm and with confidence so that the PCP and the APU may register new victories on 16 December.

For confronting reaction, for democratic victory.

Long live the United People's Alliance!

Long live the Portuguese Communist Party!

5058

CS0: 3101

DEFENSE MINISTER SETS GOALS FOR 1980

Madrid ABC in Spanish 29 Dec 79 p 8

[Excerpt] The main objectives of the Ministry of Defense for 1980 are the Organic Law on National Defense Bases, the laws on national defense and military organization, the laws on military service and mobilization and the defense policy series which include "Strategy Planning" and the "Goal of Joint Forces." These were taken up in the general report on the ministry's work in 1979 submitted by Rodriguez Sahagun to the high-ranking officers of the armed forces.

Other objectives relate to personnel policy, the evolution of the royal ordinances, the initiating of residences of generals, leaders and officials and non-commissioned officers in Madrid; the problem of military housing and the technological compensations of armament purchases.

According to the report, the situation of a few of the objectives is as follows: The Organic Law by which the National Defense bases and Military Organization are regulated. It is now before the Cortes. It is a law of basic criteria which will be a starting point for the laws of national defense (the draft for which is well advanced) and of military organization (under preparation by the heads of the Joint General Staff).

The Military Service law and that on National Mobilization are in a very advanced stage.

The "Defense Policy Series" is a work system (planning model, program, budget) which endeavors to bring into harmony the various phases of defense policy, lays down its preparation, development and controls, and establishes the authorities and responsible bodies in each instance.

Joint Strategic Plan. A fundamental part of the series is drawing up the joint strategic plan that includes the strategic goals to be attained; an assessment of possible threats; joint strategy and a determination of the joint forces objective. Determining what our armed forces will be in the 1980's is what is being sought: The quantity and type of large and small naval support units; combat squadrons, transport, support and training of the air force; determining the manpower that will be required to maintain those units in a state of complete effectiveness; the central point for their deployment, etc.

All of that in the spirit of integrating the forces of the three armies for the purpose of constituting a single harmonious defense force.

Personnel and Housing. On the subject of personnel, an effort is being made to submit bills to the government in 1980, e.g.: Creating active reserves and setting the retirement age, classifying commands and promotions in the regular system of professional grades (it will create a graduated system of promotions. An attempt is being made to see that each army activity is filled by the most competent men); reorganization of the special and basic ground army rosters.

The task of preparing the royal ordinances will be completed during the first few months of 1980.

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CSO: 3110

NEUTRALITY DESCRIBED AS 'LUXURY' BY DEFENSE MINISTER

Madrid ABC in Spanish 21 Dec 79 p 8

[Text] "Spain is not an aggressive nation but rather seeks peace," Minister of Defense Agustin Rodriguez Sahagun stated yesterday morning in the course of his address to the pertinent committee of the Upper Chamber, in which he set forth the general lines of defense policy and replied to the series of questions a number of members of Parliament asked him.

The Ministry of Defense has 485,000 individuals, of whom 100,000 are professional military men; 50,000 civil servants and 30,000 reserve soldiers.

"Our armaments are still obsolete," the minister said, "and replacing them is of the highest priority. Since Spain is not a rich nation, the solution has to be found in manufacturing arms in our own country which will tend to reduce the level of strategic dependence. The nationalization of armaments through realistic research and development and collaborating on joint projects must be increased. Significant collaboration has been achieved on machineguns, on the AMX-30 armored car, the corvette (which derives the greatest advantage from its built-in weapons), planes like the "C-212" and the "C-101" from CASA. Continuity is basic to an armament policy."

The Prime Objective. He then explained the functions of the Higher Center for Defense Intelligence and declared that a national intelligence center will be set up to coordinate all intelligence from abroad.

He noted that the primary objective of the defense policy is the immediate mobilization of the nation's structure in the event of a conflict. For this, he added, it is necessary to determine strategic objectives; the development of possible threats; the defining of joint strategy and establishing joint strategic forces.

"No" to Neutrality. In another part of his address, Rodriguez Sahagun underscored that among other things the constitution states that the Ministry of Defense has to maintain Spanish sovereignty and its territorial integrity and to do so it is necessary to have control over air and sea. "For us to have the capacity to react immediately in the face of any external threat," he

added, "it is essential to have the means at hand and the cooperation of other countries as well as the decision Spain is taking with respect to its entry into NATO. Spain cannot allow itself the luxury of being a neutral nation in that neutrality would mean a cost we cannot assume. Spain must place special emphasis on its Atlantic presence because the trade coming to us from the Atlantic amounts to over 90 percent of our trade balance.

Finally, he noted the necessity of increasing the strength of the Canary Islands-Strait of Gibraltar-Balearic Islands axis and said it was essential to work out agreements with Spanish America. "Spain aspires to being a factor for peace and balance in North Africa," he concluded.

8094

CSO: 3110

BRIEFS

DOMESTIC ARMS INDUSTRY--Minister of Defense Agustin Rodriguez Sahagun, in his report to the high-ranking officers of the armed forces, confirmed the statement made to the Defense Committee of Congress along the lines that technological progress is being sought that will bring about the manufacture of new national armaments, including the development of joint projects with other countries. This objective is based on verification that the current results of the purchases and investments involves high costs in much of the manufacturing, a low level of nationalization in furnishing weapons to the armies and an excessive strategic dependence on other countries. Among other goals of the defense policy for the future, the report stresses the bill on the organic law for national defense bases and military organization now before the Cortes, which is a law expounded in the constitution and which in turn will be immediately developed. Work has already been done on making drafts of the laws on national defense and military organization and those concerning military service, national mobilization and other rules have already made great progress. In the operational sphere, consideration is being given to drawing up of a joint strategic plan definitively laying down what the Spanish Armed Forces will be in the decade of the 1980's, "all of it in a joint and integrating spirit of the "new frontier" conceived with the creation of the Ministry of Defense. [Text] [Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 29 Dec 79 p 11] 8094

AIR OF CONCILIATION DETECTED AT ASSEMBLY SESSION

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 24 Nov 79 p 9

[Text] For the first time the atmosphere of the Assembly during meetings for the government program was different. For the most part there was a lack of tension. Having recognized the problems which face Turkey, everyone seemed to be weighed down by them. Another important development occurred. Prime Minister Demirel proposed cooperation with the RPP. Not on every issue, but particularly on the preventative measures to be taken against anarchy and on the issue of the struggle with inflation. From our understanding of the speech, the Prime Minister wanted Turkey's problems to be considered jointly by the RPP and the JP.

Also different was the nature of Demirel's speech. Demirel, the harsh critic of the opposition, had disappeared. In his place came a Demirel who said the same things in a different manner, in a softer manner. Did necessities bring him to this point? Or did the scene he faced after forming the cabinet require him to follow this kind of policy. We don't know. If the citizen of Turkey were to look at Demirel, he would be happy to have his ration of bread cut off. Only let the bloodshed stop.

In this situation, even to say that anarchy sprang from Turkey's economic and social conditions would have meant justifying these incidents. Even before unemployment, economic problems, and the like, legal preventative measures should have been taken immediately. The business at this point went from one thing to another and came around to the State Security Court [SSC]. According to Demirel, the SSC's should be created. However, RPP spokesman Metin Tuzun had already made it clear that they [the RPP] were opposed to them. Apparently the first problem was going to be over the SSC's. If one cares about rumors, Republican Reliance Party Chairman Feyzioglu is already engaging in endeavors to find a basis for an agreement. We don't know what came of these efforts. In the days ahead, either a long debate and struggle will again begin between the JP and the RPP on the topic of the SSC's, or if Turkey doesn't have the patience for this struggle a formula will be found.

Hoca's Prayer

Saturday, Erbakan Hoca's 3 hour speech, Metin Tuzun's 2 hour speech, and NAP speaker Somuncuoglu's 2 hour and 45 minute long speech delayed plans for a vote of confidence. Erbakan, in his lengthy speech, often stressed the importance that the 15th century of the Hegira has begun.... However, in the prayer he made at the end of his speech, he asked, "God to reveal to the nation truth as truth and vanity as vanity." As we know, according to NSP the vanity is the JP and the RPP, while the NSP is the truth. When the truth comes vanity must fade away but in no way did it happen. Yet, Erbakan apparently has not abandoned hope.... The serious criticism which the NAP spokesman Sadi Somuncuoglu directed at Ecevit's government did not draw much interest but it prompted the former minister of internal affairs, Irfan Ozaydinli, and former Minister of Education Necdet Ugur to make speeches. Ozaydinli said, "Before Demirel has yet received a vote of confidence, already nearly 60 of our fellow countrymen have died. It is impossible to arrive at a solution by provoking one another." As for Necdet Ugur, he pointed out that in a milieu where whether or not Turkey is entering a civil war, is being debated people must refrain from divisive polemics. He asserted that members of the NAP were trying to influence the government. "The slightest error of this government will be the ruin of all of us. So let us pray that it will not make an error", he said. The JP spokesman Giyasettin Karaca however, compared the government program to a bouquet: "It's a pleasingly fragrant program," he said. No matter what it's like,...according to Karaca, the young people during the War of Independence had written on their chests with pens filled with indelible ink, "Give me liberty or give me death." The JP spokesman wanted the young people of today to follow this example.

The JP Lobby Filled To Capacity

While the speeches were going on in the Assembly, the JP lobby was becoming packed full with bureaucrats, committees from the provinces and businessmen. The RPP lobby had emptied while the JP lobby took on its load. Celal Bucak had come from Siverek with about 15 body guards. With a hug pistol under his jacket on the left side of his chest, he was sitting in a corner. At one point, an argument broke out in the JP lobby between former JP member, independent Hasan Korkut, and JP member, Ihsan Ataov. Later, in the salon of the Assembly, this turned into an exchange of punches. It had nothing to do with the discussions. But more interesting was the argument that arose between JP member, Zeki Celiker, and JP member, Huseyin Ozalp, Minister of Transportation. For 2 days flights to Diyarbakir have been cancelled. Celiker had a casket that he was unable to send. When were the planes going to be flying? When Ozalp said he didn't know, it opened the way for Celiker to flare up. In this way the first sign of friction between deputies and ministers within the JP has been displayed.

Towards morning RPP member Tarhan Erdem, who made the final speech, gave the first response to Prime Minister Demirel's request for cooperation with the RPP. Yes, cooperation might be attainable. But it would be necessary for someone to make the first move. And on this, the one to make the first move was the Prime Minister. He would be able to get the cooperation

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DEMIREL ASKS RPP HELP IN FIGHTING INFLATION, ANARCHY

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 24 Nov 79 p 9

[Speech by Suleyman Demirel, Prime Minister of Turkey, to the Grand National Assembly on 7 Nov 79]

[Text] In the National Assembly the discussions on the government program lasted until 4 am yesterday. At the end of his speech, Prime Minister Demirel responded to criticism: "We want cooperation from the RPP, too. Let's discuss Turkey's major problems. I'm not saying we'll discuss every issue. But out of 100 issues we'll find 2 or 3 to discuss. If we successfully solve these, the nation's confidence in the regime and in the Assembly will increase. Let's try a new approach. Let's cooperate. Let's put an end to bloodshed. Let's put an end to inflation."

Demirel made 10 suggestions:

If there are people who say, "Let the JP be worn down to a frazzle," then let us be worn down to a frazzle if it takes that for Turkey to recover.

The RPP spokesman was taken aback with the fear of an early election. Had I thought of it, I would have said the same thing. In March 1975 in the town square of Antalya, Ecevit stated, "To avoid an election is to avoid the people." At that time he wanted an election. We didn't mention the word, election. We said, if it is possible, let this business be finished without an election.

As a source of energy oil is still cheap. If you have the money you should buy it.

If we can push the economy of Turkey ahead and if we obtain a 7 percent rate of growth, in the year 2000 Turkey will rise to the level that West Germany is at today.

Turkey won't be managed by the inspirations a person gets when he wakes up in the morning.

According to the Amberli Power Station, 1 kilowatt hour of energy is produced by 230 grams of fuel oil. If fuel is 10 liras, this comes to 230 kurush. [As published amount of fuel oil costing 10 liras is lacking] Allow 2-1/2 lira for plant expenses and it comes to 5 liras. Today Turkey loses 100 liras for every kilowatt that it fails to produce. The important thing is the supply of electricity, whatever its source.

You are telling us, "you ran Turkey into debt." You formulated a plan, ten. In it a \$15 million deficit is envisioned. In order to reach the target for the year 2000, Turkey must find \$30 million. We will find it.

We can't be called a minority government. In the elections we received 47 percent of the vote. Had it had a general election it would have amounted to 288 deputies. That encouragement moved us to establish the government.

Someday food stuff will reach a state of importance greater than that of oil. We must bring Turkey's agriculture to the state of agricultural industry which is orientated towards exportation.

If we are successful, we will share it with those who support us. If we fail, we will regard the failure as our own. This government is bound to succeed.

Amel also had the following to say on the subject of cooperation:

"There is no room for underestimating or neglecting Turkey's problems. They have become serious. The problem is the sustenance of the Turkish state, the preservation of its unity and the prevention of bloodshed. These problems are the problems of the state. We are face to face with the obligation to confer. I am calling on the honorable members to consider Turkey's problem jointly. No one can find an excuse for bloodshed in Turkey. At present, Turkey is not in a position where it will even think about tomorrow. As of today it is necessary to do something. We must establish a consensus in order to prevent bloodshed. A government is sought. You cannot allow the government vacuum to continue for long. The Assembly must lay claim to this problem. How will we deter anarchy? The first step, is to rise up determinedly in opposition to it by considering it important, to come up with some exceptionally serious measures. Fellow citizens are saying, "Stop this. For the grace of God get us out of this." The government will find the remedy. By what means will we stop it? It's necessary to turn to new remedies. We must reconsider those so-called remedies we have found. You will secure democratic authority for the government, you will make the government work. You will strengthen the security forces. You will sever the artery of weapon smuggling. Those who have a job to do will roll up their sleeves and get down to work. Who performs these tasks in Turkey? The government is obligated to know this. If it [the government] doesn't know that, it's a disgrace. The government will pursue this task. It will initiate a merciless battle against those who disrupt Turkey. The last government started out hoping it would find

a remedy for this matter by implementing the existing laws. In September 1978 it wanted support for new laws. We gave it an endorsed blank check. It was brought forth, we stood behind it. The minister of internal affairs of that period thanked the chairman of the JP committee. And afterwards that government did not follow up on these [laws]. Let's pass these laws. If there are matters to be included, let's include them.

I am searching for the way for us to achieve unity. The government should act like a government. We are not advocates of oppression. On the other hand, there is no greater crime than patting criminals on the back. So let's do whatever is necessary. Other than this I'm not asking you for further political cooperation. While this problem continues to receive political protection, the milieu becomes lax, which may necessitate greater measures in the future.

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ERBAKAN'S VIEWS ON GOVERNMENT PROGRAM

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 23 Nov 79 p 8

[Text] MSP Chairman Erbakan summed up his views on the government program like this:

Through this government the JP will be able to do as it pleases, but mainly it will be sitting for an examination in the presence of the nation.

To support this government is to take on a responsibility. But this support is in the keeping with the national will. We proposed the condition of not upsetting the cart so that the nation wouldn't say, "We told you to be supportive but didn't we say, 'Don't overlook the things that are happening.'"

IMF, EEC.... These are bonds to western thinking. Now a new period is beginning. As this new period begins the global situation is changing. That is why it is necessary to pay attention to these bonds.

The same matters which are seen in the program of the government currently being formed were also found in the program of the Ecevit government formed 2 years ago. In that case, governments must put a halt to exchanging the minutes of meeting, take the remedies for the problems and jointly diagnose and cure the illness.

In the program it is stated, "We will switch to a Value Added Tax. This is not a remedy. It would cause the suffering of the poor to increase.

On the subject of religious freedom there are missing sentences. Will you give foreign currency to pilgrims going to Mecca? Will girls with head coverings go to the schools? Will you slip by this by saying a statute already exists? Will Islamic institutes become academies? Will a theological sciences university be established?

We are for and we support all of the legal measures. It is enough that human rights be respected and opportunity not be given for their abuse.

We see no indication in the program that it is concerned with the realization of the moral progress needed to prevent a milieu for anarchistic incidents. This is distressing.

This program is a long way from real, serious solutions. It is a list of promises. A multitude of excessive promises have been made. It contains no fixed solutions for the basic problems.

This program has a liberal, capitalistic line of thought.

Not a word is mentioned in this program about [IYAK] the Workers Mutual Aid Organization and [MEYAK] the Government Employees Mutual Aid Society. We can't find where the workers and officials are squeezed into the program.

We are not against color TV. But let's establish the industry here. Otherwise, 150 million liras will leave the country. Let's have this completely settled in advance.

We want the program of the second [MC] National Front Government to be put into effect, too. The majority of the points that were in that program are not written in here.

We want the matter of NATO and the Common Market cleared up.

What will you do about Israel? Will you continue to recognize her in order to cause suffering to this country? We want open discussion on this.

In the program there is the expression, "the great nations." I absolve the parliament and the nation of this. What is the meaning of "great nations"? We are the greatest nation. For a thousand years we have been the great nation.

As long as this government does not cross over the red line, the entire Assembly will assist it.

We will support the undertakings of the JP government. We give it our vote of confidence. But if it has any defect or fault, the defect is not ours, it belongs to a portion of the electorate.

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